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I. INTRODUCTION
Moe Promisee has a right under a contract to receive monetary
payments from Mae Promisor. Moe assigns his right first to Faye and
then -to Clay. Whom must Mae pay, Faye or Clay?
For more than a century, judges have struggled with successive as-
signments to different persons of the same contract right.' These cases,
which typically involve rights to monetary payments called "accounts,"
have generated subtleties of doctrine and disagreements among courts.
Today, as a general rule, the Uniform Commercial Code controls these
cases.' Ambiguities, however, lurk in the Code.4 Cryptic common-law
doctrines also continue to govern many successive-assignment
problems.5 As a result, the law of successive-assignment priorities re-
mains fraught with complexity and confusion.
Against this backdrop it is surprising that no comprehensive treat-
ment of this subject exists in the modern legal literature. Professor
Corbin devoted a section of his treatise to disputes among competing
assignees.6 His treatment is outdated, however, because it was pub-
1. See, for example, Elliot Axelrod, Successive Assignments-Conflicting Priorities, 14 U.
Dayton L. Rev. 295, 295 (1989).
2. See, for example, Grant Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 25.6 at 670-71
(Little, Brown, 1965); David Coleman, Note, Priority of Successive Assignments in Illinois, 1963
U. Ill. L. Forum 261, 261 (stating that "a great diversity of law has developed in American jurisdic-
tions with regard to the test for priority").
3. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 342 cmt. c (1979) (stating that "[t]he subject is
now largely governed by the Uniform Commercial Code").
4. See, for example, notes 118-327 and accompanying text.
5. See notes 36-47, 334-49 and accompanying text.
6. Arthur L. Corbin, 4 Corbin on Contracts § 902 at 614-20 (West, 1951).
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lished prior to the promulgation of the U.C.C.7 Professor Farnsworth
and other contemporary treatise writers also have touched on this sub-
ject, but their analyses lack depth.' The contemporary law review liter-
ature helps even less: it contains nothing approaching a focused and
comprehensive treatment of the priority problems arising from multiple
assignments.'
This Article intends to fill this gap in the legal literature. It ex-
plores in detail the modern law governing successive account transfers.
It then considers broader jurisprudential and economic issues raised by
these cases and proposes a new framework for assessing successive-as-
signment problems.
Part II sketches the commercial realities of account transfers. Part
III outlines the evolution of the legal principles that govern priorities in
7. The Supplement to the Corbin treatise itself recognizes, and indeed emphasizes, this fact:
Since this chapter was written the use of assignments of contract rights as security for
financing a wide variety of commercial activities has greatly expanded. A concomitant
proliferation of special rules regarding creation and perfection of the security interest and
priority between competing security interests has made this branch of the law a subject in its
own right, beyond the scope of this treatise. The reader is referred to the literature on secured
commercial transactions with particular reference to Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial
Code.
Id. § 876 at 244 n.30 (West, Supp. 1992).
8. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 11.9 at 118-25 (Little, Brown, 1990);
John D. Calamari and Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 18-21 at 751-53 (West, 3d ed.
1987); John E. Murray, Jr., Murray on Contracts § 142 at 829-32 (Michie, 3d ed. 1990). Leading
commentators on the U.C.C. have discussed important facets of the problem, but have not pro-
vided a comprehensive analysis. See, for example, Ronald A. Anderson, 8 Anderson on the Uni-
form Commercial Code §§ 9-106:5 to 9-106:13 at 565-70 (Lawyer's Codperative, 3d ed. 1985 &
Supp. 1991) (addressing definitions of accounts and contracts rights, but not specifically address-
ing the special priority problems caused by multiple transfers of a single account); Barkley Clark,
The Law of Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code 1.08[6] at 1-94 to 1-98,
T 2.07[6] at 2-58 to 2-61, 3.03[4] at 3-28 to 3-29 (Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 2d ed. 1988) (dis-
cussing transactions involving accounts that are not subject to Article Nine pursuant to Section 9-
104(f) and problems raised by Sections 9-301(1)(d) and 9-302(1)(e)); Peter F. Coogan, et al., Se-
cured Transactions under the Uniform Commercial Code § 3.08 at 3-45 to 3-68 (Matthew Bender,
1992) (in Bender's Uniform Commercial Code Service, Vols. 1-1D) (discussing U.C.C. Sections 9-
104(f) and 9-302(1)(e)); William B. Davenport and Daniel R. Murray, Secured Transactions §§
7.02(b), (c), (e)(2), (e)(3) at 308-11, 313-16 (ALI-ABA, 1978) (setting forth an example of compet-
ing security interests in the same account and addressing proceeds priority problem under the
1962 and 1972 versions of the U.C.C.); William D. Hawkland, Richard A. Lord, and Charles C.
Lewis, 9 Uniform Commercial Code Series § 9-312:06 at 253-65 (Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1991)
(addressing priority among conflicting security interests generally, but not in the specific context
of accounts); Ray D. Henson, Handbook on Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code §§ 5-6, 5-7 at 146-55 (West, 2d ed. 1979) (discussing some priority problems arising from
the assignment of accounts and contract rights); James J. White and Robert S. Summers, Uniform
Commercial Code § 22-10 at 1000-03 (West, 3d ed. 1988) (Student Edition) (discussing impact of
Section 9-302(1)(e) on filing requirements as to accounts).
9. The only recent treatment dwells on the common-law rules, notwithstanding the U.C.C.'s
dramatic statutory reordering of this field of law. See generally Axelrod, 14 U. Dayton L. Rev. 295
(cited in note 1).
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successively-assigned contract rights. Part IV then lays out the present-
day law of successive-account assignments. In particular, Part IV seeks
to impose a structure on this disjointed body of doctrine by describing
it in terms of a general rule subject to exceptions. The general rule is
that the first assignee to file a U.C.C. financing statement takes prior-
ity. The exceptions to this rule, as we shall see, are numerous and
complex.
In examining these exceptions, Part IV explores important inter-
pretive issues under U.C.C. Sections 9-104, 9-301(1)(d), 9-302(1)(e), and
9-312, as well as the proper framing of non-Code law in the many cases
to which it continues to apply. Part V steps away from these discrete
issues and looks at account priorities with a broader focus. It posits that
a unifying theme in this field is judicial protection of the "nonprofes-
sional" assignee at the expense of banks and other "professional"
financers. Part V defends this orientation as consistent with efficiency
and fairness, but also criticizes courts for often pursuing these values in
the teeth of clear statutory text.
Responding to difficulties highlighted in earlier sections of the Arti-
cle-as well as the U.C.C. Permanent Editorial Board's recent initiation
of a major reevaluation of Article Nine-Part VI offers a program for
reform. That program would amend Article Nine to cover all assign-
ments of contractual rights to any form of monetary payment. In addi-
tion, it recommends simplifying and clarifying those Code provisions
that govern account assignments. Finally, the program proposed here
calls for rewriting the Code's perfection and priority rules to legitimize
judicial efforts to protect nonprofessional recipients of limited account
assignments. Part VI suggests that adopting these reforms would pro-
duce a sound, intelligible, and genuinely uniform body of law to cover
the problems created by successive assignments.
II. TRANSACTIONS IN ACCOUNTS
A. Defining the Term "Account"
Assignable rights take many forms. The holder of a contract to buy
Sunnybrook Farms has a right that may be transferred to others. 10 The
promisee who has contracted to have a pyramid constructed or an oil
well drilled has a transferrable right as well." The most marketable
form of contract right, however, is the right to receive a payment of
10. See Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 864 at 430 (cited in note 6) (noting that the right of a
purchasing party is assignable).
11. See id. § 864 at 429.
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money.2  Such a right typically is referred to as an "account,' 3 unless
embodied in a promissory note or similar writing, 4 or in so-called
"chattel paper."' 5 The U.C.C. defines an "account" as "any right to
payment for goods sold or leased or for services rendered, which is not
evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper, whether or not it has been
earned by performance."'"6 As we shall see, this legal definition of the
term "account" is not coextensive with the businessperson's defini-
tion.'7 It identifies well enough for now, however, the basic type of con-
tractual right that this Article concerns.
B. Account Transactions
Rights to future payments have present value. As a result, holders
of accounts long have sold these rights for cash or assigned them as
security for credit. The earliest transfers of accounts were small, indi-
vidualized transactions. By the twentieth century, however, dealing in
accounts had become big business.' 8
The first form of systematic trading in accounts, often called "fac-
toring," involved purchasing a business's receivables outright. 9 The
12. A business's receivables are an attractive form of collateral for loans because realizing
their value does not require repossession and resale; rather, the secured lender can collect the
account proceeds directly from the account debtor under U.C.C. Section 9-502(1). See, for exam-
ple, Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 4B.10 at 4B-51 (cited in note 8); Special Project, The
Priority Rules of Article Nine, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 834, 880 n.203 (1977).
13. See U.C.C. § 9-106.
14. The U.C.C. refers to such documents as "instruments." Section 9-105(1)(i) defines an
"instrument" as "a negotiable instrument . ., or a certificated security .. or any other writing
which evidences a right to the payment of money and is not itself a security agreement or lease
and is of a type which is in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery with any necessary
indorsement or assignment." U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(i) (1990) (cross references omitted).
15. U.C.C. Section 9-105(1)(b) defines "chattel paper" as "a writing or writings which evi-
dence both a monetary obligation and a security interest in or a lease of specific goods." It goes on
to provide that "[w]hen a transaction is evidenced both by such a security agreement or a lease
and by an instrument or a series of instruments, the group of writings taken together constitutes
chattel paper."
Distinctive priority rules exist for instruments and chattel paper. See, for example, id. § 9-308.
Thus, the treatment of priorities for those specialized forms of contracts rights is beyond the scope
of this Article.
16. Id. § 9-106.
17. See notes 506-17 and accompanying text.
18. See generally Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 8.1 at 250-53 (cited in
note 2) (detailing the development of accounts receivable financing).
19. According to one commentator:
Factoring, which traces its history to the growth of the woolen industry in England beginning
in the late 14th century, involved the outright purchase of accounts receivable at a discount
by a factor without recourse to the assignor for inability of the account debtor to pay. In most
instances, the factor notified the account debtor of the assignment by an appropriate legend
on the original invoice and collected the account in its own name.
Morton M. Scult, Accounts Receivable Financing: Operational Patterns Under the Uniform Corn-
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emergence of factoring as a form of commercial activity illustrates the
recognition of a new variety of value-maximizing exchange." The ac-
count-purchasing factor made money on the spread between the face
value of the receivable and the discounted cash price the factor paid for
it.21 In turn, the cash paid for the account provided the account seller
with capital needed to fund current business operations. 22 As the fac-
toring industry matured, more specialized forms of factoring arrange-
ments emerged. For example, a factor buys "without recourse" when it
is required to absorb losses that arise from unpaid accounts.2 A factor
buys "with recourse" when the assignor must buy back an account if
the account debtor defaults.24 Under a "notification" arrangement, the
account debtor is told of the account transfer and remits payment di-
rectly to the factor-assignee.2 5 Under a "non-notification" arrangement,
the account debtor continues to pay the assignor, who passes along any
payments received to the factory.2  All these forms of factoring, as well
mercial Code, 11 Ariz. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1969) (footnotes omitted). The term "factoring" today is used
in a number of different ways. See, for example,, R.E. O'Leary, Accounts Receivable as Security,
29 Mo. L. Rev. 486, 487-88 (1964). In this article the term is used to describe the outright purchas-
ing of accounts. The term "discounting" also is sometimes used for this purpose. Id. at 487.
20. See generally Anthony T. Kronman and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Contract
Law at 1-2 (Little, Brown, 1979).
21. See Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions 1.04 at 1-24 (cited in note 8) (noting
payment risk and payment delay as two factors determining discount price at which factor
purchases accounts).
22. See Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 15.01 at 15-3 (cited in note 8) (noting that
businesses "will often turn to a professional financer to convert receivables into cash for current
needs"); Daly v. Shrimplin, 610 P.2d 397, 398 (Wyo. 1980) (stating that business that supplied
water to drilling sites "sold accounts receivable at a discount to secure operating cash"). Notably,
the development of factoring also created efficiencies by facilitating the specialization of labor. See
Scult, 11 Ariz. L. Rev. at 2 (cited in note 19) (noting that factoring permits the assignor "to dis-
pense with credit and accounts receivable departments"). See generally Comment, Multistate Ac-
counts Receivable Financing: Conflicts in Context, 67 Yale L. J. 402, 402-03 (1958) (discussing
advantages of factoring).
23. See, for example, Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions 10.04(2) at 10-43 (cited in
note 8).
24. See, for example, Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 5.2 at 132 (cited in
note 2). See also U.C.C. § 9-502 cmt. 4 (stating that "there may be a true sale of accounts...
although recourse exists").
25. See, for example, Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions 1.04 at 1-24 (describing
notification-based factoring).
26. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 25.6 at 671 (noting, among other
things, that "non-notification accounts receivable financing. . ., during the first half of this cen-
tury, came to rival notification financing in volume and importance"). The drafters of the U.C.C.
noted the distinction between notification and non-notification factoring in the Official Comments:
"Under the non-notification system of accounts financing, the seller-assignor, despite the assign.
ment, bills and collects from the account debtor; under notification financing the account debtor
makes payment to the assignee, but the bills may be prepared and sent out by either assignor or
assignee." U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 5(a). See also id. § 9-502 cmts. 1 & 2 (describing various forms of
account assignments).
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as others, remain in place today."
Account assignments result not only from factoring, but also from
another common commercial practice known as "accounts receivable fi-
nancing."2 s Unlike the factor, the accounts receivable financer does not
purchase the assignor's accounts outright; rather, the financer takes a
collateral assignment of those accounts and then lends money against
them.29 Many secured transactions arise in this way. A local bank, for
example, may agree to lend funds to a general contractor secured by its
right under a construction contract to as-yet unearned progress pay-
ments.30 A financial institution may provide funds to a sales firm or
manufacturer, taking as security a floating lien on the borrower's ever-
shifting corpus of accounts." Or a lender may provide its customer with
a line of credit against which the customer may borrow so long as its
assigned account pool remains at a stipulated level.3 2 The common ele-
ment of these and like transactions is that an institutional financer
lends money against accounts, rather than buying those accounts
directly.33
27. For an illustration of a specialized form of notification-and-recourse-based factoring, see
In re Amco Products, Inc., 17 Bankr. 758 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982), rev'd, 50 Bankr. 723 (W.D. Mo.
1983). The bank, acting as factor, required a reserve account to be kept by the customer from
which the bank could directly collect otherwise uncollectible portions of any assigned rights to
payment; the customer had to maintain the account at no less than five percent of the balance of
outstanding amounts due. Id. at 759. For another illustrative account transfer arrangement, see
Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538, 540 (3d Cir. 1979) (describing
recourse arrangement under which factor paid assignor face amount of each account less 15% "dis-
count" and less another 10% to produce a reserve fund for chargeback of bad accounts).
28. See, for example, Scult, 11 Ariz. L. Rev. at 1-2 (cited in note 19).
29. Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 15.01 at 15-6 (cited in note 8); Clark, The Law of
Secured Transactions 10.04[2] at 10-42 to 10-43 (cited in note 8).
30. See E. George Rudolph, Financing on Construction Contracts Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 5 B.C. Indust. & Comm. L. Rev. 245, 245 (1963) (stating that "[b]uilding contractors
commonly assign future payments under their contracts as security for working capital loans").
Numerous cases involving this form of financing are discussed in notes 420-46 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the specialized federal-law problems presented by assignments of rights to
payment for work on federal government projects, see Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions
11.06 at 11-31 to 11-36 (cited in note 8).
31. See Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 15.01 at 15-6 (cited in note 8); Rudolph, 5
B.C. Indust. & Comm. L. Rev. at 254-55 (noting existence of floating liens covering all of building
contractor's accounts generated during specified period); Peter F. Coogan and Nahum L. Gordon,
The Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code Upon Receivables Financing-Some Answers and
Some Unresolved Problems, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1529, 1546-47 (1963) (noting that "[a] security agree-
ment may cover receivables to arise in the future," and providing an example of the operation of
such a continuing security interest).
32. See, for example, Lehigh Press, Inc. v. National Bank of Ga., 389 S.E.2d 376, 377 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1989) (describing line of credit agreement under which assignor "could borrow ...an
amount equal to 80 percent of [its] eligible receivables up to $250,000").
33. On the values and attractiveness of accounts receivable financing, see O'Leary, 29 Mo. L.
Rev. at 489 (cited in note 19). For another good discussion of factoring and accounts receivable
financing, see Scult, 11 Ariz. L. Rev. at 1-4 (cited in note 19).
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Account transfers also occur outside the contexts of commercial
factoring and institutional accounts receivable financing. A borrower
may pay off a debt owed a family member by transferring some right to
future payment to that person. 4 A small merchant may sell a single
receivable to raise quick cash for business operations. 5 A corporation
may assign accounts as part of a sale of assets or upon its liquidation. 6
Given this array of transactions in accounts, it is not surprising that
claims by more than one assignee to the same account often arise. The
law has responded to resulting priority problems in three distinct
stages: (1) the development of common-law rules; (2) the ensuing enact-
ment of accounts receivable statutes, beginning in the 1940s; and (3)
the later promulgation of the U.C.C. with its extensive, but incomplete,
treatment of account assignments.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF SUCCESSIVE ACCOUNT-HOLDER
PRIORITIES
A. The Common-Law Response
As with other contract law problems, issues of account-assignee pri-
ority were initially the business of the common-law courts. The courts
in this country dealt with these conflicts by spinning out no fewer than
three different rules. The "New York Rule" insisted that "[fjirst in
time is first in right. ' 37 Under this rule, priority went to the first as-
signee, even if that meant the second assignee had to disgorge payments
already received.38 The "English Rule," adopted in states such as Cali-
fornia and Pennsylvania, gave priority to the first value-giving assignee
to notify the account debtor of the assignment.3 9 Under this rule, "sec-
ond in time" meant "first in right" so long as the second assignee pro-
vided the initial notification without knowledge or reason to know of an
earlier transfer.40 Finally, the authors of the Restatement of Contracts,
34. See Lyon v. Ty-Wood Corp., 239 A.2d 819, 820 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1968) (involving assign-
ment by the president of corporation to his relatives for funds advanced by them to the
corporation).
35. See Abramson v. Printer's Bindery, Inc., 440 S.W.2d 326, 327 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969)
(describing one-shot sale of accounts by one small business to another to generate needed cash for
seller and possibly large return for buyer).
36. See Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions 3.09[2][b] at 3-97 (cited in note 8) (recog-
nizing that "intangibles such as account receivables" may be transferred as part of the "assets of
the target company" pursuant to a "leveraged buyout"). See generally U.C.C. § 9-104(f).
37. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 25.6 at 670 (cited in note 2).
38. Id. See, for example, Superior Brassiere Co. v. Zimetbaum, 212 N.Y.S. 473, 475 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1925).
39. See, for example, Axelrod, 14 U. Dayton L. Rev. at 295-300 (cited in note 1).
40. See id. at 295.
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tracking the law of Massachusetts,41 adopted the delightfully denomi-
nated "four horsemen rule."42 That rule gave priority to the first as-
signee except when the second assignee, without knowledge or notice of
the first assignment, (1) received payment, (2) obtained a judgment
against the account debtor, (3) made a novation with the account
debtor, or (4) received a writing customarily accepted as a symbol of
the assigned right.43
This three-way traffic in American law was not, it turned out, com-
plex enough for American courts. Some courts generated "completely
confusing decisions. ' 44 Others shifted positions.45 Still others adopted
rules that differed from any of the three main approaches.46 In all juris-
dictions, complicating principles of equity overlaid the applicable com-
mon-law rule.47 So stood the law in 1943, when the Supreme Court
41. See, for example, Rabinowitz v. People's Nat'l Bank, 126 N.E. 289, 290 (Mass. 1920).
42. Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 11.9 at 121-22 (cited in note 8).
43. Restatement (First) of Contracts § 173 (1932); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 342
(1979). For general discussions of the various common-law approaches, see Calamari and Perillo,
The Law of Contracts § 18-21 at 751-52 (cited in note 8); Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions
11.06[2][b]) at 11-35 to 11-36 (cited in note 8); Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 902 at 614-20
(cited in note 6); Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 11.9 at 120-22; Gilmore, Security Inter-
ests in Personal Property § 25.6 at 670-71 (cited in note 2); Murray, Murray on Contracts § 142 at
829-83 (cited in note 8).
For a useful state-by-state collection of the common-law authorities, see Annotation, Priority
as Between Different Assignees of Same Chose in Action as Affected by Notice to Debtor, 110
A.L.R. 774 (1937), updating 31 A.L.R. 876 (1924) [hereinafter "Annotation"], particularly the fur-
ther updating material collected in the A.L.R. Bluebook of Supplementary Decisions. See also
Milton P. Kupfer and Irvin I. Livingston, Corn Exchange National Bank & Trust Company v.
Klauder Revisited: The Aftermath of Its Implications, 32 Va. L. Rev. 910, 914-15 nn.15, 18 & 21
(1946).
44. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 25.7 at 672 n.3. See also Kupfer and
Livingston, 32 Va. L. Rev. at 915 & n.20 (cited in note 43) (stating that in some jurisdictions,
including New Jersey, "the decisions were . . . in confusion").
45. See Coleman, 1963 U. Ill. L. Forum at 262 (cited in note 2) (explaining the shift in Illi-
nois law from the English rule to either the New York or four-horsemen rule).
46. See Annotation, 31 A.L.R. at 882 (cited in note 43) (suggesting that Indiana-as well as
Saskatchewan-adopted distinctive rule favoring second assignee/first notifier only if first as-
signee/second notifier failed to give notice before assignor made payment).
47. See, for example, Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Finance Co., 264 U.S. 182, 198
(1924) (noting, in applying first-in-time rule, that second assignee could "shift his loss to the first
assignee" if "some act or omission of the latter was proximate to the deception"); Boulevard Nat'l
Bank v. Air Metal Indus., 176 So. 2d 94, 96 (Fla. 1965) (stating that both the English and Ameri-
can "rules presuppose the absence of any estoppel or other special equities"). See also American
East India Corp. v. Ideal Shoe Co., 400 F. Supp. 141, 163 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (noting that New York
case law supported giving priority to assignee of existing contract right over prior assignee of as-
signor's future contract rights, regardless of notice of prior assignment, on theory that second as-
signee received a legal interest while first assignee received only an equitable interest that did not
become a legal interest absent further action after contract right in fact came into existence), aff'd
without opinion, 568 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1978).
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handed down its decision in Corn Exchange National Bank & Trust
Co. v. Klauder.4 s
B. The Accounts Receivable Statutes
In Klauder, the Court held that an account assignment unaccom-
panied by notice to the account debtor was a preference voidable by the
bankruptcy trustee in states that followed the English rule.49 The
Court's reasoning in the case was hardly exotic, for it simply put the
bankruptcy trustee-as required by then-existing bankruptcy law-in
the shoes of a diligent good faith purchaser of the account.50 For two
practical reasons, however, the decision sent shock waves through the
commercial finance industry.5 1 First, the taking of account assignments
on a non-notification basis became entirely unworkable in all English
rule states.52 Second, factors and lenders feared that, even in non-Eng-
lish rule states, courts would read Klauder broadly to favor the bank-
ruptcy trustee over assignees who in good faith had given fair value for
their interests in the debtor's accounts. 3 This concern, as it turned out,
proved well-founded.
54
In response to resulting cries of alarm, legislatures in most states
48. 318 U.S. 434 (1943).
49. For a detailed discussion of Klauder, see Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Prop-
erty § 25.7 at 672-74 (cited in note 2).
50. The Court analogized the rights of a trustee in bankruptcy to those of a subsequent good
faith assignee under the English rule:
IThe Bankruptcy Code's] command is to test the effectiveness of a transfer, as against the
trustee, by the standards which applicable state law would enforce against a good-faith pur-
chaser. Only when such a purchaser is precluded from obtaining superior rights is the trustee
so precluded. . . .In this case the transfers, good between the parties, had never been per-
fected as against good-faith purchasers by notice to the debtors as the law required, and so
the conclusion follows . . . that the petitioners lose their security .
Klauder, 318 U.S. at 436-37 (footnote omitted).
51. See Kupfer and Livingston, 32 Va. L. Rev. at 910 (cited in note 43) (stating that Klauder
"burst upon a startled profession").
52. This development had a significant practical effect because many financers previously
had seen fit to finance on a non-notification basis in English-rule states despite the risk that a
later, first-notifying assignee might step forward and claim priority. This risk was acceptable to
financers because it was limited and was largely controllable through monitoring of the debtor.
The risk of displacement by the trustee in bankruptcy, however, was of a fundamentally higher
order of magnitude. In addition, the situation created by Klauder was problematic for financers
because "it was far from clear how many English-rule states there were: authorities were ambigu-
ous in some states and lacking in others." Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 25.7
at 672.
53. "Klauder threw no clear light on the question whether its doctrine applied only to Eng-
lish-rule states or whether it might extend to Massachusetts, Restatement or four-horsemen states
as well." Id.
54. Courts adopted and applied the reasoning and rule of Klauder in states that endorsed
the four-horsemen rule. See, for example, In re Rosen, 157 F.2d 997, 998 (1946); In re Vardaman
Shoe Co., 52 F. Supp. 562, 563 (E.D. Mo. 1943) (setting aside assignment so as to favor the trustee
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enacted "accounts receivable statutes." 55 The purpose of these statutes
was to provide an airtight mechanism by which the factor or accounts
receivable financer could lock in a position superior to the ever-lurking
bankruptcy trustee."6 How did the assignee achieve this perfected sta-
tus? Some states enacted validation statutes, by which perfection oc-
curred automatically; in other words, the legislature simply codified the
New York first-in-time rule." In other states, the legislature put in
place a public recordation system and granted perfection and priority
to the first assignee to file a notice of its interest. 58 At least one state
adopted a bookmarking statute, under which the assignee clinched pri-
ority by physically noting its interest on the assignor's account ledg-
ers." By 1952, more than forty states had enacted some form of
accounts receivable statute.6 0 However, the ensuing enactment of Arti-
because it was still possible for a bona fide purchaser to have gained priority by, for example,
collecting the debt).
55. See Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 8.6 at 272 (stating that Klauder
"move[d] the state legislatures into action with unprecedented speed"); In re Panama Airways,
Inc., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 424, 429 (S.D. Fla. 1967) (quoting Gilmore, Security Inter-
ests in Personal Property § 8.6). Congress later amended the Bankruptcy Act to overturn the
result of Klauder. Even so, the accounts receivable statutes stayed on the books. See, for example,
O'Leary, 29 Mo. L. Rev. at 488-89 (cited in note 19).
56. See Panama Airways, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 429 (finding that the accounts receivable
statute was "intended to cover and protect the widely prevalent commercial practice of non-notifi-
cation financing through assignment of accounts receivable, which had been previously threatened
by attack in the bankruptcy courts under [Klauder]"); Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal
Property § 8.7 at 278-79 (stating that purpose of statutes was to supply an "indefeasible status"
and "impregnable position" to assignee). See also Coleman, 1963 U. Ill L. Forum at 268 (cited in
note 2) (stating that accounts receivable statute passed so that "assignee would be secure against
conflicting interests").
57. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 8.7 at 274. The Illinois experience is
illustrative:
In 1943 the Illinois legislature responded [to Klauder] by passage of the accounts receivable
statute, thereby defining when and how accounts receivable could be perfected so that an
assignee would be secure against conflicting interests in accounts assigned to him. Known as a
validation statute, it adopted the rule that notification was unnecessary in the field of ac-
counts receivable financing, and declared that a written assignment of an account receivable
would be valid as against all creditors and subsequent assignees "at the time such assignment
was or is made."
Coleman, 1963 U. Ill L. Forum at 268 (footnotes omitted).
58. See Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 8.7 at 275.
59. U.C.C. § 9-302 cmt. 5 (indicating that one state-North Dakota-had enacted a book.
marking statute). See also Kupfer and Livingston, 32 Va. L. Rev. at 933 & n.60 (cited in note 43)
(indicating that Georgia and Pennsylvania, at least initially, passed bookmarking statutes).
60. U.C.C. § 9-302 cmt. 5. See also Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 8.7 at
275 n.5 (asserting: "By 1958 there were 15 validation statutes and 23 filing statutes. One state
(North Dakota) had a 'bookmarking' statute ... ") (citing Comment, 67 Yale L. J. at 410 nn.32,
33 (cited in note 22)); Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 11.9 at 122-23 n.20 (cited in note 8).
For a valuable collection and discussion of the various account receivable statutes (particularly the
many variations among such statutes), see Comment, 67 Yale L. J. at 410-17 (cited in note 22).
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cle Nine in every state displaced these many and varied pieces of
legislation. 1
C. The U.C.C.'s Treatment of Accounts
Article Nine of the U.C.C. was a project of monumental propor-
tions compared to the accounts receivable statutes. The drafters of Ar-
ticle Nine sought to integrate the treatment of all security transfers of
personal property, including goods, fixtures, quasi-intangible property
like notes and documents of title, and all forms of intangible property,
including accounts.2 In keeping with this aim, Article Nine recognized
a single, unitary form of collateral transfer known as the "security in-
terest." 3 The Code then established a comprehensive set of rules gov-
erning these security interests. Those rules specify how to create, 4
perfect,6 5 and enforce66 a security interest, as well as how to determine
priorities among competing claimants of property subject to a security
interest.17 As a rule, the creation (or, to use the Code's terminology,
"attachment")" of a security interest requires the debtor to execute a
"security agreement" describing the transferred property.6 9 In general,
the Code requires an additional step-usually public filing of a financ-
ing statement-to perfect the security interest.70 In conformance with
the purpose of Article Nine, these rules apply only, as a general matter,
to transactions in which property is taken as collateral for a debt.7 1
The Code's drafters, however, decided that the account should oc-
cupy a place of distinction in Article Nine.72 In particular, they ex-
61. See U.C.C. § 9-102(1); Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 8.6 at 271
(noting that accounts receivable statutes have been repealed with enactment of the Code).
62. See U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. (introductory paragraph).
63. U.C.C. § 1-201(37). See Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 2.01 at 2-5 to 2-6 (cited in
note 8) (stating that "Article 9 substituted the generic security interest" for a multiplicity of pre-
Code security devices).
64. See U.C.C. §§ 9-203, 9-204.
65. See id. §§ 9-302 to 9-306, 9-401 to 9-408.
66. See id §§ 9-501 to 9-507.
67. See id. §§ 9-201, 9-301, 9-307 to 9-315.
68. Id. § 9-203.
69. See id. § 9-203(1)(a).
70. See id. §§ 9-401, 9-402. See generally Coogan and Gordon, 76 Harv. L. Rev. at 1541, 1544
(cited in note 31) (stating that perfection in the "bankruptcy sense" means that "the parties have
taken all necessary steps to protect against attack by a subsequent lien creditor," and thus, under
federal bankruptcy law, the bankruptcy trustee).
71. See U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a).
72. The Code's drafters also put chattel paper in a place of distinction in Article Nine and, in
many ways, treated accounts and chattel paper in similar fashion. See, for example, id. (regarding
treatment of absolute transfers of accounts and chattel paper as security interests). In many re-
spects, however, the Code distinguishes between accounts and chattel paper. See, for example, id. §
9-305 (regarding possessory perfection). See generally id. § 9-102 cmt. 5 (itemizing U.C.C. provi-
sions dealing specifically with both accounts and chattel paper). For this reason, this Article con-
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tended Article Nine's rules of attachment, perfection, and priorities not
only to collateral transfers, but also to outright sales of accounts. 73 The
drafters took this step for a number of reasons. First, they saw the dis-
tinction between account sales and account security transfers as murky
in many cases.74 Second, the Code's drafters recognized that unrecorded
sales of the wholly intangible interest in accounts, no less than collat-
eral transfers of such property, would generate "the type of secret inter-
est which the law abhors. '75 Third, the Code's treatment of accounts
tracked the accounts receivable statutes, which generally did not distin-
guish between account sales and security transfers.76
cerns itself solely with accounts.
73. Id. § 9-102(1)(b). See, for example, In re Cripps, 31 Bankr. 541, 543 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1983) (collecting case-law authority on application of U.C.C. to outright account sales); Coogan and
Gordon, 76 Harv. L. Rev. at 1541 (cited in note 31) (stating that "as a practical matter, all buyers
of accounts. . . are secured parties, even though the transaction is not one ordinarily thought of as
a secured transaction"). To accomplish this result, the Code drafters defined the term "security
interest" to include (in addition to collateral transfers of all other forms of personal property)
"any interest of a buyer of accounts," U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (emphasis added), and stated in Section
9-102(1)(b) that Article Nine applied to "any sale of accounts."
74. U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 2. See, for example, Valley Bank of Nev. v. City of Henderson, 528
F. Supp. 907, 911 (D. Nev. 1981) (noting the difficulty of determining whether an assignment is
meant as a security interest or an outright purchase); K.A.O.P. Co. v. Midway Nat'l Bank, 372
N.W.2d 774, 777 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that "Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
applies to both security interests in accounts and to outright sales of accounts because of the
difficulty in distinguishing between a security transfer and a sale"); Coogan, et al., Secured Trans-
actions § 3.08[l][al at 3-45 (cited in note 8).
The difficulty of drawing this distinction derives in large measure from the existence of hybrid
factoring arrangements, under which the factor has a significant, but not total, right of recourse
against the assignor upon default by the account debtor. Professor Gilmore deemed even the out-
right-purchasing nonrecourse factor a "financier, a 'banker,' a lender of money against security"
because it "is a supplier of working capital, not a joint venturer in a business enterprise." Gilmore,
Security Interests in Personal Property § 5.1 at 128-29 n.3 (cited in note 2). For similar views, see
Bramble Transp., Inc. v. Sam Senter Sales, Inc., 294 A.2d 97, 101 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971) (citing
Delaware Study Comment to Section 9-102 as noting that inclusion of outright sales "fully recog-
nizes the commercial practice, frequently followed by manufacturers, merchandisers, and other
businessmen of deriving working capital from such assets in order to finance various phases of
their business"), aft'd, 294 A.2d 104 (Del. 1972); Rudolph, 5 B.C. Indust. & Comm. L. Rev. at 245
n.3 (cited in note 30) (noting that whether an assignment is outright or for security "is only a
technical distinction since either form may be used to finance on future payments"); Karen C.
Jensen, Comment, Assignment of Accounts and Contract Rights-Exploring the Scope of Article
Nine and Applying the 9-302(1)(e) Filing Exemption, 1977 Utah L. Rev. 331, 332-33. See also
Henson, Handbook on Secured Transactions § 5-6 at 146-47 (cited in note 8).
75. Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 3.08[1][a] at 3-45 (cited in note 8). See also Luize
E. Zubrow, Integration of Deposit Account Financing into Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code: A Proposal for Legislative Reform, 68 Minn. L. Rev. 899, 920-21 (1984) (noting that abso-
lute account transfers "create risks of 'secret liens'" and therefore policy reasons support bringing
them "under the article 9 'umbrella' "). See generally E. Turgeon Constr. Co. v. Elhatton Plumb-
ing & Heat. Co., 292 A.2d 230, 233-34 (R.I. 1972) (stating that the "entire thrust of art. 9 is the
protection of the innocent creditors from a secret transfer of substantial intangible assets").
76. See U.C.C. § 9-302 cmt. 5; Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 8.7 at 275
(cited in note 2) (stating that "the statutes were typically very broad: transfers which were sales or
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The framers of Article Nine, however, did not follow accounts re-
ceivable statutes that required filing to perfect each and every account
assignment.77 The drafters concluded that these statutes were tripping
up some account assignees who never would have thought of filing and
did not remotely resemble professional factors and account financers s.7
For this reason, the drafters decided to bestow perfection on some ac-
count assignments regardless of filing79 and to exclude other account
transfers from the Code altogether.80 This decision has complicated
greatly present-day priority rules applicable to successive-account-as-
signment problems. In particular, it has meant that a complex mix of
Code and non-Code law governs these disputes.
IV. PRESENT-DAY PRIORITY RULES
Lawyers and judges who confront account-priority problems must
deal with a welter of complexities: the need to decide whether or not
the priority conflict falls within the Code;"' the nonuniformity, sparse-
ness, and indeterminacy of non-Code law;82 the possible impact of the
Code on the formulation of non-Code rules;8 3 and the presence of
knotty interpretive problems within the Code itself.84 The framework
set forth in this Part of the Article seeks to help courts and lawyers
steer their way through these booby traps. Most basically, it does so by
suggesting that the law of successive-assignment priorities is best un-
derstood in terms of a general rule marked by various exceptions. We
turn first to the general rule.
A. The General Rule: The First to File Wins
The Code defines the term "security interest" to cover not only as-
signments of collateral interests in accounts, but also most outright ac-
count sales.8 5 It follows that U.C.C. Section 9-312, which fixes priorities
among conflicting security interests, governs most priority disputes .be-
tween account assignees.8 6 The general rule of Section 9-312 is set forth
in subsection (5)(a):
outright assignments were included as well as transfers for security"); id. § 10.5 at 308.
77. See Gilmore, Security Transactions in Personal Property § 8.7 at 276.
78. Id.
79. See U.C.C. § 9-302(l)(e), (g).
80. See id. § 9-104(f).
81. See notes 210-327 and accompanying text.
82. See notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
83. See notes 334-49 and accompanying text.
84. See, for example, notes 351-402 and accompanying text.
85. U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
86. See note 2.
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Conflicting security interests rank according to priority in time of filing or perfec-
tion. Priority dates from the time a filing is first made covering the collateral or the
time the security interest is first perfected, whichever is earlier, provided that there
is no period thereafter when there is neither filing nor perfection.
8 7
Section 9-312(5)(a) speaks of both filing and perfection because the
holders of security interests often can perfect their interests in ways
other than filing; in particular, most security interests in goods are per-
fectible by taking possession.8s The Code makes clear, however, that a
secured party may not perfect by way of possession the distinctively
intangible interest in accounts.89 Thus, with only two exceptions that
concern automatic, rather than possessory, perfection,90 security inter-
ests in accounts covered by the Code are perfectible only by filing."
This fact permits translation of Section 9-312(5)(a)'s first-to-perfect-or-
file directive into an even simpler general rule for accounts: Priority
belongs to the first filer.92
Application of this general principle poses no serious problem in
most cases. A complication arises, however, when the first of the two
assignments is an absolute, rather than collateral, transfer. In such a
case the question arises whether the first-to-file principle of Section 9-
87. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a). See Scult, 11 Ariz. L. Rev. at 25 (cited in note 19) (stating that
"[w]here no special rule exists to cover a particular situation, the general rules stated in section 9-
312(5) apply").
88. See U.C.C. § 9-305.
89. See id. §§ 9-302(1), 9-305 cmt. 1; Cripps, 31 Bankr. at 543-44 (quoting White and Sum-
mers, Uniform Commercial Code) (stating that "[e]ven if the creditor collects ledger cards, jour-
nals, computer print-outs, sales slips and any other items believed to represent receivables he will
not by those acts perfect a security interest in accounts"). But see Feldman v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 408 F. Supp. 24, 38 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (suggesting, erroneously, that assignee's possession of
written assignment document perfects that assignee's interest in account); In re Epps, 25 Bankr.
115, 117 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982) (suggesting that possession of contractual right to renewal com-
missions was obtained upon notice to account debtor and account debtor's issuance of written
recognition of assignment).
90. See U.C.C. §§ 9-302(1)(e), (g).
91. Id. § 9-302 cmt. 5; id. § 9-305 cmt. 1 (stating that "security interest in accounts ... may
under this Article be perfected only by filing"). See, for example, Scult, 11 Ariz. L. Rev. at 11
(cited in note 19); Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 25.8 at 674-75 n.2 (cited in
note 2).
92. See, for example, MBank Alamo Nat'l Ass'n v. Raytheon Co., 886 F.2d 1449, 1454 (5th
Cir. 1989) (applying first-to-file rule); In re Padgett, 49 Bankr. 212, 214-15 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
1985); American East India Corp., 400 F. Supp. at 164-65; Daly, 610 P.2d at 401-03; U.C.C. § 9-
312 cmts. 4 & 8, exs. 7 & 8; Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions 11.06[21[b] at 11-34 to 11-
35 (cited in note 8) (discussing In re Altek Systems, Inc., 14 Bankr. 144 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981));
Henson, Handbook on Secured Transactions § 5-6 at 148 (cited in note 8) (stating that "[s]ince
filing is required for perfection of security interests in accounts, where there are conflicting secur-
ity interests in accounts as primary- collateral priority should be resolved in the order of filing");
Coogan and Gordon, 76 Harv. L. Rev. at 1554, 1559 (cited in note 31); Coleman, 1963 U. Ill. L.
Forum at 269 (cited in note 2); Charles C. Craig, Accounts Receivable Financing: Transition from
Variety to Uniform Commercial Code, 42 B.U. L. Rev. 187, 189 (1962).
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312 or the rights-in-the-collateral principle of Section 9-203 controls.
The problem is highlighted by hypothetical Case A:
CASE A. On January 1, Mike Mechanic repairs the car of Obie
Obligor, who has agreed to pay Mike $1000 for his work on April 1.
On February 1, Mike sells without recourse at a substantial discount
all his accounts receivable, including the Obie Obligor account, to
First Assignee Factoring, Inc. On March 1, Second Assignee Bank
lends Mike $50,000 and secures from him a floating lien covering all
accounts, including the account owed by Obie Obligor. The Bank
files its U.C.C. financing statement later that day. First Assignee
Factoring files its financing statement thereafter. When Mike de-
faults, who has a prior right to payment from Obie, First Assignee
Factoring or Second Assignee Bank?
Under an orthodox first-to-file analysis, Second Assignee Bank, as
the first filer, takes priority over First Assignee Factoring.93 This is true
even though First Assignee Factoring was, true to its name, the first
assignee. 4 Indeed, Second Assignee Bank would prevail even if it took
its assignment with knowledge of the earlier assignment to First As-
signee Factoring,"5 and even if First Assignee Factoring first gave notice
to Obie of the assignment to it. 6 These results differ radically from
those dictated by pre-Code common-law principles.97 They are, how-
ever, proper under Section 9-312's pure race rule.98
But wait. First Assignee Factoring might argue that it wins due to
the absolute character of the assignment it received, notwithstanding
93. See notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
94. See In re Drapery Design Center, Inc., 86 Bankr. 120, 124-25 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988)
(applying first-to-file rule to give priority to first filer over two prior assignees); Lehigh Press, 389
S.E.2d at 379 (applying first-to-file rule to defeat unperfected first assignee); K.A.O.P. Co., 372
N.W.2d at 777-78 (applying first-to-file rule in favor of second assignee); H. and Val J. Rothschild,
Inc. v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 242 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1976).
95. See, for example, K.A.O.P. Co., 372 N.W.2d at 778; Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions
§ 15.10[2] at 15-59 (cited in note 8); O'Leary, 29 Mo. L. Rev. at 496 (cited in note 19); Clark, The
Law of Secured Transactions 3.08[1][b] at 3-82 & n.260 (cited in note 8) (noting, but properly
criticizing, cases holding that first filer loses if filing made with knowledge of prior unperfected
security interest); Coogan and Gordon, 76 Harv. L. Rev. at 1553-54 (cited in note 31) (stating that,
under Section 9-312(5)'s first-to-file rule, a "first filer's knowledge that there exists an earlier cre-
ated security interest which has been perfected through a later filing is also irrelevant").
96. See M.D. Hodges Enters., Inc. v. First Ga. Bank, 256 S.E.2d 350 (Ga. 1979) (applying
first-to-file rule to grant priority to second assignee that gave second notice to account debtor of
assignment).
97. See notes 36-47 and accompanying text. See also Rudolph, 5 B.C. Indust. & Comm. L.
Rev. at 255 (cited in note 30) (stating that "[i]f the first assignee has perfected his assignment by
filing and has priority under the provisions of the Code, then he will apparently be able to recover
amounts already collected by the junior assignee," and noting that the Massachusetts rule is
changed by this result). See generally Coleman, 1963 U. Ill. L. Forum at 268-69 (cited in note 2).
98. Special Project, 62 Cornell L. Rev. at 848-49 n.51 (cited in note 12).
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Second Assignee Bank's earlier filing and the pure race principle of Sec-
tion 9-312. After all, the common law views an absolute assignment as
divesting the assignor of all its rights in an account in much the same
way a handoff rids a quarterback of the pigskin.9 One must have rights
in the collateral to create an enforceable security interest.100 It follows,
according to this argument, that Second Assignee Bank could not re-
ceive a security interest at all in the Obie Obligor account on March 1,
much less an interest entitled to priority under Section 9-312. As a re-
sult, the argument goes, First Assignee Factoring should win.101
Given the text, structure and history of the Code, courts should
reject this argument. 02 The suggested interpretation would in effect ex-
empt outright buyers of accounts from the filing requirement.' 3 Section
9-302, however, specifies only two particular instances in which absolute
assignments are automatically perfected.104 That section thus teaches
that no automatic perfection rule-or functional equivalent
thereof-exists for absolute assignments. The proposed interpretation
also would make the Code, with respect to absolute assignments, a vali-
dation-type statute that carries forward the New York first-in-time
99. See Charles L. Knapp and Nathan M. Crystal, Problems in Contract Law 1133 (Little,
Brown, 2d ed. 1987); Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts 11.10 at 126-27 (cited in note 8);
Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 902 at 614 (cited in note 6) (stating that "[an assignment of a
contract right is operative to extinguish the right of the assignor," and that "[t]o produce this
effect, it is not necessary that notice shall be given to the obligor").
100. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(c).
101. Compare Septembertide Publishing, B.V. v. Stein & Day, Inc., 884 F.2d 675, 681-82 (2d
Cir. 1989). In that case, the court broadly stated that funds owed by a subpublisher to a publisher
that were previously transferred to the author "could not be assigned thereafter [to the publisher's
professional financer] because an assignor cannot assign that which it no longer owns or controls."
Id. In giving priority to the author over the professional financer, however, the court also broadly
relied on its determination that author was a third-party beneficiary of an agreement under which
the subpublisher was bound to make payments to publisher. Id. at 682.
102. In an earlier draft of this Article, this sentence read: "Given the text, structure, and
history of the Code, we should expect to hear this argument only from drunken sailors." I substi-
tuted the sentence in the text only after Professor McDonnell-who is hardly a drunken sailor, but
instead is one of the nation's leading authorities on Article Nine-indicated that the rights-in-the-
collateral argument at least is plausible when the assignor has made an absolute assignment of an
account to the first assignee without retaining any collection responsibilities or acceding to any
recourse or chargeback arrangement. For the reasons set forth immediately below, I find this posi-
tion unpersuasive. In considering this issue, however, one must distinguish Case A from one in
which the first assignee receives an absolute assignment and the account debtor also makes an
enforceable agreement that it will pay account proceeds directly to the assignee. In such a case, the
rights-in-the-collateral argument is far stronger because the assignee holds not only an Article
Nine security interest, but also has a novation or third-party beneficiary arrangement that inde-
pendently negates any continuing payment right claimable by the assignor. Even in this situation,
it is not clear under existing authorities that the assignor loses transferable rights in the previously
transferred account. See generally notes 416-21.
103. See generally U.C.C. § 9-302.
104. See id. at § 9-302(1)(e) (regarding nonsignificant-part assignments); id. § 9-302(1)(g)
(regarding assignments for the benefit of creditors).
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rule.10 5 The history of the Code makes clear, however, that Article Nine
was designed to displace accounts receivable statutes of the validation
variety with a notice-by-recording system.10 6 The Code's description of
the absolute transfer of accounts as a "security interest" further sug-
gests that the assignor does not part with all transferable rights in ac-
counts even following an absolute assignment.10 7 The cases, not
surprisingly, also point in this direction. '
Finally, the proposed trumping of the Section 9-312 first-to-file
principle by the Section 9-203 rights-in-the-collateral principle would
undermine two policies at the core of Article Nine's treatment of ac-
counts. First, this interpretation would require courts to distinguish be-
tween account sales and account security transfers. This is the very
line, however, that the drafters sought to avoid drawing by subjecting
both types of assignments to the Code.109 Second, the proposed inter-
pretation wars with the Code's overriding purpose of defeating secured
parties who rely on secret interests, for the unrecorded absolute assign-
ment is no less hidden from view than the unrecorded collateral trans-
fer.110 Indeed, a competing absolute assignment poses an even greater
danger to a later assignee than a competing collateral assignment inas-
much as payment of the collateralized debt ordinarily extinguishes the
105. See notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
106. See U.C.C. § 9-302 cmt. 5.
107. U.C.C. § 1-201 (37). See In re Liles and Raymond, 24 Bankr. 627, 629 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1982) (stating that "[bly definition,. . . an outright purchaser of contract rights has a secur-
ity interest in the contract rights which he obtains"); Jensen, 1977 Utah L. Rev. at 333 n.18 (cited
in note 74) (stating that Sections 9-102(1)(b) and 1-201(37) ensure that "any provision in the code
which is applicable to the usual security interests will also be applicable to interests created by
sales").
108. See, for example, United States v. Trigg, 465 F.2d 1264, 1268 (8th Cir. 1972); In re
Cawthorn, 33 Bankr. 119, 120, (M.D. Tenn. 1983) (rejecting argument that "an assignment is an
irrevocable transfer under Tennessee law" so that assigned account "cannot be considered prop-
erty of the debtor's estate"); Cripps, 31 Bankr. at 544 (rejecting argument that absolute assignee of
accounts defeats later lien creditor because of title passage, and stating that "[tlitle, for purposes
of defining rights of parties, is of little relative consequence under the U.C.C."); Nevada Rock &
Sand Co. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 161, 172 (D. Nev. 1974); In re Uvesco, Inc., 13 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 957, 958 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (noting, and rejecting, assignee's claim to priority
over bankruptcy trustee on ground "that there was an actual transfer or conveyance of a portion of
the commission and that title passed"); City of Vermillion v. Stan Houston Equipment Co., 341 F.
Supp. 707, 711 (D. S.D. 1972) (rejecting argument that "from the date of the assignment the Con-
tractor had no property interest upon which the I.R.S. could attach a lien"). See generally Clark,
The Law of Secured Transactions 3.08[1][c] at 3-85 (cited in note 8) (noting that "[t]he first-to-
file-or-perfect rule also governs priorities between an assignee of accounts receivable and a fac-
tor"); U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 2 (stating that account buyer "is treated as a secured party, and his
interest as a security interest"). But compare Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 3.08[l][a] at
3-45 (cited in note 8) (suggesting that "a true sale of the accounts will move the assets out of the
.property of the estate' of the seller and beyond the reach of the seller's trustee in bankruptcy").
109. See note 73 and accompanying text.
110. See note 74 and accompanying text.
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competing collateral assignment."' For all these reasons, there can be
no doubt about Case A. Second Assignee Bank wins under the first-to-
file rule of Section 9-312.112
We start, then, with a general rule governing successive-assignment
priorities: The first assignee to file wins. Having identified this general
rule, we turn to its many exceptions.
B. The Section 9-302(1)(e) Nonsignificant-Part Exception
The Code itself establishes the first exception to the first-to-file
principle. That exception arises out of Section 9-302(1)(e), and its ap-
plication is illustrated by Case B:" 3 ,
CASE B. On Day 1, Adele Accountdebtor buys Horatio the Hog
from Arthur Assignor for $450 with payment due on Day 5. At that
time, Arthur has twenty hog-sale accounts. On Day 2, Arthur sells
this single right to payment from Adele to a neighbor, Alfee As-
signee I. On Day 3, Arthur sells the same account to Artee Assignee
II, another neighbor, who files a U.C.C. financing statement later
that day. Both Assignee I and Assignee II, who have never taken an
111. See generally Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 7.12 at 249 (cited in
note 2) (stating that "[a] borrower's other creditors are entitled to know what his true situation is;
a requirement of public notice for perfection of security interests seems to be a wise accompani-
ment to the recognition of the effectiveness of security transfers of contract rights, particularly of
those to arise in the future").
112. See George W. Ultch Lumber Co. v. Hall Plastering, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 1060, 1065
(W.D. Mo. 1979) (holding that "whether the transaction was an assignment of the contract right as
collateral for the loan or whether the contract right was sold will not affect the priority of those
claims"). As one commentator has stated,
Thus the Code is drafted carefully so as to point out that both forms of accounts receivable
financing (sale or loan) are within Article 9. But once it is decided that a transaction of this
nature is in Article 9, the Code makes no attempt to distinguish between these two forms of
accounts receivable financing. Rather the sections of Article 9 are, with one exception, applied
equally to both forms[,] the sale of accounts being treated the same as the assignment of
accounts to secure a loan.
Michael R. Ford, Note, Commercial Transactions: Is a Transfer of Accounts to Satisfy Pre-ex-
isting Debt an Article 9 Transaction?, 22 Okla. L. Rev. 423, 424 (1969). See also Clark, The Law of
Secured Transactions 10.04[2] at 10-43 (stating that "[firom the Article 9 viewpoint, the most
important concern for the factor is not to forget to file the financing statement"); U.C.C. § 9-301
cmt. 4 (indicating that priorities for secured parties not dealt with in Section 9-301 "are covered in
Section 9-312").
113. For other, less extensive treatments of Section 9-302(1)(e), see Clark, The Law of Se-
cured Transactions 1.08[6][d] at 1-97 to 1-98, 2.07[6] at 2-58 to 2-61 (cited in note 8); Coogan,
et al., Secured Transactions § 3.08[5] at 3-62 to 3-66 (cited in note 8); White and Summers, Uni-
form Commercial Code § 22-10 at 1000-03 (cited in note 8); Kristine C. Karnezis, Annotation,
When Is Filing of Financing Statement Necessary to Perfect an Assignment of Accounts Under
UCC § 9-302(1)(e), 85 A.L.R.3d 1050 (1978); Jensen, 1977 Utah L. Rev. 331 (cited in note 74);
Norman B. Page, Recent Development, Uniform Commercial Code-Accounts Receivable Financ-
ing: Secured Parties' New Doubts Under the "Casual and Isolated" Test-Architectural Woods,
Inc. v. State, 53 Wash. L. Rev. 511 (1977-78).
1080
PRIORITIES IN ACCOUNTS
account assignment before, demand payment from Accountdebtor
on Day 5. Who brings home the bacon, Assignee I or Assignee II?
If the first-to-file rule applies to this case, Assignee II prevails be-
cause Assignee I has not filed at all. The first-to-file rule, however, does
not control Case B because of Section 9-302(1)(e). That section pro-
vides that a financing statement need not be filed to perfect "an assign-
ment of accounts which does not alone or in conjunction with other
assignments to the same assignee transfer a significant part of the out-
standing accounts of the assignor."'"" Did Assignor transfer a significant
part of his accounts to Assignee I? Surely not.1 5 It follows that As-
signee I's security interest was automatically perfected upon its attach-
ment."" Because Section 9-312 dictates that "security interests rank
according to priority in time of filing or perfection,"'"1 7 Assignee I,
whose security interest was perfected when it attached on Day 2,
defeats Assignee II, whose interest was obtained and perfected
thereafter."18
1. Some Background on Section 9-302(1)(e)
Three basic points about Section 9-302(1)(e) should be made up
front. First, the courts have left no doubt that the burden of proving
the applicability of Section 9-302(1)(e) is on the nonfiling claimant who
seeks the shelter of that provision." 9 Only one decision looks the other
114. Subsection (1)(g) of Section 9-302 exempts from the filing requirement assignments of
accounts for the benefit of creditors. The theory behind this exemption is that such transfers are
not financing transactions. U.C.C. § 9-302 cmt. 5. Regardless of filing, such assignments are un-
likely to go unnoticed by most would-be subsequent account transferees who investigate the as-
signor and its business. If the reported cases are any guide, Section 9-302(1)(g) presents neither
account claimants nor the courts with any serious difficulties.
115. See, for example, notes 149 and 159 and accompanying text.
116. See, for example, White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 22-7 at 991 (cited in
note 8).
117. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (emphasis added). See notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
118. See, for example, Architectural Woods, Inc. v. State, 88 Wash.2d 406, 562 P.2d 248
(1977).
119. See Consolidated Film Indus. v. United States, 547 F.2d 533, 536 (10th Cir. 1977) (stat-
ing that "[the] cases from other jurisdictions tend to hold that the party claiming the exemption
has the burden of producing proof that brings his case within the scope of the exemption"); In re
Tri-County Materials, Inc., 114 Bankr. 160, 164 (C.D. 11. 1990); Drapery Design Center, 86
Bankr. at 124; In re AM Int'l, Inc., 46 Bankr. 566, 571 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985); In re Brent
Explorations, Inc., 31 Bankr. 745, 747 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983); George W. Ultch Lumber Co., 477 F.
Supp. at 1068; In re Munro Builders, Inc., 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 739, 743 (W.D. Mich.
1976); Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank Int'l Corp., 406 F. Supp. 452, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aft'd, 540
F.2d 548 (2nd Cir. 1976); Uvesco, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 959; Sun Bank v. Parkland Design &
Dev. Corp., 466 So. 2d 1089, 1093 (Fla. Ct. App. 1985); Chattanooga Brick & Tile, Inc. v. Agnew,
18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1063, 1065-66 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976); E. Turgeon Constr. Co., 292
A.2d at 234; Craig v. Gudim, 488 P.2d 316, 320 (Wyo. 1971). See also In re Charter First Mortgage,
Inc., 56 Bankr. 838, 841 (Bankr. D. Or. 1985) (stating that "[a] secured creditor which alleges it
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way, and that case (not surprisingly, as we shall see) involved a nonpro-
fessional account assignee. 2 '
Second, the prevailing view is that Section 9-302(1)(e) provides for
automatic perfection of both absolute and collateral assignments.
121
The section's applicability to collateral assignments may seem odd in
light of a statutory purpose to perfect "casual or isolated assignments"
that "no one would think of filing."' 22 After all, under a statutory
scheme that requires filing to perfect almost all collateral transfers, it
seems strange to say that "no one would think of filing" with regard to
a collateral transfer of an account. One could write a long footnote in a
law review article about why the Code drafters might have applied Sec-
tion 9-302(1)(e) to collateral assignments. 12 3 The key point, however, is
that the section's language is clear as a bell.
24
Third, some courts have advocated reading a clear and precise
standard into Section 9-302(1)(e) so that transferees can readily deter-
mine upon receiving the assignment whether or not they need to file in
light of the exemption.2 5 That approach is not proper, however, be-
cause the purpose of Section 9-302(1)(e) is to safeguard "assignments
holds a properly perfected security interest in collateral and what it alleges are its proceeds has the
burden of proof on that issue"). For cases placing a similar burden on secured creditors who assert
a right to proceeds under Section 9-306(4), see In re Gibson Products of Arizona, 543 F.2d 652, 657
(9th Cir. 1976); In re Conklin's, Inc., 14 Bankr. 318, 320 (Bankr. S.C. 1981)); In re Guaranteed
Muffler Supply Co., 1 Bankr. 324, 330 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1979).
120. Abramson v. Printer's Bindery, Inc., 440 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969).
121. See, for example, In re Crabtree Constr. Co., 87 Bankr. 212, 213 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988)
(stating that "[t]he debtor's argument that the form of the document created a security interest
and not an absolute assignment does not preclude the applicability of the statutory exception"); In
re Fort Dodge Roofing Co., 50 Bankr. 666, 669-70 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985) (implying that although
the specific assignment was not an absolute transfer, such a transfer could fall within the Section
9-302(1)(e) exception).
122. U.C.C. § 9-302 cmt. 5.
123. For example, the drafters of the Code may have found the line between security and
absolute transfers as likely to be blurred in applying Section 9-302(1)(e) as in applying other sec-
tions of the Code. See note 73 and accompanying text. The drafters may have reasoned that, be-
cause most insignificant-part account transfers would be insignificant, the cost of filing even for
security transfers would not be justified. Finally, the drafters may have concluded that any estate-
preservation purpose of Section 9-302(1)(e), see note 135 and accompanying text, applied no less to
security transfers than to absolute ones.
124. The key interpretive question is whether the term "assignment," as used in Section 9-
302(1)(e), includes both collateral and absolute assignments. Common usage leaves no doubt that
the answer to this question is yes. If any doubt exists about this issue, however, it is removed by
other Code sections and Comments, which make it clear that the term "assignment" applies to
both types of account transfers. See, for example, U.C.C. § 9-102(2) (noting that security interests
may be created by "assignment") and cmt.2 (discussing "assignments of accounts . . . as security
for an obligation").
125. For example, In re Boughner, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 144, 150 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 1970) (advocating interpretation of (1)(e) "making it possible for secured parties and attor-
neys to determine with reasonable certainty whether an assignment must be filed to perfect").
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which no one would think of filing. ' 12 6 Persons who would not think of
filing do not need a clear rule to tell them whether or not to file.127
2. The Purposes Underlying the Nonsignificant-Part Standard
So how do courts decide whether a particular assignment involves a
significant part of the assignor's accounts? This question is difficult to
answer, largely because mystery surrounds the Code drafters' selection
of the significant-part standard. 2 " In promulgating U.C.C. § 9-
302(1)(e), the drafters sought to protect the "casual or isolated assign-
ment." 2 ' How the drafters thought the "significant part" rubric would
serve to achieve that goal, however, is unclear.1 0 Perhaps they antici-
pated that this standard would provide a workable rule of thumb for
distinguishing assignments to sophisticated assignees designed to gener-
ate working capital (for which filing ought to be required) from assign-
ments to "little persons" who happened to get involved in assignment
transactions without reason to know of technical filing rules (for which
filing ought not be required). 3'
If the drafters intended such a rule-of-thumb approach, however,
they picked a peculiar rule. The most unsophisticated account trans-
feree, after all, may well take a limited one-shot assignment that in-
volves all or most of a small-time assignor's contractual rights to
payment.1 3 2 Conversely, the highly sophisticated transferee sometimes
will take an assignment of a large account that constitutes only a small
fraction of a major corporate assignor's receivables portfolio.'33 For
these reasons, one cannot readily explain the significant-part standard
as a rule of thumb designed to distinguish formal and recurring assign-
126. See notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
127. See White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 22-10 at 1003 (cited in note 8)
(stating that "certainty in planning should have little relevance in construing this provision").
128. See, for example, Boughner, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 150 (stating that "[fln spite of the
general clarity of the UCC and its great improvement over former statutes, I find subsection (e) to
be anything but pellucid").
129. See note 155 and accompanying text.
130. See, for example, Jensen, 1977 Utah L. Rev. at 342 (cited in note 74). The commentator
says that consideration of this issue requires juxtaposing statutory language and the drafters'
stated intent. Id. The comments state fairly clearly that Section 9-302(1)(e)'s purpose is "to pro-
tect an assignee that does not regularly take assignments. This purpose seems to have little rela-
tion to the criterion of whether the assignment was of an insignificant portion of the assignor's
total accounts." Id.
131. See notes 77-80 and accompanying text. In keeping with this theory, commercial factors
and account financers may often have continuing, or at least substantial, arrangements with the
assignor. Assignments to such ongoing financers thus would normally concern "alone or in conjunc-
tion with other assignments to the same assignee ...a significant part of the outstanding ac-
counts of the assignor." U.C.C. § 9-302(l)(e).
132. See, for example, Architectural Woods, 562 P.2d at 248-49.
133. See, for example, In re Bindl, 13 Bankr. 148, 149 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1981).
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ments from casual or isolated ones.
Another possible explanation for the significant-part litmus is that
the drafters sought to achieve efficiency by sheltering trivial account
transfers from the filing requirement. From this perspective, the pur-
pose of Section 9-302(1)(e) is similar to that of Section 9-302(1)(d),
which automatically-and thus cost-effectively-perfects purchase
money security interests in consumer goods, which are usually small-
ticket items.13 4 The "not a significant part" standard, however, seems
an ill-fitting formula for pursuing this objective. If the drafters had
meant to perfect automatically only account transfers that are negligi-
ble or small in the absolute sense, they could have done so in so many
words. 115 They would not have chosen the explicitly relative standard
suggested by the term "significant part."
A more plausible explanation for the drafters' choice of this legal
rubric may be that the drafters of Section 9-302(1)(e) sought to protect
the nonfiling assignee only if doing so would not unduly bleed the as-
signor's estate. On this view, the drafters wrote the section to ensure
that the bulk of any assignor's intangible property remained subject to
claims of general creditors and later account transferees unless claimed
by an assignee who had provided full public notice. In other words, the
Code's drafters may have decided to cut a break to assignees who un-
derstandably failed to file, but only if doing so did not encumber a sig-
nificant part of the assignor's account property to the disadvantage of
other creditors.
3 6
In the end, any search for the purpose underlying the significant-
part formulation faces the difficulty that the drafters seem to have
given the matter less thought than they should have. Courts thus have
little choice but to muddle through Section 9-302(1)(e) cases as best
they can, with only limited guidance.
3. The Judicially Crafted Section 9-302(1)(e) Tests
The confusion surrounding the drafters' choice of the significant-
part standard is best evidenced by the actual application of that stan-
dard by the courts. Befuddled judges have developed no fewer than five
134. See id. at 150.
135. Compare U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (extending Statute of Frauds rule only to sales of goods at a
price of $500 or more).
136. See Jensen, 1977 Utah L. Rev. at 342 (cited in note 74) (stating that "[tihe requirement
that the assignment be of an insignificant part of the assignor's accounts limits impingement on
the rights of other creditors who may not have had notice of the assignment if it was not filed" and
that "[i]t assures a significant part of the assignor's accounts or contract rights will be available for
satisfaction of their claims"). A case seemingly sensitive to this notion is Liles and Raymond, 24
Bankr. at 630 (citing fact that accounts assigned "represented a major portion of the debtor's gross
income" and were necessary to success of Chapter 11 reorganization).
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separate tests for adjudging the applicability of Section 9-302(1)(e).
Some courts use the percentage test, which focuses on the proportion of
the assignor's total accounts transferred to the assignee."'7 Other courts
apply one of three separate variations of the "casual or isolated" stan-
dard, 138 which emanates from the admonition of the Official Comment
accompanying Section 9-302(1)(e). 3 9 Still other courts adopt what
might be called the "osterizer" approach. These tribunals seem to reject
any strict version of either the percentage test or the casual-or-isolated
test and throw into the analytical blender a number of considerations
before declaring whether the significant-part exemption applies.'4 °
a. The Percentage Test
Under the percentage test, the court determines what percentage of
the assignor's accounts the transfer represents and then declares
whether that percentage is significant. 4' Although this approach seems
simple enough, its application has spawned analytical problems. First,
in fixing the operative percentage of accounts transferred, some courts
have focused on the volume of the assignor's accounts at the time of
the litigation.'42 This approach is wrong because it is necessarily at the
time of attachment that automatic perfection either does or does not
occur under Section 9-302.113
137. See notes 140-53 and accompanying text.
138. See note 154 and accompanying text.
139. See notes 154-81 and accompanying text.
140. See notes 182-92 and accompanying text.
141. See generally White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 22-10 at 1002 (cited in
note 8).
142. See, for example, Drapery Design Center, 86 Bankr. at 124 (focusing on unpaid ac-
counts at time of decision in making "significant part" analysis); In re Arctic Air Conditioning,
Inc., 35 Bankr 107, 109 n.3 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983) (considering debtor's "receivables on the date
of bankruptcy"). See also White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 22-10 at 1002.
143. In accord, see In re B. Hollis Knight Co., 605 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1979) (stating that
"[tihe determination of whether an assignment constitutes a significant part of the assignor's out-
standing accounts must be made on the basis of the facts available at the time of the assignment");
Consolidated Film Indus. v. United States, 403 F. Supp. 1279, 1283 (D. Utah 1975) (stating that
Section 9-302(1)(e) "requires reference to the amount of contract rights owned by [assignor] at the
time of the assignment"), rev'd on other grounds, 547 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1977). Analysis is compli-
cated in those cases in which an assignor makes a continuing assignment of accounts extending
into the future, such as by giving a lender a floating lien in some subset of the assignor's accounts.
See Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 19.6 at 537 (cited in note 2) (suggesting
that section's applicability depends on whether "assignment, together with others which may be
made to [the assignee] in the future, will . . .result in the 'transfer [of] a significant part' "). See
also B. Hollis Knight Co., 605 F.2d at 401 n.2 (noting that the Code "requires a court to examine
the total of all assignments to the secured party whether or not they took place in a single transac-
tion"). In these cases, the rule most consistent with the notion of automatic perfection would focus
on the dollar value of accounts held and transferred as of the date each separate account comes
into existence, at which time, under U.C.C. Section 9-203, the security interest in that account
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Second, judges have had to wrestle with how to calculate the per-
centage of accounts transferred by the assignor. Some courts, for exam-
ple, have questioned whether they should include uncollectible accounts
in computing the total amount of the debtor's outstanding accounts.
1 44
Again, the proper approach is to focus on collectibility at the time of
assignment rather than the time of litigation, for any automatic perfec-
tion would occur at the time of attachment.145 Considerations of cer-
tainty and convenience further counsel that courts should presume
accounts to be collectible as of the time of assignment unless the non-
Section 9-302(1)(e) claimant proves otherwise. If proof of uncollectibil-
ity is offered, however, courts should measure the total body of the as-
signor's accounts based on their actual discounted value.14 6 This
approach not only comports with commercial reality, but also best con-
forms to the estate-preservation policy that seems to underlie, at least
in part, the significant-part standard.
47
actually attaches. Such an approach would present complex and artificial computational difficul-
ties. Courts thus are likely to analyze such cases by focusing more generally on the dollar value of
accounts held and transferred over a continuing period. See, for example, Bindl, 13 Bankr. at 150.
The focus, however, should not be on the assignor's account holdings as of the time of litigation,
but rather on the overall picture of the assignor's account holdings at or about the time the assign-
ment(s) in issue took place.
Arguably, attention in all cases should focus on the account picture at the time of litigation,
particularly in light of the anti-estate-bleeding justification offered above for the Section 9-
302(1)(e) filing exception. See note 136 and accompanying text. However, thinking of a secured
interest holder's perfected status as being in suspended animation pending future and unknowable
events outside the control of the secured creditor seems too exotic. That notion, one might sup-
pose, seemed too exotic to the drafters of the Code as well.
144. See, for example, B. Hollis Knight Co., 605 F.2d at 400, 402.
145. See Crabtree Constr. Co., 87 Bankr. at 213 (stating that "collectibility later determined
by the parties is not relevant"); In re Sun Air Int'l, Inc., 24 Bankr. 135, 137 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1982) (emphasizing lack of direct evidence of which accounts would have been considered collecti-
ble at the time of the assignment, and finding that the fact that "debtor's office manager testified
and identified which accounts were actually paid, as best she could remember," does not count in
figuring what part was transferred).
146. In applying Section 9-302(1)(e), courts must recognize "qualitative differences in ac-
counts receivable" so that accounts known to be uncollectible are not counted as part of debtor's
outstanding accounts. See B. Hollis Knight Co., 605 F.2d at 402 (noting that "reasoning is similar
when there are significant limitations on . . . collectibility" so that courts should "discount [the]
value" in determining total amount of outstanding accounts). See also Sun Air Int'l, 24 Bankr. at
137 (suggesting willingness to take this approach although bankruptcy trustee "cites no authority
for that interpretation").
147. See note 136 and accompanying text. The cases have presented other interesting per-
centage calculation issues. For example, in In re Tri-County Materials, Inc., 114 Bankr. 160 (C.D.
Ill. 1990) Tri-County made a contract with Ladd to supply Ladd with sand and gravel for pay-
ments amounting to some $250,000. 114 Bankr. at 161. To fulfill this contract, Tri-County leased
equipment from KMB and assigned to the lessor, KMB, partial payment rights from Ladd to
secure Tri-County's own payment obligations under the lease. The assignment permitted KMB to
request that the Ladd Construction Company . . . make any and all payments to [Tri-
County] by including on said check payment the name of [KMB] who shall have said check
negotiated and endorsed by [Tri-County] and said check shall be deposited in [KMB's] ac-
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The most basic difficulty in applying the percentage test lies not in
count with [Tri-County's] endorsement, at which time [KMB] shall issue a check to [Tri-
County] for the difference between the amount of the check issued and the rental payment
owed to [KMB].
Id. at 164-65 (quoting the Lease Agreement).
On these facts, the court concluded:
It is thus clear that the assignment was not of the entire Ladd account but only of that
portion of the account necessary to cover the balance due to KMB. At the time the parties
entered into the Agreement, the total rental amount was estimated at $30,000; the actual
figure turned out to be $30,484. The ratio of the amount assigned to the total account, even
assuming that the Ladd contract was the only account, is approximately 12%.
Id. at 165.
This way of computing the part of the assignor's accounts that have been transferred seems
sensible because it reflects commercial reality. The assignee, in everyone's understanding, was to
get, at most, $30,484 in value out of the assignment. In these circumstances, it would be artificial
to conclude-as the lower court had done-that the entire $250,000 account (constituting 100% of
the debtor's accounts) had been assigned.
A related problem arose in E. Turgeon Constr. Co. v. Elhatton Plumbing & Heat. Co., 292
A.2d 230 (R.I. 1972). There, a plumbing subcontractor gave a security interest to one of its suppli-
ers, named National, in "all monies now due or which will be due as retainer" from the general
contractor. 292 A.2d at 232. The amount of the retainage, apparently at all relevant times, was
slightly over $20,000. The subcontractor previously had granted a security interest in the same
retainage account to the SBA, which held a priority position as to that collateral. Id. In giving the
benefit of the Section 9-302(1)(e) exemption to the supplier to the exclusion of a receiver repre-
senting the subcontractor's general creditors, the court reasoned in part: "Once the S.B.A.'s secur-
ity interest in the retainage was satisfied, approximately $10,000 was available to National. Such
an amount, in our opinion, bearing in mind the purpose of [Section 9-302(1)(e)], does not consti-
tute a significant part of Elhatton's receivables." Id. at 234-35. Although brief, the court's reason-
ing seems to be that the part of the subcontractor's accounts transferred to National was $10,000,
rather than the full $20,000 account; thus the subcontractor transferred at most 50%, rather than
100%, of its then-outstanding accounts to National. If this was the court's understanding, it seems
wrong; otherwise, a claimant's ability to claim the Section 9-302(1)(e) exception would turn on the
fortuity that there existed a prior competing claim to a portion of the assigned account. It was
certainly possible at the time of the assignment that the SBA loan would be paid off, so that the
entire account collateral would become available to satisfy National's claim. Even though the sub-
contractor had previously given the SBA a security interest in the retainage, it retained rights in
the full $20,000 retainer to transfer to other secured parties, and in fact did transfer to National
"all monies now due or which will be due as retainer." Id. at 232 (emphasis added). Under these
circumstances it is artificial to say that the subcontractor assigned to National only $10,000 in
accounts, thus constituting only 50% of the subcontractor's outstanding accounts. Rather, the
proper conclusion is that the subcontractor assigned to National (albeit as a partially subordinate
security interest) $20,000 in accounts, which constituted 100% of the subcontractor's receivables.
Yet another percentage-computation problem was presented by In re Rankin, 102 Bankr. 439
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989). There, the collateral assignee argued that the court should count only a
small portion of the total amount of the assigned account because the assignor also had transferred
to the creditor substantial realty collateral that would satisfy most of the debt without resort to
the account collateral. The court properly rejected this argument because "the assignment, by its
plain language, assigned all of the account. The entire account was available to the Bank in the
event its other collateral proved to be insufficient." Id. at 442. The existence of the realty collateral
did not affect the amount of the account collateral the assignor assigned. The assignee might have
first resorted to the realty collateral or the account collateral. Even if it first resorted to the realty
collateral that collateral may have turned out to be unavailable due to any number of reasons
(including, for example, the existence of a prior competing claim to the realty or a defect in its
transfer). Therefore, the assignor did-as a practical matter as well as a conceptual mat-
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computing the percentage of accounts transferred, but in determining
whether this percentage rises to the level of being "significant.'
1 48
Courts have provided only garbled guidance on this critical point.149
The safest generalization is that some courts think that sixteen percent
of one's accounts is not a significant part,150 although even that state-
ment must be qualified.' 5 ' The reality is that the courts have failed to
demarcate any clear line between the significant and nonsignificant part
of a debtor's accounts. This failure may explairn why few courts, if any,
have embraced a pure percentage test.5 2
ter-transfer all of its account to the assignee. Thus all of the account properly was taken into
consideration in applying Section 9-302(1)(e).
148. See note 141 and accompanying text.
149. See, for example, Tri-County Materials, 114 Bankr. at 165 (stating that 12% "is surely
on the 'insignificant' side"); Rankin, 102 Bankr. at 442 (stating that when debtor transfers to a
bank the "only account of substance," filing is required;) Drapery Design Center, 86 Bankr. at 124
(finding that $30,039 constitutes significant part of $62,647); In re First City Mortgage Co., 69
Bankr. 765, 768 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986) (stating that the transfer to a bank of a "substantial
portion, if not all of the Debtor's accounts . . . in conjunction with an existing debtor/creditor
relationship" is not within the Section 9-302(1)(e) exemption); AM Int'l, 46 Bankr. at 571 (finding
that assignment of 75% of 50%-that is, 37.5%-of assignor's receivables is a significant part);
Arctic Air Conditioning, 35 Bankr. at 109 n.3 (stating that Section 9-302(1)(e) exemption not af-
forded to wife of corporation's president who loaned corporation $10,000 and received back assign-
ment of $10,000 in contract rights, when corporation had about $15,000 in unpaid accounts on date
of bankruptcy); In re Barrington, 34 Bankr. 55, 57 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983) (stating that there is
no "overwhelming consensus as to what figure represents a cutoff"); Liles and Raymond, 24 Bankr.
at 630 (holding Section 9-302(1)(e) exemption inapplicable because "debtor assigned a substantial
portion of its future contract rights in milk proceeds to FmHA"); Bindl, 13 Bankr. at 150 (refusing
to find assignment of $7,159 out of $170,400 to professional assignee insignificant); In re B. Hollis
Knight Co., 461 F. Supp. 1213, 1214 (E.D. Ark. 1967) (describing "25% to 50%" as "clearly a
significant part of the outstanding accounts" and stating that 14% does not constitute a significant
part under percentage test), rev'd on other grounds, 605 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1979); In re Munro
Builders, Inc., 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 741-42 (finding assignment of 40% of contract rights to
bank constitutes a significant part); In re Consolidated Steel Corp., 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 408, 411 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (holding subcontractor's assignment of $5,838 account to supplier
not a significant part of assignor's $116,000 in then-existing payment rights); Lehigh Press, 389
S.E.2d at 379 (holding that 57% is a significant part).
150. The leading case is Standard Lumber Co. v. Chamber Frames, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 837,
840 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (holding that assignment of 16% made to supplier of goods was not a signifi-
cant part). See also Tri-County Materials, 114 Bankr. at 165 (finding that 12% was "insignifi-
cant"); Crabtree Constr. Co., 87 Bankr. at 213 (finding that 14% was not significant): Sun Air
Int'l, 24 Bankr. at 137 (same); B. Hollis Knight Co., 461 F. Supp. at 1214 (same).
151. For example, in Bindl the court explicitly refused to find 16% "the bottom limit of a
significant part." 13 Bankr. at 150. In B. Hollis Knight Co., the Eighth Circuit explained that
Standard Lumber was "not inconsistent with" the Eighth Circuit's own decision not to apply the
Section 9-302(1)(e) filing to an account transfer constituting 14% of the assignor's accounts. 605
F.2d at 401. The court observed: "In Standard, the secured party, Standard Lumber Company, did
not regularly take assignments from its suppliers. There was no question that the assignment was
an isolated one and, thus, there was no reason for the District Court to consider the issue." Id. See
also note 154 and accompanying text (noting focus of some courts on absolute value of transferred
account).
152. See, for example, Architectural Woods, 562 P.2d at 249 (stating that "the percentage
1088
PRIORITIES IN ACCOUNTS
This is as it should be. If the drafters had preferred a mechanical
percentage approach, they could have themselves declared that an as-
signment of up to ten, twenty, or thirty percent of the assignor's ac-
counts did not require filing. By opting instead for the more pliable
significant-part test, the drafters required something more. In particu-
lar, courts undertaking the significant-part inquiry should also consider
the absolute value of the accounts assigned. To track the language of
the Comment, one might well think of filing as to a $100,000 account
even though it constitutes only ten percent of the assignor's receiv-
ables.' 53 One might well, however, not think of filing as to an assign-
ment of a $100 account even though it constitutes twenty-five percent
of the assignor's outstanding receivables.
Taking account of the absolute value of the assignment in this way
meshes with the language of the Code. The $100,000 assignment in-
volves a significant part of the assignor's accounts for the very reason
that $100,000 would be seen as significant by the assignor, the assignee,
and any normal human being. The same cannot be said of the $100
assignment, even though it concerns a larger percentage of the as-
signor's accounts. In short, a focus on the absolute value of the assigned
accounts, as well as the percentage of accounts transferred, comports
with both the Comment's focus on casual or isolated assignments and
the provision's size-tied text. In light of these considerations, a number
of courts have deemed the absolute size of the transferred account a
proper consideration in determining the applicability of the filing
exemption.'5
test will never have any certainty as various courts find certain percentages to be significant or
not").
Particularly interesting is Professors White's and Summers's flip-flop in their position on the
percentage test. In the first edition of their treatise, these commentators advocated adoption of the
percentage test. White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 23-9 at 808-09 (West, 1st ed.
1972). In their later editions, Professors White and Summers concluded that certainty in this field
had proven to be a "will o' the wisp." As a result, they urged abandonment of the percentage test.
White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 22-10 at 1002-03 (cited in note 8).
153. See note 125 and accompanying text,
154. See, for example, Consolidated Film Indus., 547 F.2d at 537 (considering "the size of
the transaction"); In re Hostetler, 49 Bankr. 737, 739 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1985) (citing absolute
amount); In re Bindl, 13 Bankr. at 150 (stating: "I am not compelled by the suggestion that 16
percent represents the bottom limit of a significant part of accounts assigned. Farm Loan Service
has been assigned accounts in the amount of $7,159.44; Federal Land Bank, $89,700.00; Equico,
$113,758.68; and FHA, $25,000. None of those sums are on their face insignificant."); Miller, 406 F.
Supp. at 477 (holding that transfer of account constituting about 20% of $4,439,300 in accounts
was a significant part, "especially in view of the high absolute value of the transaction at issue");
Architectural Woods, 562 P.2d at 249 (noting that "cases may find the dollar amount to be signifi-
cant without regard to the percentage"). See generally Page, 53 Wash. L. Rev. at 519 n.47 (cited in
note 113); Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 10.03[8] at 1087; George W. Ultch Lumber Co.,
477 F. Supp. at 1069.
For cases that are insensitive to this analysis, see Crabtree Constr. Co., 87 Bankr. at 213 (hold-
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b. The Casual-or-Isolated-Assignment Test
Flustered by the cloudiness of the significant-part standard and the
mechanical quality of the percentage test, many courts have looked to
the Official Comment for guidance in applying Section 9-302(1)(e). The
relevant language of the Comment states:
The purpose of the subsection (1)(e) exemption is to save from ex post facto
invalidation casual or isolated assignments: some accounts receivable statutes were
so broadly drafted that all assignments, whatever their character or purpose, fell
within their filing provisions. Under such statutes many assignments which no one
would think of filing might have been subject to invalidation. The paragraph (1)(e)
exemption goes to that type of assignment. Any person who regularly takes assign-
ments of any debtor's accounts should file. 1
5
Courts often have said that "the case law has developed two tests under
Section 9-302(1)(e): the percentage test and the casual or isolated
test." '156 In fact, courts have extracted three different tests, in addition
to the percentage test, out of the Comment's reference to casual or iso-
lated transfers. Some courts apply the filing exemption if, without
more, they find that the account transfer is casual or isolated. 157 Others
apply the exemption only if the assignment both qualifies as casual or
isolated and passes the percentage test or some kindred standard.158 Fi-
ing that security assignment of 14% of assignor's accounts, worth $173,144, to secure debt of
$93,000 is within Section 9-302(1)(e) filing exception); Fort Dodge Roofing Co., 50 Bankr. at 670
(applying Section 9-302(1)(e) exception to protect nonprofessional assignee, although transferred
account worth $52,000, because assignment concerned only 6.2% of assignor's total receivables); In
re K & G Health Care Indus., Inc., 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 837, 838-39 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1979) (finding that assignment to bank of $75,000 account by company that generated about
$330,000 in accounts per month was "not significant").
155. U.C.C. § 9-302 cmt. 5.
156. B. Hollis Knight Co., 605 F.2d at 400-01 (suggesting that two tests have emerged as aids
in interpreting the significant part standard: the "casual or isolated" test and the "percentage"
test); Tri-County Materials, 114 Bankr. at 164. In accord, Fort Dodge Roofing Co., 50 Bankr. at
669 (stating that "courts have utilized two basic tests to determine whether filing a financing state-
ment is necessary to perfect a security interest in accounts receivable"); Consolidated Film Indus.,
403 F. Supp. at 1283 (stating that "[t]here have been two differing approaches or tests utilized by
courts under § 9-302(1)(e)").
157. Padgett, 49 Bankr. at 215; In re Himlie Properties, Inc., 36 Bankr. 32, 34 n.5 (Bankr.
W.D. Wash. 1983); Barrington, 34 Bankr. at 57; Architectural Woods, 562 P.2d at 250; Sherburne
Corp. v. Carter, 340 A.2d 82, 85-86 (Vt. 1975); Abramson, 440 S.W.2d at 328-29.
158. B. Hollis Knight Co., 605 F.2d at 401 (concluding that Section 9-302(1)(e) requires ap-
plication of both percentage and "casual and isolated" tests). The court in Tri-County Materials
found support for requiring both tests to be met in the language of the Code and its comments:
The totality of circumstances surrounding the transaction determines whether an assign-
ment was casual or isolated. ...
...The statutory language specifically requires that the assignment be an insignificant
part of the outstanding account.. . . A showing of a casual or isolated assignment of a signifi-
cant part of outstanding accounts would not be entitled to the exemption given this clear
statutory requirement. . . . [G]iven the comments to the UCC regarding the purpose of this
exemption, in a case involving the transfer of an insigificant part of outstanding accounts to a
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nally, one court has declared that the filing exemption applies if either
the percentage test or the casual-or-isolated test is met.15
All three variations on the casual-or-isolated theme require identi-
fication of the earmarks of the casual or isolated transfer. Courts adopt-
ing the casual-or-isolated standard uniformly have agreed that the
professional character of the account assignee and the regularity with
which the assignee receives account assignments are the guiding criteria
for applying the Section 9-302(1)(e) filing exemption. 6 ' Beyond this,
however, there is much disagreement. Many courts, for example, have
taken the position that the assignee's status as a commercial financing
institution ipso facto disqualifies it from receiving a casual or isolated
assignment. 6 Other courts have taken a different stance. Some of these
creditor whose regular business is financing, such accounts should not fall within this
exemption.
114 Bankr. at 164. See also In re Wood, 67 Bankr. 321, 323 (W.D.N.Y. 1986) (noting that lower
court "concluded that the appropriate standard to be applied in interpreting U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(e)
is a combination of both the 'percentage test' and 'casual and isolated transaction test' "); AM
Int'l, 46 Bankr. at 571 (citing B. Hollis Knight Co.).
159. Wood, 67 Bankr. at 323 (stating that "[t]his Court supports the position of the Bank-
ruptcy Court which utilized both the percentage test and the casual and isolated transaction test
in applying U.C.C. Section 9-302(1)(e). However, the assignee need only satisfy one test to fall
within the exemption from filing."). As indicated above, the foundation of all these variations of
the casual-or-isolated test lies in the Comment to Section 9-302(1)(e). Some courts, however, have
sought to bolster the case for applying the casual-or-isolated test-and in particular to do so to the
exclusion of the percentage test-with additional policy arguments. In Barrington, the court advo-
cated adoption of the casual-or-isolated test in part because, under it, commercial lenders "cannot
avoid filing respecting a substantial security interest by extending the payment schedule, causing
monthly payments to fall below the point of 'significance.'" 34 Bankr. at 58. To believe that banks
would manipulate loan transactions in this manner simply to avoid the easy and certain step of
filing a U.C.C. financing statement is speculative and, indeed, farfetched. A number of courts have
argued that the casual-or-isolated test will create greater certainty for creditors and courts than
the competing percentage test. See, for example, id. at 57 (stating that the casual-or-isolated test
provides "greater certainty"). The casual-or-isolated test, however, creates enough of its own
problems that certainty in its application is not a persuasive reason for its adoption. See, for exam-
ple, Sun Bank, 466 So. 2d at 1093 (stating that the casual-or-isolated test does not seem any more
certain than the percentage test); Page, 53 Wash. L. Rev. at 517 (cited in note 113); Jensen, 1977
Utah L. Rev. at 344 (cited in note 74) (stating that "[ilt would be much more difficult to define
and apply the additional factor of 'casual or isolated.' A standard for determining when an as-
signee is in the business of taking assignments would involve many difficult factual determinations
and uneven results.").
160. See notes 159, 161-67 and accompanying text.
161. See, for example, Barrington, 34 Bankr. at 58 (stating that "commercial lenders ...
assume the risk of failure to file"); Valley Bank of Nev., 528 F. Supp. at 914 (suggesting that
"institutional financiers" may never invoke Section 9-302(1)(e)); Sun Bank, 466 So. 2d at 1092-93
(stating that "[tihis test excludes from the filing exemption, banks or professional lenders, regard-
less how small the assigned account"); George W. Ultch Lumber Co., 477 F. Supp. at 1069 (barring
bank from claiming Section 9-302(1)(e) exemption because of its involvement in commercial fi-
nancing, and stating "whether Bank regularly takes assignments of contract rights, as distin-
guished from other collateral security, is not decisive"). See also Tri-County Materials, 114 Bankr.
at 164 (stating that "[t]he totality of circumstances . . . determines whether an assignment was
casual or isolated," but also stating flatly that "a creditor whose regular business is financing. ..
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courts have indicated that an assignment to a bank may qualify as cas-
ual or isolated if the bank shows it has not taken other account assign-
ments in the past.162 Other courts have signaled that, while a financial
institution that takes a security assignment always must file, the Sec-
tion 9-302(1)(e) exclusion might remain available for an outright ac-
count purchase.'63
Tracking the Code Comment, most courts have found that assign-
ments-whether to financial institutions or to others-fail to meet the
casual-or-isolated description as long as the assignee regularly takes ac-
count assignments. 64 Again, however, some courts deem this factor dis-
should not fall within [the] exemption"); Consolidated Film Indus., 403 F. Supp. at 1285 (finding
it important that assignee "was not a regular commercial financer"); H. & Val J. Rothschild, Inc.,
242 N.W.2d at 847 (citing as critical that "Rothschild [the assignee] has extensive experience in
commercial finance").
162. See, for example, B. Hollis Knight Co., 605 F.2d at 402; Valley Bank of Nev., 528 F.
Supp. at 914; In re First Gen. Contractors, Inc., 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 762, 763 (S.D. Fla. 1971)
(suggesting that Code filing requirement does not apply even to commercial financing transactions
so long as the lender is "not following a regular practice of financing accounts"). Assuming the
appropriateness of the casual-or-isolated test, the distinction between banks that do and do not
regularly take assignments of accounts receivable is strained and should be rejected. The reason is
that the test seeks, in the end, to protect "assignments which no one would think of filing." This
description simply does not fit a bank that takes a security interest in an account. That is true
regardless of whether or not the bank regularly takes account assignments. The inappropriateness
of the assignment-taking-bank/non-assignment-taking-bank distinction is well illustrated by the
leading case supporting this distinction, B. Hollis Knight Co. In that case, the court remanded for
a finding on whether the particular bank-assignee regularly took account assignments. 605 F.2d at
402-03. Whether the bank did or not, however, the bank clearly was not the type of transferee that
deserved the protection afforded transferees of accounts no one would think of filing. The bank in
fact had filed a U.C.C. financing statement in an effort to perfect its interest in the transferred
account. The bank sought to fall back on the Section 9-302(1)(e) exception only because it erred in
completing the U.C.C. form, and thus had not properly filed. Id. at 399.
163. See Valley Bank of Nev., 528 F. Supp. at 914 (stating that "[t]his section is applicable
only when an outright sale of an account occurs, or the security interest is granted to an assignee
who is not regularly engaged in financing activities"); K.A.O.P. Co., 372 N.W.2d at 777 (question-
ing "whether the filing exemption in [Section 9-302(1)(e)] applies to the bank absent an outright
assignment of [the assignor's] right to the fees.").
164. See U.C.C. § 9-302 cmt. 5. For examples of cases so holding, see B. Hollis Knight Co.,
605 F.2d at 401 (suggesting that the rationale of the casual-or-isolated test is to "require a secured
creditor to file if he regularly takes assignments of a debtor's accounts, but [not to require filing] if
this was not a usual practice"); Tri-County Materials, 114 Bankr. at 165 (stating that it is impor-
tant that the assignee "was not in the business of accepting contract assignments," among other
factors); Wood, 67 Bankr. at 324 (stating that "the authorities are clear that where the assignee is
regularly engaged in commercial financing and routinely accepts assignments of accounts, perfec-
tion by way of filing under the U.C.C. is required regardless of the actual amount of the accounts
assigned"); Padgett, 49 Bankr. at 215 (stating that "[t]he Comment ... advises that '[a]ny person
who regularly takes assignments of any debtor's accounts should file.' . . . In this case, [assignee]
took a series of assignments over a period of time, not just an isolated one. Therefore, the Court
finds that [assignee] is an unperfected party as it did not file .. "); Fort Dodge Roofing Co., 50
Bankr. at 670 (granting assignee-supplier that had only once before accepted an assignment of
accounts protection under Section 9-302(1)(e)); Barrington, 34 Bankr. at 57 (quoting Section 9-302
cmt. 5); K.A.O.P. Co., 372 N.W.2d at 777 (stating that the "exemption ... is applicable 'only when
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positive, 165 while others call it a significant consideration.1 66 All these
cases, however, draw a fundamental distinction between what might be
described as "professional" and "nonprofessional" account assignees.1
6 7
As a practical matter, only the nonprofessional may claim to have re-
ceived a casual or isolated assignment. A similar claim by a bank or
other professional financer is almost certainly destined to fail. 68
. . . assignee. . . is not regularly engaged in financing activities' "); George W. Ultch Lumber Co.,
477 F. Supp. at 1067-68 & n.7 (noting that "Gilmore. . . emphasized regularity" and finding this
"the principal factor in determining whether to apply the exemption"); Abramson, 440 S.W.2d at
328 (finding Section 9-302(1)(e) exemption satisfied, without any reference to percentage of ac-
counts sold, because discount sale of $6,331.73 in accounts to bindery company was casual or iso-
lated and "there is no evidence that Bindery [the assignee] 'regularly takes assignments of any
debtor's account,' to quote the language used in the commentary").
Courts that emphasize the regularity factor rely on the Comment's admonition: "Any person
who regularly takes assignments of any debtor's accounts should file." U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(e) cmt. 5.
The assumption seems to be that the sentence's reference to "any debtor" means any debtor in the
world, so that regular past account transactions with anyone necessarily removes the assignee from
under the protective casual-or-isolated umbrella. Another possible reading of the Comment, how-
ever, is that the reference to "any debtor" denotes any particular debtor, so that filing is advisable
by assignees who have taken past assignments of the particular assignor's accounts. After all, those
assignees might expect to be receiving "a significant part of the outstanding accounts of the as-
signor." U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(e) (emphasis added).
165. See, for example, M.D. Hodges Enters., 256 S.E.2d at 352 (stating that Section 9-
302(1)(e) "indicates that the exception from filing for the isolated or casual assignment of accounts
is not available to 'any person who regularly takes assignments of any debtor's accounts,'" and
that "[a] bank which regularly loans money and accepts accounts as security must file"). See also
the cases collected in note 173.
166. See Architectural Woods, 562 P.2d at 250 (stating that the fact that the "[p]laintiff was
a wholesaler of wood products [and] . . . was not in the business of commercial financing or ob-
taining assignments.. . . [was] a significant factor in determining the casual and isolated nature of
the assignment"). See also B. Hollis Knight Co., 605 F.2d at 401 (finding that the casual-or-iso-
lated test "requires a court to examine the circumstances surrounding the transaction, including
the status of the assignee"); City of Vermillion, 341 F. Supp. at 712.
167. See, for example, Drapery Design Center, 86 Bankr. at 124 (emphasizing that the Credit
Union was a financial institution); Fort Dodge Roofing Co., 50 Bankr. at 669-70 (illustrating broad
application of Section 9-302(1)(e) to protect non-financial institution); Brent Explorations, 31
Bankr. at 748 (stating that "the legislative history, as revealed by the official comments indicates
an intent to protect an insignificant and ignorant assignee"); K.A.O.P. Co., 372 N.W.2d at 778
(stating that "the bank took this pledge of collateral in the ordinary course of financing"); Page, 53
Wash. L. Rev. at 514 (cited in note 113) (stating that "[t]he casual and isolated test relies on an
examination of the circumstances surrounding the assignment and on the assignee's financing ex-
perience. An isolated assignment, made to a nonprofessional buyer of accounts, is exempt from the
filing requirements under this third test.").
168. Apparently only three reported cases exist in which a financial institution successfully
invoked the Section 9-302(1)(e) automatic-perfection rule: K & G Health Care Indus., 28 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. at 839-40; In re Hostetler, 49 Bankr. at 739; and Effective Commun. West, Inc. v. Board
of Cooperative Educ. Servs., 446 N.Y.S.2d 684 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981). The K & G Health Care
court, for example, found that the assignment to the bank "was an isolated transaction, the subject
assignment and accompanying note and security agreement being Barnett Bank's only loan trans-
action with K & G during the period of time in question." 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 839. Of course,
questions may arise as to whether a particular assignee qualifies as a professional. See, for exam-
ple, Wood, 67 Bankr. at 324 (stating that "[t]his Court is unable to find any authority which
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At least if one accepts the basic soundness of the Code filing sys-
tem, judicial focus on the professional character of the account assignee
in applying Section 9-302(1)(e) comports with sound policy. Financial
institutions that regularly take account assignments should file U.C.C.
financing statements. Those statements provide useful information that
may avoid wasteful, and even catastrophic, reliance by third parties.'" 9
Filing by financial institutions, moreover, produces few transaction
costs because their employees know of the U.C.C. filing system and rou-
tinely use it.170 Indeed, several institutions will find it cost-effective to
file as to all account transfers, rather than to make case-specific and
uncertain determinations whether particular transfers involve a signifi-
cant part of a debtor's accounts.' Put another way, when a financial
institution seeks to use the Section 9-302(1)(e) exemption, it is simply
seeking relief from its own mistake.172 Courts should hardly encourage
filing errors, however, and this is especially true with financial institu-
tions that profit greatly through their own use of the U.C.C. filing sys-
tem.' 73 In sum, the judge-made distinction between professional and
nonprofessional claimants of the Section 9-302(1)(e) exemption makes
good economic sense.
The central goal of interpreting statutes, however, is not to make
good economic sense. Rather it is to give a fair and proper meaning to
the language of the statute.174 This is not to say that economic consider-
ations are unimportant in construing the Code. In fact, because the
characterizes attorneys as a group which are ineligible to engage in casual and isolated assignments
of accounts under U.C.C. 9-302(1)(e)").
169. See generally Special Project, 62 Cornell L. Rev. at 839 (cited in note 12).
170. See Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions 1.04 at 1-26 (cited in note 8) (stating
that "[ift is a simple matter for the assignee to file a financing statement and thus warn the
world"); Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H. Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Examination
of the Scope of Article 9, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 175, 186 (1983) (noting that "[tihe cost of making an
Article 9 filing is quite small").
171. See Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 19.6 at 538 (cited in note 2)
(stating that "[a]ll right-minded assignees will ... file").
172. See id. Gilmore notes that Section 9-302(1)(e) "is carefully drafted so that no assignee,
engaged in a regular course of financing, will ever be tempted to rely on it in order to avoid a filing
which ought to be made." Id. For examples of cases in which the professional assignee specifically
undertook to file a proper financing statement, but then failed to do so, see K.A.O.P. Co., 372
N.W.2d at 775 (noting that "[a]lthough Midway National Bank [assignee] prepared a financing
statement, neither the bank nor Engelson [another assignee] ever filed a financing statement with
the Secretary of State's office"); City of Vermillion, 341 F. Supp. at 709, 712. See also note 162
(discussing B. Hollis Knight).
173. See K.A.O.P. Co., 372 N.W.2d at 777 (stating that "[t]his exemption was 'never in-
tended to provide an escape hatch for negligent institutional financiers' ") (quoting Valley Bank,
528 F. Supp. at 914); Sun Bank, 466 So. 2d at 1092 (inquiring whether "assignee was sufficiently
removed from commercial financing circles as to be excused from being unaware of any necessity
to file").
174. See generally notes 572-73 and accompanying text.
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Code is a commercial statute designed to govern practical business ar-
rangements, we may assume that the Code's drafters preferred commer-
cially sensible results.17 5 In construing the Code, however, this
interpretive norm cannot take primacy over clear statutory text. Con-
sider, in this vein, the following variation on Case B:
CASE C. All the facts of Case B remain the same except that, on
Day 2, Arthur Assignor transfers the single $450 Horatio the Hog
account to the First Assignee Bank, rather than Alfee Assignee I,
the neighboring farmer. Now who takes priority: First Assignee
Bank or the second assignee and first filer, Artee Assignee II?
Given our discussion of Case B, any normal English-speaking per-
son would answer this question in favor of the Bank. The inquiry man-
dated by Section 9-302(1)(e) is whether the assignment involves a
significant part of the assignor's accounts. If a $450 account, constitut-
ing five percent of Arthur Assignor's receivables, is not a significant
part of his accounts when transferred to Assignee I, how can it be a
significant part of his accounts simply because it is transferred to some-
one else? To say that whether an assignment involves a significant part
of the outstanding accounts of the assignor depends on the identity of
the assignee makes no sense. Either an account is a significant part of
the assignor's accounts or it isn't, and that should be true whether the
assignee is First Assignee Bank, Dagwood Bumstead, or the Man in the
Moon.
To be sure, courts should give Code provisions a purposive inter-
pretation that is sensitive to the Code Comments.7 6 The Code Com-
ments, however, "do not approach the weight of legislation; if the
statutory provisions adopted by the legislature contradict or fail to sup-
port the Comments, the Comments must be rejected.'
7 7
Does the critical professional-nonprofessional distinction distilled
175. The distinctive difficulty of amending the Code, because of its uniform character, may
justify greater judicial tinkering than might be applied to other statutes in order to avert demon-
strably bad results.
176. See note 579 and accompanying text.
177. Robert H. Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments to the Uniform Commercial
Code, 1966 Wis. L. Rev. 597, 604. (quoting John Honnold, Cases and Materials on the Law of
Sales and Sales Financing at 19 (2d ed. 1962). Such broad pronouncements about the relationship
between Code text and Code Comments have tended to oversimplify matters-especially in a time
when the Permanent Editorial Board is constantly revising the Comments "on the run," in much
the same manner that an administrative agency makes shifting policy decisions through the pro-
mulgation of rules pursuant to delegated authority. The Permanent Editorial Board, however, is
not an administrative agency. Moreover, even administrative agencies can only promulgate rules
that comport with statutory mandates. The Comments cannot and do not permit courts to do
whatever they wish in interpreting the Code. The text of the Code continues to impose important
limits.
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by courts from the Comment's reference to casual or isolated transfers
depart too much from the statutory text? An affirmative answer to this
question finds strong support in the preceding discussion of how the
normal English-speaking person would read Section 9-302(1)(e). 178 The
same conclusion draws support from two additional considerations.
First, if one takes the casual-or-isolated test to its logical stopping
point, the Section 9-302(1)(e) filing exemption applies even when an
assignor makes a small and single transfer to a nonprofessional assignee
of the only accounts it ever has had.179 It shatters the eardrum, how-
ever, to hear that an assignment does not involve a significant part of a
debtor's outstanding accounts when in fact it transfers all the debtor's
receivables. 18 0 The Comments are helpful aids, but not when used to
tear up the statutory text; and this reading of Section 9-302(1)(e) rips
the word "part" right out of Code."8
Second, there exists strong evidence that courts that have read the
professional-nonprofessional distinction into Section 9-302(1)(e) have
pushed the Code's text beyond the breaking point. In particular, at
least three courts have applied the casual-and-isolated test to excuse
178. See text following note 174. This analysis gains support from Professor McDonnell, who
long has championed purposive interpretation of the Code. See note 579. In his commentary on the
subject, Professor McDonnell finds a contradiction between the text of Section 9-302(1)(e) and the
Comment to it. Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 3.08[5] [b] at 3-63 (cited in note 8) (chapter
by Professor McDonnell; compare note 166). He goes on to note that "courts have manipulated
[the section] . . . to protect unsophisticated, non-merchant financers." Id. § 3.08[5][a] at 3-62 (em-
phasis added).
179. See Architectural Woods, 562 P.2d at 248-50 (applying casual-or-isolated standard to
find Section 9-302(1)(e) satisfied although wood-supplier assignee received $144,953 in accounts
and there was no indication that the assignor had any other accounts when assignments were
made); E. Turgeon Constr. Co., 292 A.2d at 234-35 (holding that $10,000 assignment was not a
significant part, but failed to engage in inquiry whether assignor had additional receivables).
180. See Page, 53 Wash. L. Rev. at 522 (cited in note 113) (describing this outcome as "star-
tling"). A number of courts have thus rejected this result. See, for example, B. Hollis Knight Co.,
605 F.2d at 401 (stating that "[tihe language of the section would not permit an assignee to escape
the filing requirement if he received a large proportion of an assignor's accounts whether or not the
transaction was an isolated one"); Consolidated Film Indus., 547 F.2d at 537 (stating that "we
have to conclude that from all appearances this [account] constituted most if not all of the ac-
counts or rights of the assignor. If that is true, and there is no evidence from appellee to the
contrary, it would make no difference that it may be an isolated transaction."); Uvesco, 13 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. at 959 (suggesting that if debtor were transferring its "only contract right," that would
amount to a "significant part of the debtor's outstanding contract rights"). Of course any interpre-
tation of Section 9-302(1)(e) based on the estate-preservation purpose also would preclude such
extreme applications of the casual-or-isolated test. See note 136 and accompanying text.
181. Courts have found that Comment-based interpretations in other settings push Code text
too far. See, for example, In re Bel Air Carpets, Inc., 452 F.2d 1210, 1212 (9th Cir. 1971) (refusing
to follow the language of the Comment to U.C.C. Section 2-702(2) over the clear language of the
Code itself); Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 460, 464 (Md. Ct. App. 1976) (relying on
the "clear language" of U.C.C. 2-607 over the contradictory language of the accompanying Com-
ment); Wright v. Bank of Cal., 81 Cal. Rptr. 11, 14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (deciding that "[tihe plain
language of [Section 3-405] cannot be varied by reference to the comments").
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the filing requirement, even while expressly recognizing that the ac-
count transfer at issue involved a significant part of the assignor's ac-
counts.182 These courts did not even pretend to rely on statutory
purpose as an aid in interpreting the Code's text; rather, they un-
abashedly substituted for the statutory standard a different standard
derived exclusively from the Comment.
Often there is room for debate about whether statutory language is
sufficiently ambiguous in a particular respect to bear a proffered con-
struction. This group of cases indicates, however, that courts adopting a
strong professional-nonprofessional distinction under the casual-or-iso-
lated test are ignoring the Code's text rather than interpreting it. The
term "significant part," albeit ambiguous, is not so ambiguous as to
support the fundamental distinction between professional and nonpro-
fessional assignees drawn by courts applying the casual-or-isolated test.
Accordingly, courts should abandon this approach.
c. The Osterizer Test
Some courts have eschewed strict versions of either the casual-or-
isolated test or the percentage standard and, at least on the surface,
opted for a more open-ended appraisal of the applicability of Section 9-
302(1)(e). as The distinctive mark of these osterizer cases is that the
courts, in applying the filing exemption, mention factors in addition to
the percentage of transferred accounts and the regularity with which
the assignee receives account assignments."" Some courts, as we have
182. See George W. Ultch Lumber Co., 477 F. Supp. at 1068 (noting that Architectural
Woods and First General Contractors both applied Section 9-302(1)(e) "in spite of findings that
the assignments constituted a significant part"); First Gen. Contractors, Inc., 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
at 763 (exempting account transfer from filing because it was "a casual and isolated transaction"
even while stating explicitly that the "assignment in question did involve a 'significant part' of the
outstanding accounts" of the assignor).
183. See, for example, Brent Explorations, 31 Bankr. at 748 (citing casual and isolated na-
ture of assignment as a "factor some courts consider"); Consolidated Film Indus., 403 F. Supp. at
1285 (stating that courts should first look at "the size of the assigned contract vis-A-vis the remain-
ing contract rights of the assignor," and if that is not dispositive, the court should consider "other
relevant factors").
184. Also properly placed in this category are cases in which the court blends the critical
considerations underlying both the percentage and casual-or-isolated test. An example is Drapery
Design Center, in which the court reasoned:
The Credit Union stands on no better footing than does Rigdon. Its underlying course of
dealing regarding the Debtor's assigned accounts was neither casual nor isolated. Its claim of
$176,109.76 relates to assigned notes and accounts receivable assigned by the Debtor to satisfy
six (6) loans made by the Credit Union. The Credit Union's business is that of a financial
institution. Further, the aggregate amount of the assignments as stated above constitutes a
significant portion of the Debtor's outstanding accounts. Its transactions with the Debtor
were multiple. Therefore, the Credit Union, likewise, has failed to successfully demonstrate
that it meets the filing exception. . ..
86 Bankr. at 124. See also Brent Explorations, 31 Bankr. at 747-48.
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seen, cite the absolute size of the transferred account."8 5 Other courts
have noted additional factors as well.
These factors fall into four basic categories. First, some courts have
noted the degree of formality with which the account transfer was
made.186 Reliance on this factor apparently reflects a sensitivity to the
Comment's reference to safeguarding casual account transfers.18 7 Sec-
ond, a few courts have noted the reality, or heightened risk, of adverse
reliance on a failure to file in the particular case. 88 The thought behind
this approach seems to be that a stricter insistence on filing is justified
when a greater danger from failing to file exists. Third, there are deci-
sions that-with some textual justification-consider the significance,
or potential significance, of the account transfer in light of considera-
tions other than the percentage of accounts transferred and the assign-
ment's absolute size.' 89 Finally, some courts explore whether a special
justification exists for filing or failing to file a financing statement in the
individual case. 90 These courts, in declining to apply the filing exemp-
185. See note 154 and accompanying text.
186. See Tri-County Materials, 114 Bankr. at 165 (denying assignee Section 9-302(1)(e) ex-
emption where, among other things, assignment was accomplished by a formal written agreement
and notice was given to the account debtor); K.A.O.P. Co., 372 N.W.2d at 777 (noting the use of
standard U.C.C. forms in effecting the transfer and finding Section 9-302(1)(e) inapplicable). Con-
trast Wood, 67 Bankr. at 324 (finding Section 9-302(1)(e) protection appropriate where the trans-
action was between two individuals with a personal relationship).
187. See note 154 and accompanying text.
188. See, for example, Bindl, 13 Bankr. at 150 (including in list of reasons why exemption
did not apply the common presence of subsequent transferees of milk proceeds checks with conse-
quent risk of adverse reliance unless filing is required). Contrast K.A.O.P. Co., 372 N.W.2d at 778
(granting a second assignee priority even though it "may have originally believed that another
party had priority" because of the importance of policy behind filing requirement).
189. AM Int'l, 46 Bankr. at 571 (finding Section 9-302(1)(e) inapplicable in part because
transfer of accounts as part of "financing the purchases of AMI equipment was essential to TDS'
operations"); Brent Explorations, 31 Bankr. at 747 (citing assignor's inability to pay its bills due
to the assignment as one factor that cuts in favor of filing); Bindl, 13 Bankr. at 150 (stating that
"[t]he multiplicity of assignees and the continuing nature of the assignments augur for the com-
pleteness of notice"); K.A.O.P. Co., 372 N.W.2d at 777 (looking to the unliquidated nature of the
transferred account in denying Section 9-302(1)(e) protection because of corresponding inability to
compare it with all other outstanding accounts). Contrast Hostetler, 49 Bankr. at 739 (granting
Section 9-302(1)(e) protection because the assignments in question constituted only a small por-
tion of the assignor's obligation to the assignees); K & G Health Care Indus., 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
at 839 (finding the security interest perfected without filing because "the subject assignment and
accompanying note and security agreement [was the assignee's] only loan transaction with
[assignor]").
190. See Brent Explorations, 31 Bankr. at 748 (stating that assignee "knew it should have
recorded the assignment" because it was "a large supplier of pipe [with] sufficient business acumen
to file liens"); K.A.O.P. Co., 372 N.W.2d at 777 (questioning applicability of Section 9-302(1)(e)
where transferee reserved only a security interest in the accounts rather than receiving an absolute
assignment, and noting the transferee's failure to file an already prepared financing statement); H.
& Val J. Rothschild, Inc., 242 N.W.2d at 847 (noting the assignee's familiarity with mortgage filing
requirements in refusing to excuse the failure to file security interest). Contrast Fort Dodge Roof-
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tion, have emphasized the particular assignee's familiarity with the fil-
ing system and consequent assumption of the risk in failing to use it.''
Those courts that take the osterizer approach do not typically fo-
cus on any of these factors. Rather, they deem the professional or non-
professional character of the assignee to be most important in applying
Section 9-302(1)(e). 192 As we have seen, however, the statutory text does
not bear this interpretive approach.'93
4. A Better Approach to Section 9-302(1)(e)
So how should courts interpret Section 9-302(1)(e)? In general
terms, courts should construe the section in keeping with its underlying
aims, but only so far as its language permits. Judges undertaking this
effort are not likely to find perfect peace of mind. Nevertheless, they
might avoid some psychic wear and tear by following these suggestions:
First, courts should reject out of hand the extreme antitextual in-
terpretations of Section 9-302(1)(e) that bar all financial institutions
from ever invoking the filing exemption,19 4 and permit nonprofessional
assignees to claim the exemption even when they receive all the as-
signor's accounts.9 5 These rules do too much violence to the language
of the Code, even if they are sensible as a matter of abstract policy.
Second, in divining whether an assignment involves a significant
part of the assignor's accounts, courts should not focus on whether the
assignee is a professional financer. 96 Critics of this position will argue
that the drafters of the U.C.C. included Section 9-302(1)(e) in the Code
to protect the nonprofessional account transferee.19 7 The drafters did
so, however, by forging a rule that does not focus on the professional or
nonprofessional status of the transferee. Moreover, they did so in a set-
ing Co., 50 Bankr. at 669 (noting that two years passed between assignee's taking of assignments in
excusing the failure to file second assignment under Section 9-302(1)(e)); Consolidated Film In-
dus., 403 F. Supp. at 1284 (stating that the assignee "apparently was given information that its
assignment was not a significant portion of [assignor's] contract rights, and it may have [reasona-
bly] relied on that information in not filing a financing statement").
191. See note 190.
192. See, for example, Fort Dodge Roofing Co., 50 Bankr. at 669; Barrington, 34 Bankr. at 58
(stating that "commercial lenders ... assume the risk of failure to file financing statements re-
specting assignments of accounts"); Brent Explorations, 31 Bankr. at 748; City of Vermillion, 341
F. Supp. at 712.
193. See notes 174-82 and accompanying text.
194. See note 161 and accompanying text.
195. See notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
196. See notes 174-82 and accompanying text.
197. See, for example, Bindl, 13 Bankr. at 150 (explaining that "as suggested by the official
comment to the UCC, in isolated or casual assignments filing is an undue burden on the unsophis-
ticated transferee"). See also notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
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ting where sound reasons can be marshalled for preferring a rule that
rejects any such distinction.198
The proper judicial response to this state of affairs is not to rewrite
the statute to distinguish between nonprofessional and professional as-
signees. Rather, judges should give the Section 9-302(1)(e) exemption
an ample scope in all cases to ensure that nonprofessionals who claim
the exemption are not prejudiced by the Code's incidental extension of
the exemption to institutional financers. 99 In short, courts should apply
Section 9-302(1)(e) in all cases on the premise that the claimant is a
family farmer or other small businessperson. Otherwise, courts will
make precedent that, if applied in principled fashion, later will leave
deserving nonprofessionals out in the cold.200
Third, courts that cannot resist differentiating between the "little
person" assignee and the expert financial institution should not accom-
plish this result by warping the language of Section 9-302(1)(e). Instead
they should, in an intellectually honest and straightforward manner,
fashion supplementary non-Code law under Section 1-103 to avoid
harsh and unfair results in cases that genuinely threaten the nonprofes-
sional assignee's interests.2 1 A nonprofessional assignee might actually
rely on the lack of any filed financing statement in taking an account
assignment. If a lending bank later pops up and claims a prior position
based on Section 9-302(1)(e), courts might apply the doctrine of equita-
ble estoppel to subordinate the bank. Whether such an application of
198. The drafters may have foreseen inordinate difficulties for courts called on to distinguish
between professionals and nonprofessionals. See note 605 and accompanying text. The drafters
may have reasoned that all or most assignments to professionals would involve a substantial part
of the debtor's accounts, so that the section would have little practical bearing on professionals
even if made applicable to them. See note 131 and accompanying text. Perhaps the drafters antici-
pated that professional assignees would file as to small account transfers regardless of whether
Section 9-302(1)(e) applied to them, thus further limiting the real-world impact of the section on
such assignees. See notes 170-71 and accompanying text. Whatever their reason, the drafters drew
up a rule that, though concededly was designed in large part to protect nonprofessionals, draws no
line at all between professional and nonprofessional transferees.
199. By way of analogy, a major purpose of a three-year statute of limitations is to protect
persons prejudiced by delay in initiating actions. The existence of this purpose, however, does not
mean that persons who are not prejudiced by delay cannot invoke the statute or are subject to a
less generous interpretation of the term "three years." Rather, the statute is enforced according to
its terms.
200. The practical difficulties in taking this leap are twofold. First, a court looking at an
individual case is not likely to have sympathy for a Section 9-302(1)(e) claimant that is a bank or
commercial factor. Second, even the court that looks beyond the individual case will be tempted to
read less generously an exemption applicable to both professionals and nonprofessionals, than one
applicable only to nonprofessionals. By recognizing these impulses, courts should be better able to
overcome them.
201. See Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions I 1.01[1][d] at 1-5 (cited in note 8) (stat-
ing that "courts . . . rely heavily on § 1-103 to fill in the gaps deliberately or accidently left in
Article 9"). Section 1-103 is set forth in substantial part in the text accompanying note 406.
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equitable estoppel is displaced by the particular provisions of Sections
9-302(1)(e) and 9-312, and is thus impermissible under Section 1-103, is
debatable.0 2 But there is room to argue that courts may equitably
subordinate the distinctively culpable professional assignee whose lack
of diligence has induced detrimental reliance. 03
Finally, courts applying the Section 9-302(1)(e) exemption should
focus-in conformance with the section's "significant part" lan-
guage-on the portion of accounts transferred and the absolute size of
the assignment.20 4 Inescapably such line-drawing involves difficult judg-
ments. In general, however, courts should apply a sliding scale under
which the tolerable percentage of accounts transferred rises as the abso-
lute size of the assignment decreases. It is not surprising that a number
of cases illustrate a proper application of this approach.0 5
On a more general level, courts need to reflect on the proper philos-
ophy to bring to close cases under Section 9-302(1)(e). There is reason
to advocate resolving close cases in favor of filing, given "[t]he desira-
bility of providing public notice of interests in such ephemeral prop-
erty, and the ease with which [assignees] can file. ' 206 The better view,
however, is just the opposite. Because Section 9-302(1)(e) sets forth a
rule of lenity designed to protect nonprofessionals who take limited and
out-of-the-ordinary account assignments, courts should construe the
statute liberally in all cases to ensure that they achieve this aim.207
5. The Interplay of Section 9-302(1)(e) and the First-To-File Rule
Section 9-302(1)(e) establishes a principle of perfection and not of
priorities. Even when applicable, Section 9-302(1)(e) does not always
202. See U.C.C. § 1-103.
203. By way of analogy, U.C.C. Section 2-201 sets forth a detailed statute of frauds for agree-
ments involving the sale of goods. Nonetheless, many courts have agreed that principles of estop-
pel, applicable under U.C.C. Section 1-103, bar invocation of that provision by the promisor whose
otherwise unenforceable oral promise has induced substantial adverse reliance. See White and
Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 2-6 at 88-89 (cited in note 8).
204. See notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
205. See, for example, Hostetler, 49 Bankr. at 739 (applying Section 9-302(1)(e) exemption to
protect financial institution assignees holding loans of $5,381 and $4,168, respectively). A case on
the edge, but probably correctly decided is First Gen. Contractors, in which the court applied the
Section 9-302(1)(e) exception to a $25,000 account while the assignor had $70,000 to $80,000 in
outstanding accounts. 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 763-64.
206. White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 22-10 at 1003. See B. Hollis Knight
Co., 605 F.2d at 401 (viewing Section 9-302(1)(e) "as a narrow exception to the filing require-
ment"); Wood, 67 Bankr. at 324 (stating that "section was designed as a narrow exception"). See
also H. and Val J. Rothschild, Inc., 242 N.W.2d at 847 (stating that the "filing requirement for
assignments is not obscure"). See generally In re Vinzant, 108 Bankr. 752, 757 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1989) (stating that "le]xceptions to the U.C.C. should be construed narrowly").
207. See notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
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operate in such a way as to provide an exception to the first-to-file rule.
This point is illustrated by Case D:
CASE D. On Day 1, Adele Accountdebtor buys Horatio the Hog
from Arthur Assignor for $450, with payment due on Day 5. As of
Day 1, Alfee Assignee I already holds a floating lien that covers all
accounts of Arthur Assignor and has a U.C.C. financing statement
on file as to that security interest. On Day 2, Arthur Assignor trans-
fers his right to payment for Horatio-one of his twenty hog ac-
counts-to Artee Assignee II. Assignee I and Assignee II both
demand payment on Day 5.
In this case Assignee I is not covered by Section 9-302(1)(e) be-
cause he has taken all of Arthur's hog accounts on a continuing basis.
Assignee II, however, has not obtained a significant part of Arthur's ac-
counts and so can claim the benefit of Section 9-302(1)(e). Does this
mean that Assignor II takes priority? Quite the contrary.
The reason why is that Section 9-302(1)(e) serves only to perfect
Assignee II's security interest automatically; it does not give Assignee II
priority. Instead, Section 9-312(5)(a) fixes priorities, and it does so on
the basis of time of filing or perfection. 20 s Because Assignee I filed
before Assignee II's security interest was automatically perfected by 9-
302(1)(e), Assignee I wins Case D.
Even the otherwise meticulous Professor Farnsworth stumbles on
this point. He correctly notes that "Article 9 exempts from its 'first-to-
file' rule 'an assignment of accounts which does not alone or in conjunc-
tion with other assignments to the same assignee transfer a significant
part of the outstanding accounts of the assignor.'" Then he adds:
"Such an assignment, although within the scope of Article 9, is appar-
ently entitled to priority if it was made before the competing assign-
ment."20 9 That, however, is often not the case because filing may
predate the assignment. Assume, for example, that on Day 1 Big Bank
has on file a financing statement covering all the assignor's accounts.
On Day 2, Max makes a nonsignificant-part assignment of Account No.
219 to Zelma. On Day 3, Max enters into a security agreement that
assigns Account No. 219 to Big Bank. On these facts, Big Bank takes
priority even though the assignment to Zelma was "made before the
competing assignment." This is the proper result because, although
Section 9-302(1)(e) excuses Zelma from the Article Nine filing rules, it
does not excuse her from the Article Nine priority rules. Under those
208. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a). See id. § 9-312(5)(a) cmt. 4; White and Summers, Uniform Com-
mercial Code § 24-4 at 1131.
209. Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 11.9 at 123 (cited in note 8) (emphasis added).
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priority rules Big Bank wins because it filed before the automatically
perfected assignment to Zelma occurred.210
The bottom line is that, although Section 9-302(1)(e) creates an ex-
ception to the general rule of first-to-file priority, the applicability of
Section 9-302(1)(e) to an assignee's interest does not mean that the
competing first filer will always lose. Rather, because of its interaction
with Section 9-312(5), Section 9-302(1)(e) provides an exception to the
general first-to-file rule only if the first-filed financing statement cover-
ing the competing interest is recorded after the Section 9-302(1)(e) ac-
count transfer is automatically perfected.
C. The Section 9-104(f) Exclusion
When the Code's drafters extended Article Nine's coverage to ac-
count sales, they could have provided a complete set of rules for decid-
ing all priority disputes arising from successive assignments. The
drafters, however, were not so ambitious. Viewing their overriding pur-
pose as the regulation of security devices,211 the drafters exempted from
the Code certain account transfers "which, by their nature, have noth-
ing to do with commercial financing transactions. ' 212 The result was
Section 9-104(f), which provides that Article Nine "does not apply" to
a sale of accounts or chattel paper as part of a sale of the business out of which
they arose, or an assignment of accounts or chattel paper which is for the purpose
of collection only, or a transfer of a right to payment under a contract to an as-
signee who is also to do the performance under the contract or a transfer of a single
account to an assignee in whole or partial satisfaction of a preexisting
indebtedness; .. .213
This section does not exclude specified accounts from Article Nine.
Rather, it excludes specified transactions in accounts. The result is that
one transfer of an account may fall within Article Nine, while another
transfer of the identical account may fall outside the Article. Such situ-
ations present prickly priority problems, particularly for the first-filing
financer who carefully has jumped through every Article Nine hoop.
214
Before turning to Section 9-104(f)'s effect on priorities, however, it is
210. In accord, Daly, 610 P.2d at 401 (stating that Section 9-302(1)(e)-equivalent in Wyo-
ming Code would not protect nonfiler where its interest attached only after competing secured
party's filing). See also Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 19.6 at 537 (cited in
note 2) (stating that "[t]he transactions described in § 9-302(1)(e) remain subject to the provisions
of the Article and are exempted only from the filing requirement").
211. U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt.
212. Id. § 9-104(f) cmt. 6. See Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 10.5 at 309
(cited in note 2).
213. U.C.C. § 9-104(f).
214. See, for example, Brent Explorations, 31 Bankr. at 748 (noting that Section 9-104(f)
"provides another exemption from filing").
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necessary to explore the types of account transactions Section 9-104(f)
excludes from the Code.
1. Professor Gilmore's "Financing Nature" Approach
Professor Gilmore asserted that Section 9-104(f)'s listing of account
transfers set forth merely an illustrative collection of examples.215 Thus,
according to Gilmore, courts should view the list as nonexclusive and
use the section to remove from Article Nine all nonfinancing sales.216
This interpretation merits attention because Gilmore, the Reporter for
the Article Nine project, "is the horse's mouth.2 117 Moreover, although
some courts have rejected Gilmore's position,218 others have cottoned to
his view. 219 This latter tendency is unfortunate, because Professor Gil-
more's reading of Section 9-104(f) is nothing less than outrageous.
Gilmore's interpretation flatly contradicts the statutory text. On its
face, Section 9-102 extends the Code to all account sales and transfers
for security.220 Moreover, neither Section 9-104(f) nor any other Code
215. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 10.5 at 309 (cited in note 2). See
also Panama Airways, Inc., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 431.
216. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 10.5 at 309.
217. Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions 1.01[2][c] at 1-7 (cited in note 8). See also
Homer Kripke, Suggestions for Clarifying Article 9: Intangibles, Proceeds, and Priorities, 41
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 687, 690 (1966) (stating that "fit is all but impossible to discuss ambiguous areas
in the present article 9 without finding that Mr. Coogan and Professor Gilmore, like Kilroy, have
been there before").
218. See, for example, Sun Air Int'l, 24 Bankr. at 137 (rejecting theory that Code is inappli-
cable to any transaction "not intended as a financing arrangement" because Code "was not in-
tended to be applied only to transactions intended for security"); Sun Bank, 466 So. 2d at 1092
(refusing to recognize general exemption from Code for nonfinancing transctions); John Deere Co.
v. Neal, 544 S.W.2d 514, 516 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (stating "[tihat such comprehensive exclusion
was not the intent of the draftsman seems apparent"). See also Cripps, 31 Bankr. at 542-44 (refus-
ing to apply Section 9-104 even though parties stipulate that sale of accounts from one individual
to another "was not a commercial financing transaction"); Consolidated Film Indus., 403 F. Supp.
at 1282 (rejecting generalized nonfinancing transaction exemption).
219. For example, in Panama Airways, Inc., the court construed an account receivable stat-
ute, which broadly required filing as to assignment of "an existing or future right to the payment
of money," not to cover transactions "where there is no accounts receivable factoring or financing
in the ordinary commercial sense." 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 428-30. It also noted that the problem
"remains with us even under the Uniform Commercial Code," id. at 431, and quoted Gilmore's
illustrative-list interpretation of Section 9-104(f) to support judicial exclusion of nonfinancing
transactions, id. See also First Gen. Contractors, 12 U.C.C. Rep. at 764 (reaffirming Panama Air-
ways as reaching proper result under Code and citing Gilmore with approval); Cripps, 31 Bankr. at
544 (discussing "financing nature" approach used in In re Hurricane Elkhorn Coal Corp. 11, 19
Bankr. 609 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982)).
220. Professor Gilmore himself recognizes this fact. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal
Property § 10.5 at 309 (noting that "final draft starts by covering all 'sales' "). In accord, Board of
Trustees of the Vacation Trust Carpenters Local No. 1780 v. Durable Developers, Inc., 724 P.2d
736, 745 (Nev. 1986) (hereinafter "Vacation Trust")(stating that "[a]ccording to the drafter's com-
ments to this section, every assignment of an account receivable, whether intended for security or
not, is included within the scope of Article Nine unless expressly excluded by some other
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provision contain language supporting a generalized exemption for
nonfinancing assignments.22" ' Rather, Section 9-104(f) enumerates four,
and only four, specific categories of excluded account transactions. The
point is driven home by the Comment to Section 9-104, which teaches
that only "certain transfers. . . which, by their nature, have nothing to
do with commercial financing transactions" are excluded from the Arti-
cle.222 The Code's drafters knew how to craft illustrative lists when they
so desired,2 23 and they did not write such a list into Section 9-104(f).
Professor Gilmore's position also is untenable in light of the history
of the Code. Early drafts of the Code did endorse Gilmore's view.224
The 1952 version applied the Code only "to any financing sale of ac-
counts,"2 25 while the Code's 1950 incarnation exempted from the filing
requirement "an assignment of accounts . . . not for the purpose of fi-
nancing. ' ' 2 6 By 1956, however, the Code's drafters had scrapped the fi-
nancing-sale litmus because it was too "undefined. ' 227 Instead, they
provision").
221. See Sun Bank, 466 So. 2d at 1092 (stating that "the specific language of section [9-
104(f)] does not appear to allow for additional ad hoc exemptions and such an approach would
subject the priority and filing rules established by Article 9 to increasing uncertainty") (footnote
omitted); John Deere Co., 544 S.W.2d at 516 (stating that "[t]he scope of Chapter 9 has been
generally defined by Section 9.102, and specifically limited by Section 9.104. There is no apparent
reason to give an expansive reading to the enumerated limitations").
222. U.C.C. § 9-104 cmt. 6 (emphasis added).
223. See, for example, id. § 9-102(2) & cmt. 1.
224. See generally Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 3.08[1][b] at 3-46 (cited in note 8);
Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 10.5 at 309 (cited in note 2); Jensen, 1977 Utah
L. Rev. at 333 (cited in note 74).
225. U.C.C. § 9-102 (1952) (emphasis added). See id. § 1-201(37) (1952) (defining security
interest in same fashion).
226. U.C.C. § 9-303(f) (1950). In a curious passage, the Comments to Section 9-102 of the
1952 Code stated: "Subsection 1(b) brings under this Article all 'financing' sales of accounts, chat-
tel paper and contract rights, whether made for security or not. The kinds of sales meant to be
excluded by the qualification 'financing' are identified in Section 9-104(f)." U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 3
(1952). As Professor McDonnell suggests, the Comment "shows that these provisions were in-
tended to work in tandem." Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 3.08[l][b] at 3-47 (cited in note
8). The Comment, however, does not reveal how Sections 9-102 and 9-104(f) were to interact under
the 1952 draft. The point is now academic because the drafters in 1956 opted to remove the pliable
financing qualification from Section 9-102 altogether and let Section 9-104(f) alone define those
categories of accounts not covered by Article Nine.
227. American Law Institute, 1956 Recommendations of the Editorial Board for the Uni-
form Commercial Code at 14, 254 (1957). Even Professor Gilmore acknowledged that "[t]he unde-
fined (and perhaps undefinable) phrase 'financing sale' was evidently felt to be too vague."
Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 10.5 at 309 (cited in note 2). Subsequent strug-
gling with what is and what is not a financing sale confirms the validity of this concern. See, for
example, Sun Air Int'l, 24 Bankr. at 137 (characterizing present and absolute assignment of ac-
count for agreement to provide legal services as "a financing arrangement for the payment of attor-
neys fees"); John Deere Co., 544 S.W.2d at 516 (stating that a tractor retailer's sale of chattel
paper to large wholesaler for cash cannot "be said to have nothing to do with commercial financ-
ing"); Ford, 22 Okla. L. Rev. at 429, 431 (cited in note 112) (arguing that leading cases supporting
the illustrative-list interpretation in fact involved financing transactions properly covered by
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sculpted Article Nine to cover "all sales" of accounts "except as other-
wise excluded. ' 2 8 The drafters of Article Nine thus initially embraced,
but later repudiated, the very standard Professor Gilmore would apply.
They did so, moreover, because the listed categories of account trans-
fers set forth in Section 9-104(f) "satisfactorily specify types of transac-
tions in accounts . . . not subject to the Article."22
Any doubt about the inappropriateness of Professor Gilmore's in-
terpretation was removed by the 1972 Code Amendments, which added
to Section 9-104(f) its fourth excluded category of accounts: the single
account transfer made to satisfy a preexisting debt. The revisors added
this category to validate earlier decisions that had found such transfers
outside Article Nine even though they are not listed in Section 9-
104(f).2 30 If the Code's revisors had agreed with Professor Gilmore's
reading of Section 9-104(f), however, they would not have had to amend
the section to vindicate those holdings.23 ' More important, once the
Board decided to amend Section 9-104(f), it did not rewrite the section
to reach all nonfinancing assignments. Rather, it added to the section
only a single and specific category of account transactions. In sum, the
drafters of the Code consistently have refused to give courts carte
blanche to exclude account transfers on the nebulous ground that they
do not involve a financing sale.23 2
Even so, there continue to be rumblings that Professor Gilmore
had things right. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, for
example, recently endorsed Gilmore's approach to Section 9-104(f),233
as have other tribunals.2 4 Moreover, although Professor McDonnell
seems in the end to reject the financing-sale interpretation of Section 9-
104(f) ,235 his treatment of that interpretation overstates its credibility.
In particular, following his discussion of Spurlin v. Sloan236 and Lyon v.
Code); Jensen, 1977 Utah L. Rev. at 335 n.27 (cited in note 74) (same).
228. American Law Institute, 1956 Recommendations at 254 (cited in note 227).
229. Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
230. See U.C.C. § 9-104 cmt. 6 (citing the Lyon and Spurlin decisions discussed in notes 287-
90 and accompanying text).
231. In accord, Consolidated Film Indus., 403 F. Supp. at 1282 (rejecting view that 1972
Amendment simply clarified the preexisting meaning of Section 9-104(f); rather, the amendment
"was in fact necessary to effect" results of earlier preexisting-debt-satisfication cases).
232. See notes 224-31 and accompanying text.
233. Goldstein v. Madison Nat'l Bank, 807 F.2d 1070, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
234. See note 219 and accompanying text.
235. See Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 3.08[4][a] at 3-55 (cited in note 8) (stating
that "[b]y narrowly confining the statutory exemption to the facts of the Spurlin case, the revisers
effectively rejected language which would exclude a range of nonfinancing transfers from the Arti-
cle"); id. § 3.08[2] at 3-51 (criticizing "continuing judicial unwillingness to accept the drafters'
attempt to draw bright lines as to which assignment of accounts will and will not be included in
the scope of Article 9"); id. § 3.08[3][c] at 3-54 to 3-55.
236. 368 S.W.2d 314 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963).
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Ty-Wood Corp.,3 7 Professor McDonnell suggests that "Professor Gil-
more's position [has been] buttressed by the reference to the Lyon case
in the [1972] comment to Section 9-104. ' ' 231 His reasoning is as follows:
[In 1972] a new sentence was added to the comment stating "this paragraph ex-
cludes from the article such transactions as that involved in" Lyon and Spurlin.
Since Spurlin clearly involved a transfer of a single account in partial satisfaction
of an existing indebtedness, the new comment is unexceptional with respect to that
case. But the characterization of the Lyon transfer as an absolute conveyance in
satisfaction of debt, as has been seen, is very questionable. Nor can Lyon be fitted
within any of the other express exemptions of Section 9-104(f). The real ground for
that decision appears to be the non-professional character of the lender. It is diffi-
cult to square the new wording of Comment 6 with the position that Section 9-104
exhausts the types of absolute assignments excluded from Article 9.39
The key to this analysis is that Professor McDonnell describes the
Lyon court's finding that the account transfer in that case was an abso-
lute conveyance as "very questionable." From this premise, Professor
McDonnell reasons that the Code drafters may well have intended to
extend the Section 9-104(f) exclusion to broadly protect nonprofession-
als, whether or not they take an account transfer in satisfaction of an
obligation. In Lyon itself, however, the appeals court embraced and em-
phasized the trial court's finding of fact that the account transfer was
not for purposes of security, but was an absolute conveyance in pay-
ment of a preexisting debt.2 40 Accordingly, the best reading of the 1972
Comment is that the new exclusion in Section 9-104(f) applies only
when such a finding is made. Of course, the Comment's reference to
Lyon might be read to throw interpretive light on Section 9-104(f)'s
new preexisting-indebtedness exclusion, including by suggesting that
security as well as absolute transfers meet the "in satisfaction" require-
ment.2 41 In no way, however, does the Comment's brief reference to
Lyon support a wideranging antitextual exemption for all nonfinancing
account transfers.242
237. 239 A.2d 819 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1968).
238. Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 3.08[3][c] at 3-54 (cited in note 8).
239. Id. § 3.08[3][al at 3-52.
240. Lyon, 239 A.2d at 821.
241. See notes 298-326 and accompanying text.
242. In accord, White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 22-10 at 1001 (cited in
note 8) (stating that "we believe that all sales or assignments of accounts except for those specifi-
cally excluded under 2-104(f) are governed by Article Nine."); Clark, The Law of Secured Trans-
actions 1.04 at 1-26 (cited in note 8) (stating that "[a]lthough Comment 6 to § 9-104 suggests
that the courts might create ad hoc exemptions based on this [non-financing-transactions] stan-
dard," the proper result is not to "open up this Pandora's box"). See also Editors' Note, Goldstein
v. Madison Nat'l Bank, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 260, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (stating that
"[wihile the amendment achieves the same result as [Spurlin and Lyon], it does not adopt the
reasoning behind the decisions").
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We turn now to examining the four categories of account transac-
tions the drafters did exclude from Code coverage in Section 9-104(f).
2. The Sale-of-a-Business Exclusion
The first type of account transfer excluded from Code coverage is
the "sale of accounts . . . as part of a sale of the business out of which
they arose.' ' 24s This exclusion fits comfortably with Section 9-104(f)'s
overarching aim of excluding specified nonfinancing transfers from Arti-
cle Nine. 44 The sellers of business assets typically are not seeking cur-
rent operative funds; instead, they are removing any need for working
capital by disposing of their operations. 46
Even so, why should the business purchaser not be required to
comply with the Code's attachment and perfection requirements with
respect to the transfer of accounts? Following the notion of Professor
Gilmore, it is difficult to say that the transfer of accounts pursuant to
the sale of a business is not the type of transaction that no one "would
have thought of filing. '246 The sale of a business is always a significant
transaction, and the parties to such a transaction are almost always rep-
resented by counsel. Such a sale requires the execution of formal docu-
ments and often involves a number of public filings. Indeed, counsel for
the buyer of the business should, and often will, check the U.C.C. files
to discover any existing encumbrances against property-including ac-
count property-being transferred as part of the sale. It is ironic that
the business buyer, who thus profits from the U.C.C. filing system,
should not have to use that same system to warn potential future trans-
ferees of the account purchases the buyer has made.
On the other hand, one can construct an efficiency argument to
support the sale-of-a-business exclusion. The seller of a business no
longer has that business. No person would be so foolish as to purchase
accounts from someone who is not conducting business operations.
Thus, the argument goes; it is a needless and wasteful exercise to re-
quire the business buyer to provide warning via the U.C.C. files to pro-
tect possible future purchasers of the business's seller's accounts.
This rationale for the sale-of-a-business exemption is not persua-
243. U.C.C..§ 9-104(f).
244. In accord, Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 3.08[4][d] at 3-61 (cited in note 8).
See generally notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
245. See Ford, 22 Okla. L. Rev. at 426 (cited in note 112) (suggesting that the earmark of a
financing transaction is whether "the assignment enabled [the assignee] to obtain or retain money
advanced by another to aid his business"); Jensen, 1977 Utah L. Rev. at 335 n.27 (cited in note 74)
(same). The seller of a business may use sale proceeds to provide working capital for another
business. Such a transaction, however, travels far from any ordinary factoring-type transaction.
246. See note 78 and accompanying text.
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sive. For example, a business may be sold in stages, or a business seller
may have another business, or set up a new business, that provides
"cover" for reselling already-assigned accounts. Particularly given the
significance of business-sale transactions, and the low cost of filing, one
can make a strong case against this Code exemption. Nonetheless, the
sale-of-a-business exclusion stands large as life in Section 9-104(f).247
3. The For-Collection-Purposes-Only Exclusion
The second Section 9-104(f) exclusion applies to "an assignment of
accounts . . . which is for the purpose of collection only." Any non-
recourse notification-based account sale to an institutional factor is for
collection purposes in the sense that the parties envision that the as-
signee will process and bear the risk as to all account payments.2 4 Such
assignments, however, are not for collection purposes only, and clearly
are subject to Article Nine.249 Even so, some courts have used the for-
collection-purposes-only exclusion to protect creditors who have taken
notification-based assignments to facilitate payment of the assignor's
debt.250 These cases are off the beam, however, because the purpose of
the exclusion was to protect the "assignment of an account to a collec-
tion agency or to an attorney for simple collection of a deadbeat
account."25'
247. For a case applying the sale-of-a-business exemption (albeit not in a priority context),
see Paul v. Chromalytics Corp., 343 A.2d 622 (Del Super. 1975). Compare Vittert Constr. & Inv.
Co. v. Wall Covering Contr., Inc., 473 S.W.2d 799, 802-03 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971) (finding account
transfer not "part of a sale of the business" where assignee had merely "spoke[n] of buying [the
assignor"s] company"). See generally Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions 1.08[6][a] at 1-95
to 1-96 (cited in note 8).
248. See notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
249. See White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 21-9 at 956 (cited in note 8)
(suggesting that Article Nine requires filing by factors who "buy accounts outright and without
recourse"); Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 10.5 at 308 (cited in note 2) (noting
that the factoring operation in which "the assignee buys receivables without recourse against the
assignor" is closely related to straight accounts receivable financing). See also District of Columbia
v. Thomas Funding Corp., 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 242, 246 (D.C. Ct. App. 1991)
(stating that factoring arrangement is "a frequently used means of commercial financing that the
drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code clearly contemplated would fall within the scope of
Article 9").
250. See, for example, Feldman, 408 F. Supp. at 38 (finding lessor's assignment of rents to
lender that provided funds with which lessor purchased aircraft was made "to facilitate direct
payment of the loan by means of the rent payments" and thus "was for collection purposes only,"
and suggesting that Lyon was a for-collection-purposes-only case); United States v. Mercury Mo-
tor Express, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 919 (S.D. Ga. 1968) (conclusory opinion deeming collection-pur-
poses exclusion applicable to assignment made with view toward account proceeds being paid
directly to assignee to satisfy assignor's debt).
251. Ford, 22 Okla. L. Rev. at 426 (cited in note 112). In accord, In re Cawthorn, 33 Bankr.
119, 120 (M.D. Tenn. 1983) (stating that "[t]he phrase 'for the purpose of collection only' must
necessarily apply only to assignments of a non-commercial nature, such as the assignment of a
debt to a collection agency for the sole purpose of obtaining collection of the debt"); Brent Explo-
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So what assignments do fall within this category of excluded ac-
count transactions? Consider Case E.
CASE E. Sam Seller, Inc. holds sixteen long-overdue invoices un-
paid by Betsy Buyer Co. Sam assigns all these accounts to Curly's
Collection Agency. In return, Curly's agrees it will promptly remit
to Sam one-half of all collections it receives from Betsy.
This assignment is for collection purposes only in the most literal
sense: Sam's sole reason for transferring the accounts is to facilitate
their collection. Looking to the purpose of 9-104(f), the assignment is
not a financing transaction-at least in the ordinary discounting
sense-because Sam's transfer does not transform his right to future
payment into any present operating capital.252 Rather Sam has received
only an executory agreement entitling Sam to realize at most a portion
of amounts Sam already is owed and to do so only in the event that
collections in fact occur. Case E thus provides the paradigmatic exam-
ple of the assignment for collection purposes only.253
What of Case F?
CASE F. As in case E, Sam holds sixteen overdue accounts paya-
rations, 31 Bankr. at 748 (stating that "[t]he purpose of the provision is to remove assignments of
a non-commercial nature such as those to a collection agency for the sole purpose of collecting a
debt," and that "it does not exclude from filing those transactions that are 'financing in nature' ");
Liles and Raymond, 24 Bankr. at 629 n.3 (noting that assignment made to FmHA to repay loan
could not fall under Section 9-104(f) exemption); York v. Ottusch, 412 F. Supp. 819, 822 (W.D.
Wisc. 1976) (stating that the assignee "cannot avoid the Uniform Commercial Code requirements
by arguing . . . that this is an 'assignment. . . for the purpose of collection only,' [because] [a]s
the trustee points out in his brief, [the assignee] does not run a collection agency .... "); Sun
Bank, 466 So. 2d at 1091 (finding section inapplicable because "the assignment was not a transfer
to a collection agency"); Bramble Transp., 294 A.2d at 101 (stating that "this exclusion is for the
purpose of removing from the Code assignments of a non-commercial nature such as those to a
collection agency for the sole purpose of facilitating collection of the debt"). See also Gold Coast
Leasing Co. v. California Carrots, Inc., 155 Cal. Rptr. 511, 514 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (refusing to
apply "for collection only" exemption when assignment made to facilitate collection of rental pay-
ments owed by assignor).
252. See Ford, 22 Okla. L. Rev. at 426 (cited in note 2). See generally note 245 and accompa-
nying text.
253. In accord, Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 3.08[4][c] at 3-60 (cited in note 8).
This conclusion is incorrect if one thinks the for-collection-purposes-only exemption is designed
solely to clarify that the Code's attachment and perfection rules do not apply to the designation of
an agent to effectuate collection efforts on behalf of the account debtor, or without the transfer of
any property interest to that agent. That Article Nine does not apply to the mere designation of an
agent, however, is clear. First, no express exemption was necessary to provide for that result under
the terms of U.C.C. Section 9-102(1)(b), since nothing in that section suggests that the simple
creation of an agency relationship constitutes a security interest. More important, the exemption
by its own terms covers "an assignment of accounts on chattel paper which is for the purpose of
collection." U.C.C. § 9-104(f). The section thus clearly applies solely to cases in which a property
interest in the accounts is transferred, and not to cases in which a mere agency is established.
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ble by Betsy. Now, however, Sam assigns the accounts to Curly's for
$1000 in cash. Curly's is to keep all amounts it collects from Betsy.
Is this transfer for collection purposes only? There is room to argue
that it is not.2 54 Some might even say that, from Sam's perspective, the
assignment in Case F is not for collection purposes at all; rather its
purpose is to produce immediate cash.2 55 This fact marks the Case F
transfer as more like a financing transaction than the assignment in-
volved in Case E.256 Indeed, the transaction in Case F may be said to
differ from the ordinary account sale only in the respect that the sold
accounts are overdue. If the Code's drafters meant to exclude from Ar-
ticle Nine all sales of overdue accounts, however, they could have done
so with far more direct and explicit language than Section 9-104(f)
employs.
To these considerations might be added the observation that no
great injustice will follow from applying the Code to account transfers
like the one in Case F.257 The typical buyer of overdue accounts is a
professional collection agency or lawyer, and ought to know of the
U.C.C. filing system.258 In addition, because such transferees ordinarily
will take only the limited portion of the assignor's accounts that are in
default, those transferees often can invoke the Section 9-302(1)(e) ex-
emption even if not saved from their folly in failing to file by Section 9-
104(f).259
On balance, however, courts should find that Case F falls within
254. See Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 3.0814][c] at 3-61 (cited in note 8) (stating
that "cases would seem to establish that a transfer is for collection only when the assignor does not
receive anything of value other than the collection activities themselves").
255. See In re Worden, 63 Bankr. 721, 724 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1986) (stating that "contrary to
the facts in the instant case, a 'collection only' assignment does not involve an advance of money");
Swiden Appliance & Furniture, Inc. v. National Bank of S.D., 357 N.W.2d 271, 275 (S.D. 1984)
(holding that the Section 9-104(f) "exclusion for contracts or chattel paper sold or assigned for the
purpose of collection only" did not apply since the sale of the retail installment sales contracts was
not "for the purpose of collection only," but also involved the bank's advance of money to the
seller"); Daly, 610 P.2d at 401 (recognizing that "a 'collection only' assignment does not involve an
advance of money. Rather, the money is paid only if the collection is made."). See also Franchise
Tax Bd. v. Credit Managers Ass'n., 142 Cal. Rptr. 777, 780 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
256. See Ford, 22 Okla. L. Rev. at 426 (cited in note 112) (stating that "[t]he basic reason for
this exclusion is that an account which is assigned solely for the purpose of being collected and in
no manner related to the obtaining of capital for a business is not a financial transaction and,
therefore, does not belong in Article 9"). See generally note 245 and accompanying text.
257. Rather, a broad application of the "for collection purposes only" exclusion, such as to
Case E, arguably threatens to cause injustice by jeopardizing the positions of later transferees.
This is so because a business might sell overdue accounts to a collection agency and then sell them
again to an unsuspecting transferee unable to secure notice of the prior transfer from the U.C.C.
files. The uncollectability of the accounts may cause the cash-short position that induces the as-
signor to engage in such nefarious behavior.
258. See note 251 and accompanying text.
259. See notes 113-210 and accompanying text.
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the Section 9-104(f) exclusion. This is so because, just as in Case E, the
assignment in Case F involves a transfer of overdue accounts, made be-
cause they are overdue, to a professional collection agency. To say that
the transaction does not involve commercial financing is plausible in
these circumstances. 60 Indeed, the account sale in Case F resembles an
outright assignment of a damages claim (such as an action in tort) more
than a traditional factoring transaction. 61 No less important, this inter-
pretation avoids affording more protection to the assignee who merely
undertakes collection efforts (Case E) than the assignee who both works
at collection and enriches the assignor's estate by paying for the oppor-
tunity to do so (Case F). Nor does this analysis of Case F require the
unsatisfying conclusion that Section 9-104(f) places all overdue-account
transfers outside the Code.262 For example, even tardy account debtors
often pay their bills in due time without the need for special collection
efforts; thus the sale of such accounts as part of a larger account sale to
a factor would hardly qualify as being for collection purposes only.
There is reason to believe that Professor Clark would exclude Case
F from the Code,2 63 and the case law does not foreclose that result.
2 4
Although the question is close, the better view is that the Section 9-
104(f) exclusion applies to cash purchases of overdue accounts by a
buyer specifically planning to undertake affirmative collection efforts.
4. Assignments and Delegations
The third Section 9-104(f) exemption covers the "transfer of a right
to payment under a contract to an assignee who is also to do perform-
260. See U.C.C. § 9-104 cmt. 6.
261. Contrast id. § 9-104(k) (excluding even security transfers of tort claims from Article
Nine).
262. See text following note 256.
263. See Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions 1.08[6][b] at 1-96 (cited in note 8) (indi-
cating that "if the transfer of accounts is to a collection agency or other third party after default
...the transaction is clearly excluded").
264. Thus, Daly differs from Case E because in Daly "there was no indication that the ac-
counts were past due." Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 3.08[4][c] at 3-60 (cited in note 8).
In re Worden is distinguishable because it involved not an account sale, but an assignment
designed to "secure advances loaned by a bank." Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 3.08[4][c]
at 3-60 (cited in note 8). The best case authority for not applying the Section 9-104(f) exclusion to
Case E is probably Franchise Tax Bd. v. Credit Managers Ass'n., 142 Cal. Rptr. 777 (Cal. Ct. App.
1977). There a debtor assigned its accounts for the benefit of its creditors in return for their agree-
ment to delay enforcement of the debtor's obligations to them. Contrary to the analysis in the text,
the court refused to apply the for-collection-purposes-only exemption on the ground that the
debtor had received a present consideration-in the form of the enforcement moratorium-in re-
turn for the account transfer. Id. at 780. Even so, the Credit Managers case is readily distinguisha-
ble from Case E. Because the transaction in that case involved a restructuring of debt, the transfer
of accounts was part of a financing transaction. Of no less importance, the accounts transferred in
Credit Managers were not overdue at all.
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ance under the contract. 26 5 This language embraces the delegatee-as-
signee-that is, the person who both assumes duties and obtains rights
under the contract held by the assignor.2 66 A strong argument exists for
excluding these transactions from the Code because the delegatee-as-
signee may not think of the transaction as involving an "account" at all.
As a functional matter, being a delegatee-assignee differs little from be-
ing hired to do a job in the first place, and the businessperson under-
standably may fail to recognize that a legal difference exists that
requires the filing of a U.C.C. financing statement. Such assignments,
moreover, travel far from ordinary assignments pursuant to factoring or
accounts financing arrangements. In particular, the principal benefit to
the assignor from such transfers is not the receipt of funds, but the
assignee's assumption of the assignor's contractual duties. Thus it is un-
likely that such transfers will involve any meaningful financing of the
assignor's operations even in the loose sense of transforming a right to
future payments into significant current cash.267 Finally, the assignee-
delegatee has a special claim to realize the value of the assigned account
because the delegatee's own work earns the right to payment of that
account.6 '
The core of the performance-as-well-as-payment exclusion is plain
enough. The builder who assumes both the right to payment, as well as
the duty to perform, under another's construction contract falls outside
265. U.C.C. § 9-104(f).
266. See Charter First Mortgage, 56 Bankr. at 846 (holding that Section 9-104(0 "simply
excludes from the provisions of Article 9 certain non-financing transactions such as that of a total
assignment of a contract under which the assignee is to take over performance"); First Nat'l Bank
v. Autrey, 673 P.2d 448, 449 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that "this exception applies only to
situations in which the assignor both delegates a duty to perform and assigns the right to payment
to the same person"). See generally Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 10.5 at
309-10 (cited in note 2).
267. See notes 245 and 256 and accompanying text. It is probably too much to say that
"[a]bsolute assignments of contract rights when the assignee is also to do the performance under
the contract are examples of transactions 'which it would make no sense to file,' since the transac-
tion is not one about which potential creditors of the assignor would have reason to be concerned."
Pctron Trading Co. v. Hydrocarbon Trading & Transport Co., 663 F. Supp. 1153, 1159 (E.D. Pa.
1986). For example, a bank might be contemplating a loan to a contractor accompanied by an
assignment of project proceeds as collateral. If the contractor already has secretly delegated and
assigned the construction contract away, that is hardly a transaction about which the bank would
have no "reason to be concerned."
268. For example, American East India Corp., 400 F. Supp. at 167 (stating that "in the case
of an unperformed contract, the account generated by performance is more the result of the per-
formance than the product of the contract, itself"); Canter v. Schlager, 267 N.E.2d 492, 496 (Mass.
1971) (stating that "recent cases have recognized 'the peculiarly equitable claim of those responsi-
ble for the physical completion of building contracts to be paid from available moneys ahead of
others whose claims come from the advance of money' ") (citing United States v. Munsey Trust
Co., 332 U.S. 234, 240 (1947)).
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Article Nine.269 On the other hand, the exemption does not reach the
bank that takes an assignment of a contractual right to a consulting fee
payable to the bank's own consultant even though the bank is to per-
form under the contract in the sense that it is obligated to pay the
fee.170 In such a case, the bank is not the delegatee of the assignor's
duty to render consulting services and therefore has not undertaken the
relevant performance for purposes of 9-104(f).
27 1
More complex cases will generate more difficult issues. For exam-
ple, in Petron Trading Co. v. Hydrocarbon Trading & Transport Co.
272
the assignor was a supplier obligated to deliver fuel to the State of New
York. The supplier-assignor subcontracted with the assignee, who
agreed to deliver some of the fuel, and took a security interest in the
assignor's right to payment from the state to secure the supplier's obli-
gation to pay. On these facts, the court refused to apply the Section 9-
104(f) exclusion to protect the assignee. The court reasoned that the
assignor "did not extricate itself from its contract with the State" be-
cause it "retained rights to petition for price adjustments" and "contin-
ued to prepare invoices. 2 73 This analysis is unpersuasive. Delegators
seldom are extricated from the underlying transaction;27 4 at the least,
they remain responsible for performance in the event of the delegatee's
269. See Coogan, et al., Security Interests in Personal Property § 3.0814][b][ii] at 3-56 (cited
in note 8) (citing assignment-delegation by the building contractor as the prototype case under this
Code rule).
270. Autrey, 673 P.2d at 449-50.
271. See In re Hengalo Enters., Inc., 51 Bankr. 54 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (finding Section 9-
104(f) payment-and-performance exemption inapplicable to collateral transfer of franchise agree-
ments entitling assignor to operate car dealership; apparent reasoning of court is that such con-
tracts do not involve a right to payment but instead provide only a means for generating income
by way of car sales to third parties); Charter First Mortgage, 56 Bankr. at 846 (deeming "question-
able" the position that a receiver is an assignee within the meaning of the performance-and-pay-
ment exemption). A division of authority exists on whether a general contractor's assignment to a
surety company, as part of a performance bond, of rights to payment from the project owner,
contingent on the contractor's default, is excluded from Article Nine by Section 9-104(f0's pay-
ment-and-performance language. A number of cases say that it is. See, for example, In re V.
Pangori & Sons, Inc., 53 Bankr. 711, 717 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985) (collecting cases); City of Ver-
million, 341 F. Supp. at 711. Other courts, and Professor Gilmore; say that it is not. See Gilmore,
Security Interests in Personal Property § 10.5 at 309 (cited in note 2); In re Kuhn Constr. Co., 11
Bankr. 746, 749 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 1981). See generally Robert A. Hillman, Julian B. McDonnell,
and Steven H. Nickles, Common Law and Equity Under the Uniform Commercial Code §
24.01[2] [a] [i] at 24-11 n.35 (Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 1985). The debate has little if any practi-
cal significance, however, given the courts' uniform protection of construction sureties through the
equitable subrogation doctrine. See notes 422-48 and accompanying text.
272. 663 F. Supp. 1153 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
273. Id. at 1159.
274. See Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 11.10 at 131 (cited in note 8) (noting that





Also unenlightening was the court's observation that the transac-
tion was "somewhat akin to a commercial financing transaction, in that
it afforded [the supplier-assignor] a means of obtaining the oil it needed
to make the deliveries it contracted to make. 2 76 The same point applies
in any delegation case. The assumption of construction obligations by
an assignee building contractor, for example, affords the delegator-as-
signor the means of obtaining the goods and services that it has con-
tracted to deliver to the owner. The Section 9-104(f) exclusion,
however, clearly covers such a transfer.277
If the arrangement in Petron Trading properly falls outside Sec-
tion 9-104(f), it is because the assignee did not take an outright assign-
ment of amounts owed by the state, but instead took only a traditional
collateral interest in the accounts to secure the supplier-assignor's obli-
gation. In keeping with Section 9-104(f)'s underlying purpose, to say
that the assignment had "nothing to do with commercial financing
transactions" is difficult. 278 Indeed, the assignee in Petron Trading is
hardly different from a supplier that engages in the most orthodox form
of secured financing by selling on an open-account basis while taking as
collateral some portion of the buyer's assets. In addition, there is reason
to believe the drafters envisioned that Section 9-104(f) would exclude
only account sales-and not security transfers-from the reach of Arti-
cle Nine. Thus, even Professor Gilmore, who advocated the most expan-
sive interpretation of the provision in other respects,2 79 indicated that
Section 9-104(f) was designed to exempt only nonfinancing sales from
Article Nine.2 0
Even so, the better view is that the subcontractor-assignee in Pe-
tron Trading-and similarly situated subcontractors-should enjoy the
benefit of the Section 9-104(f) exemption. These subcontractors, partic-
ularly construction subcontractors, will often be small businesses. In
other contexts, courts have stretched the Code's text to afford protec-
tion of such businesses when they fail to file financing statements.28 1 In
275. See id. § 11.10 at 126.
276. 663 F. Supp. at 1159.
277. See note 269 and accompanying text.
278. U.C.C. § 9-104 cmt. 6.
279. See notes 215-42 and accompanying text.
280. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 10.5 at 309 (cited in note 2) (stating
that "the Article was meant to apply to 'sales' of intangibles in institutionalized financing transac-
tions (such as factoring); the three types of transfers which are specifically excluded are merely
examples of 'non-financing' sales"). See also Valley Bank of Nev., 528 F. Supp. at 913 (stating that
Section 9-104(f) "removes certain transactions from the scope of Article Nine," but that "[a]ll the
transactions removed, however, are outright transfers of accounts.").
281. See notes 414-21 and accompanying text.
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cases like Petron Trading, however, courts need not stretch the Code's
language at all. This is so because in that case the assignee did receive
"a transfer of a right to payment under a contract" and was "also to do
the performance under the contract." Indeed, Section 9-104(f)'s use of
the broad term "transfer" supports the conclusion that the subcontrac-
tor's fate should not hinge on whether it took its interest in the account
by way of sale or security transfer.282
This is all the more true because an underlying premise of Article
Nine is that courts, in general, should afford the same treatment to
both absolute and collateral assignments of accounts.2 83 MoreoVer, it
makes particularly good sense to apply that principle in this context. In
many cases involving subcontractor-assignees, for example, the parties'
working (if not formal) understanding will be that the delegator-as-
signor's obligation to the subcontractor is payable immediately upon
the delegator-assignor's receipt of payments from the account debtor.2 84
In such situations, the difference between a security assignment and an
absolute assignment of the owner's obligation is of little practical im-
portance because in either event the parties anticipate a prompt turno-
ver of funds upon their receipt by the assignor. To draw a distinction
based on the technical description of the assignment in the contract
thus elevates form over substance in derogation of basic Code policy.28 5
In sum, Petron Trading should not be followed. 286 Rather courts
should apply the performance-as-well-as-payment exemption liberally
to protect those whose efforts generate account collections others there-
after seek to snatch from their grasp.
5. The Satisfaction-of-a-Preexisting-Indebtedness Exclusion
The final Section 9-104(f) exemption applies to "a transfer of a sin-
gle account to an assignee in whole or partial satisfaction of a preexist-
ing indebtedness." This language, the Comments tell us, was added to
validate the results reached in the infamous Spurlin and Lyon cases.287
282. In the Petron Trading case itself the court recognized that "transfer" is a broad term.
663 F. Supp. at 1161.
283. See notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
284. See Rudolph, 5 B.C. Indust. & Comm. L. Rev. at 258 (cited in note 30) (stating that
"the contractor will ordinarily pay subcontractors and material suppliers on the same basis on
which he is being paid by the owner").
285. See U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. (stating that "[tihe scheme of the Article is to make distinc-
tions, where distinctions are necessary, along functional rather than formal lines").
286. Contrast In re Consolidated Steel Corp., 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 408 (M.D. Fla. 1972)
(finding no need to address claim of performance-and-payment exemption where subcontractor's
supplier secured agreement from general contractor and subcontractor that checks should be
drawn jointly to supplier and subcontractor).
287. U.C.C. § 9-104 cmt. 6 (citing Spurlin and Lyon). For other early cases embracing the
approach of Spurlin and Lyon, see Cohen v. Casillo, 364 A.2d 858, 861 (Conn. Ct. App. 1976)
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In Spurlin, a contractor assigned rights to payment generated by
work on a project to a partner in the venture to settle partnership ac-
counts. The case is infamous because of the court's monumental fum-
bling with the statutory text in finding that the parties had not created
an Article Nine security interest at all.2" e Lyon is infamous for two rea-
sons. First, with every textual reason not to do so, the Court in Lyon
followed Spurlin's lead and held that the Code did not apply to account
transfers made "in payment of a preexisting debt. 28 9 Second, the court
found that the assignments in that case constituted payment rather
than security, despite the assignee's own admission that they were
"taken as 'security.' "29o Although these cases were hardly analytical
masterpieces, the drafters seemed to like the principle for which they
stood. Accordingly, in 1972 they grafted the new "satisfaction of a pre-
existing indebtedness" category of account transfers onto Section 9-
104(f).291
This preexisting-debt exception to Article Nine is not easy to ex-
plain or justify. This exclusion conflicts with the statutory purpose of
exempting from Code requirements only those account transfers that
"have nothing to do with commercial financing transactions." '292 The
reason for transferring accounts to meet preexisting debt obligations,
after all, typically is to stave off the creditor's cash-depleting collection
efforts. In effect such transfers entail debt extensions, through which
the assignor is able to augment current operating capital by averting
immediate cash outflows.
In addition, it seems strange to give preferential treatment to this
particular class of account transferees. The recipient of an account
transfer that extinguishes a preexisting debt merely surrenders a claim
that would have been costly to enforce and might have proven uncol-
(citing Lyon for proposition that "[i]f the assignment was intended to satisfy a preexisting debt
owed to the assignee, it would have priority over the trustee in bankruptcy"); National Surety
Corp. v. State Nat'! Bank, 454 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970) (citing Spurlin with approval).
288. The court ignored Section 9-102(1)(b). It also ignored the reference to buyers of ac-
counts in Section 1-201(37), even though the court quoted that very provision.
289. Lyon, 239 A.2d at 820-21.
290. Id. at 821. For critcism of the Lyon court's analysis, see Henson, Handbook on Secured
Transactions § 5-6 at 148 n.86 (cited in note 8); Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions
1.08[6][d] at 1-97 (cited in note 8). Contrast Hawkland, Lord and Lewis, 8 Uniform Commercial
Code Series § 9-104.07 at 206-07 (cited in note 8); Thomas M. Quinn, Quinn's Uniform Commer-
cial Code Commentary and Law Digest § 9-104[A][8] at 9-84 (Warren, Gorham, 2d ed. 1991).
291. See U.C.C. § 9-104(f) & cmt. 6.
292. Id. See Ford, 22 Okla L. Rev. at 426 (cited in note 112) (stating: "The real question the
court should be considering is whether this assignment is one which serves a valid financing pur-
pose. Has the assignment enabled the retailer to obtain or retain money advanced by another to
aid his business? If it has, it is a financial transaction and belongs within Article 9."). See generally
notes 245 and 256 and accompanying text.
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lectible altogether. In contrast, the outright buyer of accounts parts
with cold cash that flows directly into the assignor's estate. It seems
odd in these circumstances to favor the former transferee over the lat-
ter. That, however, is precisely the effect of the 1972 amendment to
Section 9-104(f).
In some respects, the added language is clear. The assignee must
have received only "a single account" if she wants to get outside the
Code ballpark; three (or even two) accounts and you're in.293 Moreover,
"preexisting debt" means "preexisting debt"; simultaneity in creating
the debt and making the assignment knocks the transaction out of Sec-
tion 9-104(f).294
Can financial institution lenders take advantage of the satisfaction-
of-a-preexisting-debt exemption? Not according to the court in Bank of
Cave Spring v. Gold Kist, Inc. 295 This decision is wrong. As with Sec-
tion 9-302(1)(e), not a kernel of statutory language justifies distinguish-
ing between professional and nonprofessional lenders in applying the
preexisting-debt exclusion.29 Either an assignment is "in whole or par-
tial satisfaction of a preexisting indebtedness" or it isn't; the business
address of the assignee holding the indebtedness should have nothing to
'do with this inquiry. As a practical matter, however, it will count with
some courts.29 '
293. See, for example, Vacation Trust, 724 P.2d at 745 (stating that exception is inapplicable
if assignor tranfers more than one account to assignee).
294. For example, the court in Cripps stated:
The facts in Sloan are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. Sloan dealt with the
assignment of monies owed in satisfaction of a preexisting debt. We are dealing in the instant
case with a sale of accounts for value received.
31 Bankr. at 544. See also York, 412 F. Supp. at 823 (holding preexisting indebtedness exclusion
unavailable because assignment was made "to secure the loan simultaneously advanced"); Clark,
The Law of Secured Transactions 1 1.04 at 1-25 (cited in note 8) (stating that "[i]f the transaction
involves the sale of a single account for new value rather than in satisfaction of an antecedent
debt, the buyer loses in the seller's bankruptcy if he has not filed a financing statement").
In Vacation Trust, the court confronted a case in which the assignor transferred a single
$250,000 account, but designated only $129,000 of it to satisfy a preexisting debt, with the remain-
ing $121,000 to secure future advances. 724 P.2d at 739. The court concluded that the entire as-
signment fell outside the Code because of the preexisting-debt exclusion (although it subordinated
the assignee's claim to at least a portion of the $121,000 account proceeds on other grounds). Id. at
745-46. The court's reasoning was that the assignee received only one assignment and that this
assignment was taken (to the tune of $129,000) in satisfaction of a preexisting debt. Id.
The Vacation Trust court's reasoning seems simultaneously too technical and too metaphysi-
cal. The practical financial fact was that only $129,000 of the assignor's corpus of accounts was
transferred in satisfaction of a preexisting debt. One wonders whether the court would have
reached the same result (which, as a matter of logic and principle, it would seem bound to do) if
the preexisting portion of the assignor's debt had been $1000 or $1.29.
295. 327 S.E.2d 800, 805 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
296. See notes 174-82 and accompanying text.
297. See Sherburne Corp., 340 A.2d at 86 (distinguishing Lyon in bank-assignee case on
ground that "the assignment in Lyon was between relatives"); Valley Bank of Nev., 528 F. Supp.
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The trickiest problem presented by Section 9-104(f) is determining
whether the account transfer is in "satisfaction" of a preexisting debt.
One interpretive difficulty is suggested by Case G.
CASE G. On Day 1, Freddy Friend knocks on Molly McDelin-
quent's door and complains that she still owes him a $5,000 debt.
Molly explains that she soon will receive payment on the one and
only account she holds and dashes off a note that reads: "I assign to
Freddy Friend, as security for my $5,000 debt to him, the account
now owed me by Barney Beefbuyer, payable later this month." On
Day 2, Second Assignee Bank obtains, and perfects by filing, a se-
curity interest in all of Molly's accounts as part of a loan transac-
tion. Molly thereafter defaults on her debts, and Barney Beefbuyer
wants to know whether to pay Freddy or Second Assignee Bank.
On these facts, Freddy did not achieve automatic perfection under
Section 9-302(1)(e) because Molly transferred to him all her then-out-
standing accounts. 298 It follows that, if the Code covers that assignment,
Freddy will lose under the first-to-file rule of 9-312(5).299 Freddy's only
chance is to jump outside the Code through the escape hatch of Section
9-104(f).
Freddy's argument is that he received "a transfer of a single ac-
count . . . in whole or partial satisfaction of a preexisting indebted-
ness." One can imagine the response of counsel for Second Assignee
Bank. She will say, almost verbatim: "Come on, Freddy. You didn't get
any 'satisfaction' of that debt. You only got some security for it."300
The Bank's counsel will note that the Code language relied on by
Freddy was designed to codify Spurlin and Lyon,"0' and that the courts
in both those cases deemed critical the difference between absolute and
security assignments.302 The Bank's attorney will go on to cite authority
that suggests that all the Section 9-104(f) exclusions apply only to abso-
lute transfers. 30 3 If the Bank's counsel is really on her toes, she also will
observe that the Code itself, in another context, differentiates between
"security for" and "total or partial satisfaction of" a preexisting
claim °.3 0 The inference thus is strong that the drafters of Section 9-
at 913 n.8 (citing Sherburne's reference to "professional status" of assignee in finding bank's reli-
ance on Spurlin and Lyon misplaced). See generally Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 3.08[2]
at 3-50 & n.18 (cited in note 8).
298. See notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
299. See notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
:300. See Jensen, 1977 Utah L. Rev. at 335 n.29 (cited in note 74).
301. See U.C.C. § 9-104 cmt. 6.
302. See Lyon, 239 A.2d at 821; Spurlin, 368 S.W.2d at 316.
303. See note 280 and accompanying text.
304. "[A] person gives 'value' for rights if he acquires them. . . as security for or in total or
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104(f) saw providing "security" and providing "satisfaction" as different
colored horses, and that Freddy is trying to ride the wrong one into the
regions of non-Code law.30 5
Perhaps, however, things are not so simple. One fly in the ointment
is Lyon. As we have seen already, some analysts assert that the assign-
ments at issue in Lyon were made solely as security.30 6 Thus, because
the 1972 Code Comment says that the transactions involved in Spurlin
and Lyon fall outside the Code, one might infer that the 1972 exclusion
covers security transfers.3 0 7 In a similar vein, when the satisfaction-of-a-
preexisting-indebtedness exclusion was put forward in the Permanent
Editorial Board's Final Report, the following proposed new Comment
accompanied it: "[T]his paragraph excludes from the Article such
transactions as that involved in In re Panama Airways, Inc. . . ., where
an unliquidated single receivable from a customer was transferred to
the supplier to secure the related debts.
'"3 0 8
Do these spicy morsels of legislative history establish that a trans-
fer of a single account as security for a preexisting debt is in whole or
partial satisfaction of that debt within the meaning of Section 9-104(f)?
To the contrary. With respect to Lyon, the safer assumption is that the
drafters of the 1972 Code Comment accepted the Lyon court's own
characterization of the assignments at issue in that case.309 The court in
Lyon ruled that the account transfers involved therein were "not for
security," and emphasized that the Code covers security assignments.3 10
Lyon thus undermines, rather than supports, the view that the security
transfer involved in Case G falls outside Article Nine.31'
Freddy's interpretive effort also gets no help from the drafters'
loose talk about Panama Airways because the proposed 1971 Comment
that discussed that case never became the Official 1972 Comment. In-
deed, the Official 1972 Comment dropped all mention of Panama Air-
ways and of transfers "to secure . . . debts." The deletion of this
partial satisfaction of a pre-existing claim." U.C.C. § 1-201(44)(b) (emphasis added).
305. See First City Mortgage Co., 69 Bankr. at 768 (holding that transfer of accounts to bank
to secure loan clearly not excluded by Section 9-104(f)); Valley Bank of Nev., 528 F. Supp. at 913
(refusing to follow Spurlin and Lyon in part because "assignments involved here were never in-
tended to be outright transfers, but, rather, were intended to provide Valley Bank [the assignee]
with collateral to secure its loan"); Cohen, 364 A.2d at 861-62 (same).
306. See note 239 and accompanying text. See also Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions §
3.08[2] at 3-49 (cited in note 8).
307. See Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 3.08[3][a] at 3-52.
308. See Permanent Editorial Board, Final Report at 36-37 (1972) [hereinafter "Final Re-
port"]; U.C.C. § 9-104 cmt. (1971).
309. See notes 239-41 and accompanying text.
310. See Lyon, 239 A.2d at 820-21.
311. See, for example, Cohen, 364 A.2d at 861-62 (emphasizing distinction in Lyon rule be-
tween assignment "to satisfy a preexisting debt" and assignment "intended for security").
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language, coupled with the Official Comment's approbation of only
Spurlin and Lyon, sends a strong signal that the satisfaction-of-a-pre-
existing-indebtedness exclusion does not embrace traditional security
transfers. For all these reasons, courts properly have recognized that
this aspect of Section 9-104(f) does not remove collateral assignments
from the perfection and priority rules of Article Nine.312
Of course, it remains necessary to explore what distinguishes a se-
curity assignment from a satisfaction assignment. The key interpretive
issue is presented by Case H.
CASE H. The facts are the same as in Case G except the paper
signed by Molly McDelinquent reads: "I hereby absolutely and un-
conditionally assign to Freddy Friend, in payment of my $5,000
debt to him, the account now owed by Barney Beefbuyer, payable
later this month. If Barney Beefbuyer fails to pay this account, how-
ever, I shall remain fully liable for my debt."
The argument is strong that Case H, like Case G, involves a secur-
ity transfer not excluded from the Code by Section 9-104(f). This is so
because the account assignment, although absolute, does not satisfy
Molly's debt in the ordinary sense: it does not discharge Molly's duty of
performance. 31 3
Freddy will argue, nonetheless, that Molly's assignment in Case E
involved no less a satisfaction of a debt than did the assignments in
Spurlin and Lyon, which the drafters of the 1972 amendment sought to
exclude from Code coverage. Freddy will point to the actual language of
the assignments in the Lyon case, which gave no indication that they
served to discharge the assignor's underlying debts.3 1 4 Freddy also will
note the failure of the courts in both Spurlin and Lyon to state that the
assignments did effect such a discharge. 1 5 He will emphasize even more
those courts' overriding focus on the proposition that the assignments
were absolute and unqualified, and not on the proposition that the as-
signments effected a discharge.316
312. See note 305.
313. See Ballentine's Law Dictionary 1139 (3d ed. 1969) (defining "satisfaction" as "[tihe
discharge of an obligation"). See also Geeslin v. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., 398 N.E.2d
1176, 1181 (Ill. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that "assignment was made to pay a debt, not to secure
one" because assignment discharged the debt and provided full satisfaction).
314. Lyon, 239 A.2d at 821.
315. No such indication appears in Lyon. One student author asserts that the assignee in
Spurlin "did not have recourse to [the assignor] if the account was not paid." Ford, 22 Okla. L.
Rev. at 428 (cited in note 112). The opinion in the case, however, nowhere states that such an
agreement was in place. The payments pursuant to the assignment-and not the assignor's action
simply in assigning his rights-were necessary to "settle his accounts" under the parties' agree-
ment. Spurlin, 368 S.W.2d at 315.
316. Lyon, 239 A.3d at 821 (stating that "the absolute and unqualified language of the as-
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There is, on the other hand, a basis to argue that the Lyon and
Spurlin courts viewed the transactions in those cases as involving satis-
faction of the antecedent debts in the pure sense of providing a dis-
charge. In particular, both courts referred to the assignments as being
in "payment" of the preexisting debts,317 and the term "payment" often
is used as a synonym for "satisfaction" or "discharge. '18 Of no less im-
portance, both courts reasoned that the assignments at issue did not
involve collateral-type Article Nine security interests.1 ' It is hard to
say, however, that those assignments did anything more than "secure
payment" of an underlying "obligation" 320 if the obligation persisted
even after the assignment was made.3 2'
Freddy's life also is complicated by Panama Airways, which in-
volved precisely the type of "you may collect from my account debtor
but I'm not discharged" assignment presented in Case H.322 As already
noted, the authors of the 1971 proposed Comment described the trans-
action in Panama Airways as a security transfer, and the authors of the
1972 Comments chose not to cite this case as a proper example of the
satisfaction-of-a-preexisting-debt exclusion.32 3 This legislative history,
the bank will argue, cuts against applying that exclusion to the transfer
to Freddy in Case H.324 Finally, the Bank will say that the preexisting-
indebtedness exclusion is so questionable in the first place that it
signments and the other evidence in the record ...is consistent with the conclusion that the
assignments were given in payment and not for security."); Spurlin, 368 S.W.2d at 315-16 (finding
that unconditional assignment fixed priority of assignee under pre-Code law, and twice noting that
case involved an "absolute assignment").
317. Spurlin, 368 S.W.2d at 316; Lyon, 239 A.2d at 822.
318. See, for example, F.R.C.P. 8(c).
319. Spurlin, 368 S.W.2d at 316; Lyon, 239 A.2d at 821.
320. U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
321. See Major's Furniture Mart, 602 F.2d at 546 (finding absolute transfers of accounts to
constitute "secur[ity] transfers rather than sales" because "none of the risks present in a true sale
is present here"); In re Joseph Kanner Hat Co., 482 F.2d 937, 940 (2d Cir. 1973) (same, but debt
created simultaneously); Boughner, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 149 (treating "absolute" account trans-
fer as security because assignee did not surrender right to full payment on existing debt). See
generally U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 1 (stating that when "the transaction [is] intended to have effect as
security," then "this Article applies regardless of the form of the transaction"). But see U.C.C. § 9-
502 cmt. 4 (stating that "there may be a true sale of accounts ... although recourse exists").
322. See 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 427 (setting forth terms of parties' agreement, which pro-
vided: "ACCEPTANCE of this Assignment by Socony shall not be construed as a release or dis-
charge of the liability of Panama").
323. See notes 308 and 312 and accompanying text.
324. This argument draws strength from the Article Nine policy that "distinctions based on
form. . . are no longer controlling." U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. This is so because the assignment in Case
E, even though characterized as absolute, is "intended to have effect as security" for an underlying
and ongoing obligation of the debtor. See id. § 9-102 cmt. 1. That the debtor in Case E may cash in
on his collateral directly does not change the more fundamental fact that the debtor has only
obtained collateral.
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should be construed narrowly so as not to extend to Case H. s25
The authorities point in both directions on the question presented
by Case H.326 On balance, however, Freddy should win on the ground
that absolute assignments made as the primary (albeit not exclusive)
source of payment of preexisting loans fall within the preexisting-in-
debtedness exclusion of Section 9-104(f). This result will shock some
Article Nine purists, who surely will view Case H as involving a security
transfer that functionally involves no satisfaction of the underlying
debt at all. The term "satisfaction," however, is not self-defining; it per-
mits a distinction between account transfers designed to provide the
primary source of payment (despite the presence of an additional con-
ditional right to proceed against the assignor if the accounts prove un-
collectible) and transfers of accounts as pure collateral (because they
are subject to collection only if and when the debtor defaults on pay-
ment obligations). The adoption of this distinction, however dubious as
a matter of policy, is simply the fairer reading of the critical Spurlin
and Lyon cases, both of which focused not on whether the preexisting
obligation persisted, but on whether the assignment was absolute and
unconditional in character. 27
325. See note 292 and accompanying text.
326. Compare Goldstein, 807 F.2d at 1074 (suggesting that the key inquiry is "whether the
assignment by [assignor] was an absolute assignment"); Valley Bank of Nev., 528 F. Supp. at 913
n.8; Feldman, 408 F. Supp. at 38 (suggesting that assignment of account "to facilitate direct pay-
ment" is "exempt from the provisions of Article Nine") (citing Lyon); Consolidated Film Indus.,
403 F. Supp. at 1282 (stating that the "assignment of a contract right in consequence of a past-due
obligation . . . is within the spirit of the § 9-104(f) exceptions"); Vacation Trust, 724 P.2d at 745-
46; with Rankin, 102 Bankr. at 443; Fort Dodge Roofing Co., 50 Bankr. at 668 (stating "After the
assignment was made, Stetson did not adjust its books to decrease the amount owed to it by Fort
Dodge Roofing and in fact claimed that after the transfer was made, Fort Dodge Roofing was still
indebted to it in the amount of $170,000. . . . Therefore, the Court concludes that even though
Stetson acted as the owner of the account, the transfer was in reality merely a transfer of a secur-
ity interest in the accounts rather than an outright transfer of the ownership to Stetson"); Miller,
406 F. Supp. at 477 n.25 (stating "The defendant's contention may be correct that assignments
which are meant to effect payment in themselves and not merely to provide security are not con-
trolled by the UCC. . . . Nevertheless, there is no evidence to show that the assignment alleged
here was so intended. To the contrary, it stretches credibility to assert that AIBC's debt to the
New York Bank on the first loan was extinguished on May 3 by virtue of the contract right assign-
ment; had the defendant not received repayment on November 2, it seems at least as likely that it
would have sought payment from AIBC on its promissory note as from the Swiss Bank on the
assignment."); E. Turgeon Constr. Co., 292 A.2d at 234 (refusing to apply Spurlin principle be-
cause assignee failed to "show that once the assignment had been made, it had reduced the bal-
ance due," and concluding that "[t]his failure. . . shows that [the assignee] regarded the retainage
as security and not payment").
327. See notes 314-16 and accompanying text.
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6. Section 9-104(f) and Successive-Assignment Priority Problems
The determination that Section 9-104(f) applies to an account as-
signment merely sets the stage for resolving the parties' priority dis-
pute.32 s Section 9-104(f), after all, is not a priority provision; it is a
scope provision that excludes certain types of transactions from Article
Nine altogether.3 29 The Code's basic priority rule for conflicting account
transfers is the first-to-file rule of Section 9-312.330 That rule obviously
does not apply to a priority dispute between two account assignees who
are both excluded from the Code by Section 9-104(f).33 Moreover, non-
Code common law generally governs those cases that have "one leg in-
side . . . and one leg out" of the Code.3 32 We shall soon see that Code
priority rules continue to govern unusual cases involving Section 9-
104(f). 3  Let us begin, however, by looking to the ordinary case, which
the common law controls.
a. Common-Law Priority Rules in the Era of the Code
When Section 9-104(f) pushes the priority dispute outside Article
Nine, how should the court fix the non-Code rule that controls the
case? One response is to say that the court should simply scout pre-
Code common law to find whether the state follows the New York, Eng-
328. See, for example, Charter First Mortgage, 56 Bankr. at 846 (suggesting that, even if
transferee has been assigned an account excluded by the performance-and-payment rule of Section
9-104(f), "[tlhat section does not wipe out the [previously perfected] security interest a creditor,
for financing purposes, as here, might have already taken in the contract"). Of course, the applica-
bility of Section 9-104(f) to an account transfer may also have an important impact outside the
priorities context. Paul, 343 A.2d at 626 (refusing to apply Section 9-318(4), which invalidates
prohibition on account assignments, to accounts excluded from Article Nine by Section 9-104).
329. See White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 21-8 at 952-55 (cited in note 8).
330. See notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
331. See Zubrow, 68 Minn. L. Rev. at 908-11 (cited in note 75).
332. Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions 11.08 at 11-40 (cited in note 8). See, for
example, Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 3.08[l][c] at 3-48 (cited in note 8) (noting that
Section 9-104(f) excludes those accounts from Code rules of "attachment, priority and default as
well as perfection"); Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 11.9 at 123 (cited in note 8) (stating
that "an assignment of an account that is excluded . . . is left to the conflicting common law rules
on priority"); Consolidated Film Indus., 403 F. Supp. at 1281 (stating that assignee "claims that
[its interest] does not constitute a security interest, and that, consequently, common law priority
rules govern"); Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 8.7 at 277 n.15 (cited in note 2)
(stating that with respect to accounts receivable statutes, "[m]ost courts assumed that a claim or
chose not within the statute continued to be governed by the pre-statutory common law ...
[which] would seem to have been the only possible conclusion"). Compare American East India
Corp., 400 F. Supp. at 162-65 (finding it "a difficult question of interpretation which we need not
resolve" whether common law governs a priority dispute between an "Article Nine secured party"
and a "section 9-104(f) performing assignee, but observing that there is a "reasonable argument"
that the common law governs).
333. See notes 351-404 and accompanying text.
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lish, or Massachusetts four-horsemen rule.334 Some courts have done
just that.33 5 This approach, however, fails to recognize that the Code, to
use a now-popular metaphor, has "change[d] the space" in which non-
Code law is to be found.
3 3 6
334. See generally notes 37-47 and accompanying text. A good discussion of the common-law
authorities appears in Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 902 at 614-20 (cited in note 6), including the
accompanying supplementary materials. The West Key Number under which these cases are col-
lected is Assignments #85.
335. See, for example, Axelrod, 14 U. Dayton L. Rev. at 298-300 (cited in note 1) (discussing
cases that analyzed the status of these rules in their states); Morrison v. Helms, 28 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 172, 174-75 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979). For a case taking a similarly mechanical view
of Code-era common law in another context, see In re Duke Roofing Co., 47 Bankr. 990 (E.D.
Mich. 1985) (relying on pre-Code law to find would-be assignor unempowered to transfer future
refund of insurance premiums).
336. Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn
From Modern Physics, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1989) (emphasis omitted). The Code's existence can
shape the nature and scope of common-law rules. See, for example, Farnsworth, Farnsworth on
Contracts § 11.2 at 67 (cited in note 8) (noting that even when Code provisions exclude account
transactions from Code coverage "it can be expected to have an impact by analogy"); Clark, The
Law of Secured Transactions 1.08112] at 1-126 (cited in note 8) (same); Axelrod, 14 U. Dayton L.
Rev. at 300 (cited in note 1) (noting Florida court's reliance in part on Code's notice-filing system
in opting for first-to-notify English rule as most proper common-law rule). An interesting example
of the influence of the Code on non-Code law is provided by American East India Corp. In that
case, B filed a financing statement perfecting a floating lien covering all of A's after-acquired ac-
counts; A then contracted with D to deliver goods to D for money and then assigned A's rights and
delegated A's duties under that contract to C. 400 F. Supp. at 146-54. The court assumed that New
York common law governed the priority dispute between B, as an Article Nine security interest
holder, and C, as a Section 9-104(f) performance-and-payment transferee. Id. at 155 n.7. The court
also accepted C's argument that pre-Code New York common law would have treated the interest
assignment to C as legal (because the A-D contract existed at the time of the assignment to C) and
the assignment to B as equitable (because the A-D contract did not yet exist at the time of the
assignment to B). Id. at 163. The court further assumed that, under pre-Code common law, B's
legal interest would defeat A's earlier claim. Id. at 163-64. Following the teaching of Section 9-204
and its accompanying Official Comment, however, the court found that B's security interest in
after-acquired accounts was "not merely an 'equitable' interest" in light of the enactment of the
Code. Id. at 164. Therefore, in a Code world, the assignments to both B and C were legal, so that B
took priority under the New York first-in-time rule. Id. at 165.
An important question concerning the interaction of Code and non-Code law is whether a
Section 9-104(f) assignee should take priority if that assignee is the first filer of a U.C.C. financing
statement. The Code exempts the Section 9-104(f) assignee from filing, and no provision of the
Code awards the Section 9-104(f) assignee priority when that assignee is the first filer. Under some
applications of the common-law rules, the later-filing Article Nine secured party might take prior-
ity. For example, in an English rule jurisdiction if, notwithstanding the Section 9-104(f) claimant's
first filing, the Article Nine secured party first informed the account debtor of that later assign-
ment, the second-filing secured party takes priority. The better view is that the first-filing Section
9-104(f) transferee should always take priority over the second-filing Article Nine secured party.
After all, the Article Nine secured party should be expected to check the U.C.C. files. The Section
9-104(f) assignee's filing, albeit gratuitous, provides the type of notice that properly should avert
the second transfer altogether. In sum, a rule favoring the first-filing claimant under Section 9-
104(f) best adapts the common law to the practical realities of a Code-dominated commercial
world. See Comment, UCC Section 9-301(1) and Accounts, Contract Rights and Chattel Paper:
The Non-Existent Priorities?, 41 Wash. L. Rev. 895, 905 (1966) (stating that "[t]he more reasona-
ble analysis . . . is that section 9-104(f) was not intended to deny priorities that might otherwise
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Prior to the Code, for example, New York gave priority to the first
assignee under any and all circumstances.37 The underlying rationale
for this rule was that by "the first assignment the assignor had divested
himself of all it had, so that nothing remained for it to transfer by a
second assignment. '"338 As we have seen already, the Code repudiates
this vision of the universe by routinely permitting the assignee of an
already-transferred account to prevail so long as that claimant files
first.33 " In addition, the first-assignee rule may have persisted in New
York in part because it best served the interests of the commercial fac-
toring and accounts financing industries centered in that state.340 To-
day, however, the Code and its filing rules govern virtually all
assignments to commercial financers, 341 so that any such reason for ap-
plying the New York rule even in New York has disappeared. In such
an environment, should New York courts mechanically favor the first
assignee in a priority dispute governed by non-Code law? Of course
not.3
42
In a similar vein, prior to the Code many states followed the Eng-
lish practice of awarding priority to the first account assignee that pro-
vided notice to the account debtor. 43 The theory behind this rule was
that prospective assignees could and would check with account debtors
to learn of prior assignments so as to avoid giving value for already-
transferred accounts.3 " Today, however, the Code requires assignees of
most accounts to give notice via the U.C.C. filing system,3'5 so that pro-
spective account transferees protect themselves not by contacting each
of the assignor's account debtors, but by checking the Article Nine
be obtainable under article 9").
337. See notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
338. Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 11.9 at 121 (cited in note 8).
339. See notes 91-112 and accompanying text.
340. See Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 25.6 at 671 (cited in note 2)
(noting that the New York rule guaranteed "a happy life" for assignees who could be sure no prior
assignments had occurred).
341. See notes 61-80 and accompanying text.
342. See New York Law Revision Commission, Communication and Study Relating to As-
signments of Accounts Receivable 6 (1946) (reprinted in New York Law Revision Commission,
1946 Report Recommendations and Studies 351, 356 (Williams, 1946)). The Commission indicated
a preference for retaining the first-in-time rule and expressed concern that a notice requirement
would impose hardship on assignors by giving "an erroneous and unfavorable impression of the
assignor's financial position." Id. It also noted that "[i]n the future, when the practice of borrowing
upon the security of accounts receivable has become more widespread and the tendency to regard
it as an indication of financial difficulty has been overcome, the Commission may resume study of
the topic." Id.
343. For a discussion of the English rule, see notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
344. See Axelrod, 14 U. Dayton L. Rev. at 297 (cited in note 1); Corbin, Corbin on Contracts
§ 901 at 608 (cited in note 6) (stating that "[i]f. .. the owner has notice of the assignment, any
subsequent assignee can avoid loss by making inquiry of the owner").
345. See notes 91-111 and accompanying text.
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records. As a result, the policies that once supported the English rule
carry limited force in the modern setting 46
This analysis suggests that, in a Code-dominated world, the Re-
statement's four-horsemen rule seems preferable to either the New
York or English approaches. That rule generally grants priority- to the
first assignee. There is some sense in this approach because a first as-
signee, unlike subsequent ones, cannot even possibly discover any com-
peting assignment. At the same time, the four-horsemen rule smooths
the roughest edges of the New York rule by granting priority to the
second assignee who has invested the energy necessary to reduce the
account to judgment or reached that heightened level of expectancy in-
duced by securing a novation or payment .
3,
Of course, courts that now labor in the fields of Code-era common
law need not follow any of these three rules. There may be good reason
to forge a new and improved common-law principle to govern the nar-
rowed and distinctive set of common-law priority conflicts generated by
Section 9-104(f). One candidate for a better approach would be to af-
ford more protection to nonprofessional, than professional, account as-
signees. The specifics of, and reasons for, such a rule will be developed
in short order.3 48 For now, suffice it to say that such an approach would
track the recurring instinct of the courts.
349
Whatever common-law priority rule covers Section 9-104(f) ac-
counts, that rule will produce departures from the first-to-file principle
that generally governs successive-assignment cases.350 In some Section
9-104(f) cases the first filer will prevail. The first filer, however, will win
not because she was the first filer, but because she fits into some other
346. Prior to promulgation of the Code, some businesses opposed the first-to-notify rule on
the ground that "account debtors would interpret [an] assignment as an indication of financial
weakness." Scult, 11 Ariz. L. Rev. at 3 n.15 (cited in-note 19); In accord, Coleman, 1963 U. Ill. L.
Forum at 266 n.35 (cited in note 2). This justification-whether or not sensible in the first
place-has no application in the modern commercial setting. Today, account assignments are
widespread, are typically filed under the U.C.C., and are recognized as an orthodox and acceptable
manner of generating current funds. The traditional objection to the first-to-notify rule thus no
longer pertains.
347. See notes 41-43 and accompanying text. See, for example, Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, § 342 cmt. e (1979) (explaining four-horsemen rule as reflecting "the interest of the
security of transaction"); Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 902 at 618 (cited in note 6) (citing height-
ened claim of second assignee to "money that he has innocently collected by the exercise of dili-
gence and effort"); Richard E. Speidel, "Stakeholder" Payments Under Federal Construction
Contracts: Payment Bond Surety vs. Assignee, 47 Va. L. Rev. 640, 653 (1961) (citing possibility
that "assignee . . . has relied upon the finality of payments actually received" in arguing against
construction surety's claim to contract proceeds already paid out to a financer assignee of the
general contractor by the project owner).
348. See notes 601-30 and accompanying text.
349. See notes 548-52 and accompanying text.
350. See notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
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legal pigeonhole-such as by being the first assignee, or the first as-
signee to inform the account debtor of the assignment, or the first as-
signee to reduce the assignment to judgment. Because Section 9-104(f)
subjects many account priority disputes to resolution under the com-
mon law, it creates a large, but indeterminate, exception to the Code's
general first-to-file rule.
We turn now to exploring some important ways in which the Code
shapes the exception to the first-to-file rule applicable to Section 9-
104(f) accounts.
b. The Direct Impact of the Code on Section 9-104(f) Priority
Disputes
The foregoing discussion suggests that the Code should help shape
common-law priority rules applicable to Section 9-104(f) account trans-
fers by forcing a reassessment of the underlying justifications for tradi-
tional common-law approaches. It may be that the Code also directly
dictates rules that control at least some priority conflicts concerning
Section 9-104(f) accounts. One set of disputes that the Code may con-
tinue to govern is illustrated by Case I.
CASE I. On January 1, Harold Housepainter transfers six over-
due accounts, which constitute seventy-five percent of Harold's
then-existing account holdings, to Alice Attorney. Alice and Harold
agree that Alice will use her best efforts to effect collections and pay
to Harold sixty percent of all collections made on the accounts. On
January 10, Harold gives Second Assignee Bank a security interest
in all his accounts, including those overdue accounts already as-
signed to Alice, as collateral for a $5000 loan. The bank immediately
files a U.C.C. financing statement and informs all of Harold's ac-
count debtors of this assignment. Although Alice has initiated work
on the collection actions by January 10, she has neither filed a
U.C.C. financing statement nor notified any account debtor. If the
jurisdiction in which these events occur follows the English first-
notice-to-the-obligor rule, does Alice or the Bank have priority to
the overdue accounts?
At first blush, the answer to this problem seems obvious. Because
Alice received a Section 9-104(f) assignment (for collection purposes
only), 51 the Code does not govern her priority dispute with the Bank. 52
The applicable common-law rule in this jurisdiction is that the first no-
tifier wins, and in this case the Bank provided the first notice. As a
351. See notes 248-64 and accompanying text.
352. See note 332 and accompanying text.
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result, the Bank takes priority under non-Code law.353
But wait. Even though the Code does not apply to Alice's assign-
ment,354 she will advance a syllogistic argument for priority under the
Code itself. The argument goes like this:
Major premise: Alice would have defeated the Bank if she
promptly had filed an Article Nine financing statement on January 1.
This is so, Alice will argue, because, although Alice's transfer was not
technically governed by the Code at all, it would be anomalous to give
priority to a second transferee and second filer just because its interest
in the accounts was subject to the Code. 55
Minor Premise: The purpose of Section 9-104(f) is to ensure that
persons who come within that provision are not prejudiced by not
filing.
3 56
Conclusion: Alice should win even though she failed to file; other-
wise she would be prejudiced by not filing in derogation of the purpose
of Section 9-104(f).
The plausibility of Alice's syllogism negates the suggestion that the
Code is out of the picture in determining all priority disputes involving
Section 9-104(f) assignments. Indeed, if Alice's argument is accepted,
the Code-via Section 9-104(f)-precludes application of the English
rule and mandates priority for every assignee who receives a Section 9-
104(f) transfer before a competing transferee records a financing
statement.
Is Alice's interpretation of Section 9-104(f) proper? It is not. There
is no indication that the section's drafters had cases like Case I in mind
or meant the section to establish a rule of successive-assignment priori-
ties. Rather, the sole pronouncement of Section 9-104(f) is that the
Code "does not apply" to the assignments enumerated in that sec-
tion. 57 The practical effect of Alice's syllogism is to treat Section 9-
104(f) transfers as automatically filed and thus automatically perfected.
The Code's drafters, however, provided for automatic perfection of ac-
count transfers in Section 9-302(1)(e) and (g) and not in Section 9-
353. See notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
354. See U.C.C. § 9-104(f).
355. See note 336. Alternatively, Alice will argue that her earlier filing would have consti-
tuted constructive notice to the assignor of Harold's assignment to Alice for purposes of the Eng-
lish first-to-notify rule. See Daly, 610 P.2d at 403 (stating that "[flinancing statements are filed to
give constructive notice"); Coogan and Gordon, 76 Harv. L. Rev. at 1563 n.69 (cited in note 31).
356. See, for example, Brent Explorations, 31 Bankr. at 748 (noting that Section 9-104(f)
"provides another exemption from filing"); Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions 1.08[4] at 1-
93 (cited in note 8) (reasoning that holder of account exempt under Section 9-104 "need not file a
financing statement to protect itself from third parties"). See generally notes 77-80 and accompa-
nying text.
357. U.C.C. § 9-104.
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104(f). 58 As we have seen, there is good reason to scrap the English rule
in crafting the modern common law of successive assignments.3 5 These
considerations establish, however, that Section 9-104(f) does not man-
date that result.
There is another important way in which the Code might settle pri-
ority disputes that involve Section 9-104(f). 6 0 Consider Case J:
CASE J. On January 1, The Bobo Bush and Bamboo Shoppe,
Ltd. assigned all its accounts to First Assignee Bank as security for
a loan. By February 1, some of the accounts had become overdue.
As a result, on February 1, Bobo transferred the overdue accounts
to Cueball Collection Agency, which knew nothing of the prior as-
signment, in return for Cueball's promise to use its best efforts to
collect the accounts and remit fifty percent of all collections to
Bobo. On March 1, the Bank filed its financing statement. In a juris-
diction that follows the New York first-in-time rule, who has prior-
ity to the overdue accounts, Cueball Collection Agency or First
Assignee Bank?
A court might well assume that Article Nine is irrelevant to this
problem under the one-leg-in-and-one-leg-out rule generally applicable
to Section 9-104(f) assignments. 6' Following this analysis, the bank
wins Case J because it was the first assignee in a New York rule juris-
diction. 2  Relying on "Alice's syllogism," Cueball will argue that Sec-
tion 9-104(f) grants it priority by way of an attributed first filing on
February 1. As we have seen, however, courts should reject this argu-
ment. 3 3 Even so, Cueball may not be out of luck, for an alternative
analysis under the Code may well protect its interest. Behold U.C.C.
Section 9-301(1)(d):
[A]n unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of, . . . in the case
of accounts and general intangibles, a person who is not a secured party and who is
a transferee to the extent that he gives value without knowledge of the security
interest and before it is perfected.3'
By its terms Section 9-301(1)(d) fits Case J. First Assignee Bank held
an unperfected security interest in accounts, and before the bank per-
fected by filing on March 1, Cueball Collection Agency gave value for
358. See notes 113-14 and accompanying text. To the extent that the drafters of Section 9-
104 had priority disputes in mind, they may have planned nothing more than to ensure that the
Section 9-104(f) transferee was protected against the bankruptcy trustee.
359. See notes 343-46 and accompanying text.
360. U.C.C. § 9-104(f).
361. See note 332 and accompanying text.
362. See notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
363. See notes 357-59 and accompanying text.
364. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(d).
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the same accounts3 65 "without knowledge of the security interest."3 " Fi-
nally, under Code Sections 1-201(37), 9-105, and 9-104(f), Cueball Col-
lection Agency is not a secured party.36 7 In other words, Cueball's
interest takes priority under Section 9-301(1)(d) of Article Nine be-
cause its interest is not subject to Article Nine 8" due to Section 9-
104(f).369
First Assignee Bank will not roll over when Cueball advances this
contention. The Bank will declare it nonsensical that Section 9-
301(1)(f) states a priority rule governing an account transfer to which
Article Nine does not apply.37 0 The only sensible interpretation of Sec-
tion 9-301(1)(f), First Assignee Bank will continue, is that it protects
transferees other than those excluded altogether from Code coverage by
Section 9-104.3 11 There is, however, a profound difficulty with this argu-
ment. No person other than the transferee described in Section 9-104(f)
could, in the case of accounts, be a transferee who gives value and yet
not be a secured party.7 2 The Code, after all, treats all outright and
collateral transferees of accounts as secured parties with the sole excep-
tion of those transferees covered by Section 9-104. 373 In other words,
under First Assignee Bank's interpretation of Section 9-301(1)(d), that
section cannot protect any account transferee notwithstanding the sec-
tion's express coverage of account transferees. 74
365. See id. § 1-201 (44)(d) (defining "value").
366. Id. § 9-301(1)(d). See also id. § 1-201(25) (defining "knowledge").
367. See id. § 9-105(m). See also id. § 9-102(1)(b).
368. See idi § 1-201(37).
369. See id. § 9-104(f) (identifying account transfers, including those "for collection purposes
only," to which Article Nine does not apply). Contrast O'Leary, 29 Mo. L. Rev. at 496 (cited in
note 19) (suggesting that Section 9-301 creates exception to first-to-file rule). See generally Com-
ment, 41 Wash. L. Rev. at 898 (cited in note 336).
370. See Goldstein, 807 F.2d at 1073 (stating that "Section 104(f) of Article 9 excludes cer-
tain transactions from Article 9's scope. If the transaction at issue is excluded, it would be odd
indeed for Article 9's choice of law provision to apply."); Comment, 41 Wash. L. Rev. at 898 (find-
ing it probable that Section 9-301 does not work "in favor of '9-104(f) buyers'" because the Code
provides "that no provision of article 9 applies to transactions described in section 9-104(f)"). The
Bank will further observe that when the Code's drafters did want Code priority rules to apply to
transactions otherwise excluded from the Code by Section 9-104, they provided for that result. See
U.C.C. § 9-104(f), (g).
371. The same interpretive problem is presented with respect to Section 9-301(1)(c)'s treat-
ment of chattel paper. See Comment, 41 Wash. L. Rev. at 898.
372. To tamper a bit with the observations in Comment, 41 Wash. L. Rev. at 902: "Since any
sale of [accounts] creates a security interest in the buyer, except as provided in section 9-104(f);
the very language of subsection [(1)(d)] of this section prohibits its operation in favor of buyers of
[accounts] except buyers whose interests arise in sales described in section 9-104(f)."
373. See notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
374. One possible response to this argument is that the lien creditor is a transferee of ac-
counts who is not a secured party within the meaning of Section 9-301(1)(d). This interpretation,
however, presents too many problems to be taken seriously. First, U.C.C. Section 9-301(1)(b) deals
specifically with the protection of lien creditors; to read Section 9-301(1)(d) as defining the rights
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Can Section 9-301(1)(d) be construed to give some significance to
the word "accounts" without dictating a priority rule for Section 9-
104(f) assignments? Professor Clark says yes.315 In his view, the drafters
meant for Section 9-301(1)(d) to protect outright buyers of accounts, as
opposed to persons who take account assignments as collateral.M After
all, Section 9-301 otherwise protects just such buyers of goods, instru-
ments, documents, and general intangibles in subsection 1(d) and its
companion provision, 1(c).3 77 Thus, according to Professor Clark, buyers
of accounts are not secured parties under Section 9-301(1)(d) and, ac-
cordingly, merit priority under that section over any collateral trans-
feree that has not yet perfected its interest as of the time of the
purchase. 78
The problem with Professor Clark's interpretation is that it flatly
contradicts the Code's definitional edict that the term "secured party"
includes any "person to whom accounts . . . have been sold. ' 79 It also
contradicts the Code's reiteration of this definitional point in at least
two additional Code sections380 and five Code Comments.""1 Finally,
Professor Clark's interpretation contradicts the policy behind this defi-
of lien creditors would thus be anomalous and indeed inconsistent with Section 9-301(I)(b). Sec-
ond, to say that a lien creditor gives value for purposes of Section 9-301(1)(d) is imprecise; the
definition of giving value envisions a consensual exchange, see U.C.C. § 1-201(44), and the lien
creditor does not secure its interest by way of such an exchange. Finally, the Official Comment
makes clear that subsection 1(d) is designed to "deal with purchasers," U.C.C. § 9-301 cmt. 4, and
a lien creditor does not fit this description because such a transferee does not obtain its interest by
way of a "voluntary transaction," id. § 1-201(32). In accord, Mazer v. Williams Bros. Co., 337 A.2d
559, 562-63 (Pa. 1975).
Section 9-301(1)(d) cannot be read to protect lien creditors. Nor can it be read to protect such
transferees of accounts as the beneficiaries of constructive trusts, for they are not purchasers who
give value either. If the section protects any transferees of accounts at all, it must protect some
subset of those persons who buy accounts or take them as security for a debt. One subset of such
transferees is the class of Section 9-104(f) transferees.
375. Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions T 3.03[4] at 3-28 to 3-29 (cited in note 8). In
accord is Petron Trading Co., 663 F. Supp. at 1160-62. See also Coogan, et al., Secured Transac-
tions § 7B.03[6][b] at 7B-26 (cited in note 8) (indicating, without analysis of Section 9-301(1)(d)'s
"not a secured party" interpretation, that if first-filing buyer of accounts "was aware of [earlier]
unperfected interest it takes subject to it under Section 9-301(1)(d)").
376. See also Cohen, 364 A.2d at 861 (suggesting that Section 9-301 affords priority to ac-
count transferee over earlier, but unperfected, transferee).
377. In particular, Section 9-301(1)(c) specifically undertakes to protect the buyer. See also
Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 12.6 at 384 (cited in note 2).
378. Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions 3.03[4] at 3-29 (cited in note 8).
379. U.C.C. § 9-105(m).
380. See id. §§ 1-201(37), 9-102(1)(b).
381. Id. §§ 1-201 cmt. 37, 9-102 cmt., 9-104 cmt. 6, 9-105 cmt. 2, 9-302 cmt. 5. See also id. §
9-502 cmt. 2. As stated in Comment, 41 Wash. L. Rev. at 903 (cited in note 336): "Reading to-
gether sections 9-105(1)(i), 1-201(37), and 9-102(1)(b)[,] one concludes that the Code generally
provides that buyers of accounts and contract rights are secured parties and, therefore, that their
rights are not determined by reference to section 9-301(1)(d)."
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nitional postulate: that "the distinction between a security transfer and
a sale" of accounts is sufficiently "blurred" so that no effort should be
made to divide these transfers into two different categories.3 8 2 Professor
Clark's construction of Section 9-301(1)(d) is not indefensible.38 3 It
should, however, be greeted with a healthy dose of skepticism.
38 4
On a more practical level, Professor Clark's interpretation of Sec-
tion 9-301(1)(d) provides no help to First Assignee Bank in its efforts to
win Case J. Cueball Collection Agency, after all, was not a collateral
transferee of Bobo. Rather, because it took an absolute assignment of
accounts, Cueball is in the very class of assignees Professor Clark would
protect under Section 9-301(1)(d), and is entitled to priority due to
First Assignee Bank's unperfected status at the time Cueball purchased
the accounts. As a result, the Bank must find an interpretation of Sec-
tion 9-301(1)(d) that protects neither Section 9-104(f) account transfer-
ees nor outright account purchasers. The only possibility is to argue
that the section does not protect any account assignees at all.
In support of this interpretation, the Bank can point out that Sec-
tion 9-301(1)(d) applies "in the case of accounts and general in-
tangibles." 385 Thus, interpreting Section 9-301(1)(d) not to protect
account transferees does not render Section 9-301(1)(d) meaningless,
for outright buyers of general intangibles can still claim the section's
protections.38 6 The Bank will add that the Code's drafters tacked Sec-
tion 9-301(1)(d) onto the Code late in the drafting process so as to ex-
tend the good-faith purchaser protection already afforded to
nonsecured-party buyers of goods to deserving nonsecured-party buyers
of intangibles.38e The Bank will say that, under these circumstances, it
is not surprising that Section 9-301(1)(d) refers to both general in-
382. U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 2. See note 74 and accompanying text. See also Coogan and Gordon,
76 Harv. L. Rev. at 1532 & n.14 (cited in note 31) (noting that Article Nine, with only the one
exception set forth in Sections 9-502(2) and 9-504(2), "does not distinguish between loans secured
by ...accounts ... and sales of those items") (emphasis original); Henson, Handbook on Se-
cured Transactions § 3-11 at 42 (cited in note 8) (stating that "[tihe only time when a difference
[between a sale and a security transfer of account] is really material is on default").
383. It is possible that the Code's drafters simply goofed in their choice of language so that
Professor Clark's position best captures their actual intent. Professor Clark can rely on that por-
tion of Section 9-105(1) that provides that its definition of secured party applies "unless the con-
text otherwise requires." U.C.C. § 9-105(1) (emphasis added). The context of Section 9-301, he
might say, otherwise does require treating account buyers as secured parties, secured party status,
particularly in light of the generalized focus on property buyers of various forms in subsections 9-
301(c) and (d).
384. See notes 390-92 and accompanying text.
385. For more on the meaning of the term "general intangibles," see notes 502-25 and accom-
panying text.
386. Contrast note 509 and accompanying text.
387. See U.C.C. § 9-301 cmt. 4.
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tangibles and accounts even though (as it turns out) no account trans-
ferees can claim the section's benefits.
3 88
We have, then, three possible views of Section 9-301(1)(d): (1) that
the-section protects those account assignees described in Section 9-
104(f) even though that provision says that Article Nine does not apply
to those assignees; (2) that the section protects the outright assignee by
not treating him as a secured party even though the Code defines the
term "secured party" to include the outright assignee; and (3) that the
section protects no assignees of accounts, but only assignees of general
intangibles, even though the section says that it applies "in the case of
accounts or general intangibles." '89 Which of these troublesome inter-
pretations is the most tolerable?
The second view, advocated by Professor Clark, should be the first
to go. Adoption of his construction requires the conclusion that the
Code's framers committed a drafting error properly corrected by judi-
cial interpretation.390 While such an approach may be proper in some
situations, it seems inappropriate when other plausible interpretations
are available. Moreover, this slip-of-the pen theory is weakened by the
drafters' well-evidenced recognition in other contexts that their own
definition of the term "secured party" covers account buyers.39' Courts
should accept at face value Section 9-301(1)(d)'s declaration that it pro-
tects only the transferee who is "not a secured party."
' 9 2
Of the remaining two interpretations, the better is the first one:
Section 9-301(1)(d) protects Section 9-104(f) account transferees
against unperfected secured creditors. It is conceivable that the drafters
of the Code did not specifically contemplate that Section 9-301(1)(d)
would operate in this manner. There is no strong evidence that the
drafters had some other intent, however, and this approach-unlike the
388. See Comment, 41 Wash. L. Rev. at 896 (cited in note 336) (suggesting that this is a
plausible interpretation).
389. A fourth possible interpretation is that Section 9-301(1)(d) protects all account buyers,
whether in category 1 (i.e., excluded from the Code by Section 9-104(f)) or category 2 (i.e., in-
cluded in the Code by Section 9-102(1)(b)). This construction, however, combines the interpretive
difficulties of both interpretation #1 and interpretation #2.
390. See note 379 and accompanying text.
391. See notes 380-81 and accompanying text.
392. See notes 379-84 and accompanying text. See also U.C.C. § 9-301 cmt. 4 (stating that
"[p]aragraphs (1)(c) and (1)(d) deal with purchasers (other than secured parties)"). Professor
Clark's interpretation also is objectionable because it produces the anomalous result that the sec-
ond transferee, who is the second to file, defeats the first transferee and first filer, so long as the
first filing postdates the second assignment. This result is inconsistent with the drafters' plan to
subject account transferees to the Code-filing rules. It also contradicts Section 9-312's declaration
that it determines priorities among "conflicting security interests." U.C.C. § 9-312(5). Finally, this
result is troubling because Section 9-301 reaffirms the protection afforded "persons entitled to
priority under Section 9-312." U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(a).
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remaining alternative-does give significance to Section 9-301(1)(d)'s
specific reference to "accounts. 39 3 No less important, this interpreta-
tion comports with the underlying purpose of Section 9-301(1)(d). That
purpose is to subordinate secured parties who delay in perfecting their
interests to persons who, in the interim, give value for the property sub-
ject to the interest.39 4 Section 9-104(f) transferees-including those who
take an account transfer in satisfaction of a preexisting debt395-do just
that.9 6 Finally, while it may seem odd to apply an Article Nine priority
rule to a property transfer when Article Nine says it does not apply to
such transfers, in reality it is not so odd at all. For example, it is fair to
say that Article Nine does not apply to sales of goods, instruments, or
general intangibles. 7 In a number of sections, however, Article Nine
deals with such transactions in fixing priority rules for Article Nine se-
curity interests.3 9s Nothing more than this type of incidental applica-
tion of Article Nine is involved in applying Section 9-301(1)(d) to
priority disputes involving accounts uncovered by the Code due to Sec-
tion 9-104(f). s9
The bottom line is that Sections 9-104(f) and 9-301(1)(d) create a
statutory exception to the first-to-file rule applicable to account trans-
fers to which the Code otherwise does not apply. Under that exception,
the bona fide Section 9-104(f) account purchaser takes priority over an
earlier Article Nine assignee, so long as the Section 9-104(f) transferee
receives her assignment before the competing claimant files.
A decision that Section 9-301(1)(d) applies to Section 9-104(f) ac-
counts raises several additional interpretive difficulties. What if, for ex-
ample, a court runs into Case K instead of Case J?
CASE K. The facts of Case J are unchanged except that Cueball
Collection Agency had knowledge of the earlier, unperfected secur-
ity interest held by First Assignee Bank when Cueball took its for-
393. See notes 366-69 and accompanying text.
394. See U.C.C. § 9-301 cmt. 4.
395. See id. § 1-201(44)(b).
396. See Comment, 41 Wash. L. Rev. at 905 (cited in note 336) (concluding that "[p]re-Code
and Code policies seem least violated by saying that the reference in sections 9-01(1)(c) and
(1)(d) to accounts, contract rights, and chattel paper is for the purpose of providing some priority
protection to '9-104(f) buyers' ").
397. See U.C.C. § 9-102(1). See generally notes 502-25 and accompanying text (regarding
general intangibles).
398. See, for example, U.C.C. §§ 9-307 to 9-309. Compare, in this regard, Section 9-104(i),
which says that Article Nine does not apply to any right of set-off, with Section 9-318(1)(b) (which,
nonetheless, states a rule affecting set-off rights). See also id. § 9-306(4)(d)(i).
399. "From a policy standpoint, allowing such a buyer a priority is entirely reasonable, and
compensates him somewhat for his inability to qualify under article 9 as a secured party who
otherwise might take advantage of the Code's notice filing procedures." Comment, 41 Wash. L.
Rev. at 901 (cited in note 336).
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collection-purposes-only assignment prior to First Assignee Bank's
filing.
The question posed by Case K is simple enough. We just concluded
that Cueball should win Case J under Section 9-301(1)(d) because
Cueball took its for-collection-purposes-only assignment without knowl-
edge of the earlier security interest. Does it follow that Cueball should
lose Case K under Section 9-301(1)(d) because in that case it had such
knowledge?
There is a temptation to say no. As our earlier discussion shows,
Section 9-301(1)(d) is hardly a highlight in the history of Code draft-
ing. °00 While courts grudgingly might feel bound to give its direct com-
mand some meaning, they also might be reluctant to read its negative
implication to create a binding rule.4 ' The better view is that courts
should apply Section 9-301(1)(d) to penalize the knowing Cueball no
less than they apply the section to protect the non-knowing Cueball.0 2
Courts called on to interpret analogous Code provisions have adhered
to similar negative implications.40 3 This implication-based construction
of Section 9-301(1)(d) is also sensible and fair, for there is little reason
to favor the Section 9-104(f) account transferee who takes the Section
9-104(f) assignment with actual knowledge that a prior assignee already
has taken an assignment of the same accounts.4 e4
From the conclusion that a Section 9-104(f) account assignee loses
to a prior unperfected security interest if she had knowledge of it at the
time of the assignment, it follows a fortiori that knowledge of a prior
perfected security interest is also fatal to the Section 9-104(f) trans-
feree's claim. Section 9-301(1)(d) does not command this result, even
(at least directly) by negative implication. A contrary result would be
anomalous and untenable, however, given our analysis of Case K.
In sum, Section 9-301(1)(d) dictates successive assignment priority
rules-that may well defeat the first filer-for some cases involving Sec-
400. See notes 364-99 and accompanying text. See also Petron Trading Co., 663 F. Supp. at
1160-61 (struggling with interpretation of Section 9-301(1)(d)).
401. Contrast American East India Corp., 400 F. Supp. at 162 & n.18 (noting, but not ad-
dressing apparent negative-implication argument that Section 9-104(f) account transferee is
subordinate to previously perfected security interest under Section 9-301(1)(d)).
402. See Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 7B.03[6][b] at 7B-26 (cited in note 8).
403. See, for example, Special Project, 62 Cornell L. Rev. at 944 (cited in note 12) (stating
that, under Section 9-301(1)(c), "knowledge that a security interest exists is sufficient by itself to
subordinate the buyer").
404. Knowledge is irrelevant in fixing priorities between conflicting security interest holders.
See note 95 and accompanying text. That rule, however, is designed to ensure early and prompt
filings. Since the Section 9-104(f) transferee is not required to file at all, Code policy favoring a
pure-race rule has little application. Each of the three traditional common-law rules would
subordinate a second transferee who takes with actual knowledge of a prior assignment. See notes
37-43 and accompanying text.
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tion 9-104(f) account transfers. Those rules, however, cover only two
limited types of cases: (1) cases in which the Section 9-104(f) transferee
takes the assignment without knowledge of an earlier, but unperfected,
security interest (which the Section 9-104(f) transferee wins) and (2)
cases in which the Section 9-104(f) transferee takes the assignment with
actual knowledge of the prior security interest (which the Section 9-
104(f) transferee loses). In all other cases, court-fashioned common-law
principles will dictate the contours of the Section 9-104(f) exception to
the first-to-file rule.
D. Exceptions Arising Under Section 1-103
Professors White and Summers describe Section 1-103 as "proba-
bly the most important single provision in the Code."40 5 That section
states: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the
principles of law and equity . . . shall supplement its provisions. '40 6 In
successive-assignment cases, Section 1-103 causes departures from the
first-to-file rule in two basic ways. First, non-Code law may provide a
defense to the first filer's claim of priority based on that party's con-
duct. For example, Section 1-103 carries into the Code the doctrines of
estoppel and fraud.407 Thus, a first filer may forfeit priority if it mis-
leads the second filer (or even a nonfiler) into giving value on the un-
derstanding that the first filer claims no interest.40 8 Other principles of
law and equity may operate in similar fashion to generate a defense to
the first filer's claim.40 9
A second important set of exceptions to the first-to-file rule arises
when-regardless of the first filer's actions-the second filer (or
nonfiler) holds a claim to the account property other than or in addi-
tion to an Article Nine security interest.410 These cases usually involve
405. White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 5 at 19 (cited in note 8).
406. U.C.C. § 1-103.
407. Id.
408. See, for example, Petron Trading Co., 633 F. Supp. at 1163; AM Int'l, 46 Bankr. at 573
(stating that "[elven if CUB's consent does not amount to a contractual subordination agreement
under the U.C.C., there are equitable reasons why AMI's interest in the payments is superior to
CUB's"); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 342 cmt. e (1979) (recognizing that first-filing as-
signee may be defeated by subsequent assignee if "there is an estoppel"). See generally Special
Project, 62 Cornell L. Rev. at 857-58 (cited in note 12).
409. See, for example, Liles & Raymond, 24 Bankr. at 630 n.5 (holding that consensual dis-
charge of perfected security interest results in subordination). For an extensive treatment of com-
mon-law-based exceptions to the first-to-file rule, including exceptions based on estoppel and
fraud, see Hillman, et al., Common Law and Equity 1 24.01 to 24.05 at 24-1 to 24-76 (cited in note
271).
410. See, for example, Consolidated Steel Corp., 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 410 (finding it un-
necessary to reach claimant's arguments that it is "the third party beneficiary of the contract
between the debtor and Wagoner and that its interest as a third party beneficiary is superior to
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claims to payments owed for construction work made by a first-filing
secured financer of a building contractor.41' We turn first to those cases
that involve competing claims of suppliers or subcontractors, and then
to those cases that concern the competing claims of construction
sureties.
1. Suppliers and Subcontractors
Non-Code law sometimes protects the nonprofessional claimant of
accounts against a first-filing financial institution assignee. 412 One set of
beneficiaries of these judicial rulings are suppliers and subcontractors
on construction projects.413 Some courts have protected these claimants
with favorable readings of non-Code statutory lien law.414 Other courts
have favored subcontractors or suppliers on the theory that they hold
the [assigned] claim of the debtor to the amount due on the contract price"); Jacobs v. Northeast-
ern Corp., 206 A.2d 49, 55 (Pa. 1965) (stating that "[r]ights of subrogation, although growing out of
a contractual setting and ofttimes articulated by the contract, do not depend for their existence on
a grant in the contract, but are created by law to avoid injustice" and that "[tiherefore, subroga-
tion rights are not 'security interests' within the meaning of Article 9").
411. These cases arise because "[c]onstruction contracts customarily permit the owner to
withhold a certain percentage of each progress payment, usually ten percent, until the contractor
has completed the project to the owner's satisfaction. This retainage is withheld to discourage
abandonment by the contractor." Ronald P. Friedberg, Note, Construction Sureties: Don't Put All
Your Eggs in the Equitable Subrogation Basket, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 305, 308 (1990). See, for
example, Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Barnett Bank, 540 So. 2d 113, 115 (Fla. 1989), in which the
court stated that "[t]he first [term] is a contractual provision under which the owner retains a
percentage of the progress payments for the purpose of curing or mitigating subsequent contractor
default. The retainage is paid to the contractor upon satisfactory performance and/or payment,
but neither the contractor nor its assignees or creditors have any claim on the funds until the
contractor performs."
412. The Code makes clear that non-Code law governs "a lien given by statute or other rule
of law for services or materials." U.C.C. § 9-104(c).
413. See generally Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 4B.10[2] at 4B-54 (cited in note 8)
(stating that "the secured lender will lose to the subcontractors [and] materialmen . . . to the
extent progress payments or retainage is needed to cure the contractor's breaches").
414. For example, National Bank of Detroit v. Eames & Brown, Inc., 242 N.W.2d 412 (Mich.
1976) (giving priority to subcontractors and suppliers with statutory lien against monies payable to
general contractor over bank, which did not provide funds for project giving rise to liens but none-
theless held a properly perfected floating security interest covering general contractor's accounts);
Panhandle Bank & Trust Co. v. Graybar Electric Co., 492 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (rely-
ing on statutory and equitable grounds for according subcontractor's materialman priority over
bank); Caristo Constr. Corp. v. Diner's Fin. Corp., 236 N.E.2d 461 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1968) (finding
that, because construction funds were by statute a trust fund for payment of subcontractor and
supplier, assignment of funds was subordinate). See also Southern Agency Co. v. LaSalle Cas. Co.,
393 F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1968) (holding assignee's claim to insurance premium receivables unenforce-
able due to statute under which receivables constituted trust fund for insurance company). See
,generally Henson, Handbook on Secured Transactions § 3-14 at 53 n.68 (cited in note 8) (noting
that bank assignee's interest in assigned funds may be subject to statutory liens in some states);
Scult, 11 Ariz. L. Rev. at 10 n.54 (cited in note 19); Rudolph, 5 B.C. Indus. & Comm. L. Rev. at
257 (cited in note 30) (discussing New York and California statutes, which "illustrate a strong
tendency to give labor and material suppliers a preferred position").
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an "equitable lien" against sums owed by the project owner or are bene-
ficiaries of a "construction trust fund.
415
Another important way in which courts favor suppliers and subcon-
tractors over the first-filing financial institution is by invoking long-
standing principles now codified in Sections 9-203 and 9-318 of the
Code. An illustrative case is Himes v. Cameron County Construction
Corp.,416 which concerned a priority battle over construction-contract
retainages between a general contractor's unpaid suppliers and its fi-
nancing bank. The suppliers based their claim on the contract between
the owner and the general contractor, which permitted the owner to
withhold payments otherwise due the general contractor to satisfy
claims for labor and materials. The bank relied on its perfected security
interest, which covered "all moneys that are now or may hereafter be-
come due and payable" 417 to the general contractor. The court ruled
that priority went to the suppliers on the ground that the bank's secur-
ity interest never attached to the retainages. The court reasoned that
attachment of a security interest requires that the debtor-in this case,
the general contractor-have "rights in the collateral. ' 418 On the facts,
however, the general contractor never obtained rights in the retainages
because the contract specifically permitted the owner to withhold the
retainages from the contractor when suppliers remained unpaid.41 9 A
number of courts have used the same or similar reasoning to afford pri-
415. See Chattanooga Brick & Tile, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1066 (giving priority to equitable
lien on retainage held by supplier over filed Article Nine security interest); United Parcel Serv.,
Inc. v. Weben Indus., Inc., 794 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying Georgia law and collecting
numerous construction trust fund cases), rev'g 610 F. Supp. 13 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (refusing to recog-
nize constructive trust held by subcontractor and thus giving priority to funds retained by owner
to contractor's perfected accounts financer); In re Inca Materials, Inc., 880 F.2d 1307 (11th Cir.
1989) (following United Parcel Serv.).
For cases recognizing the equitable claim of laborers and suppliers to retainages unpaid to a
defaulting general contractor, see Rudolph 5 B.C. Indus. & Comm. L. Rev. at 249 & nn.12, 15
(cited in note 30); Speidel, 47 Va. L. Rev. at 646-47 & nn.19-21 (cited in note 347) (noting recogni-
tion in cases of "the equitable right of materialmen and suppliers to priority" over the general
contractor's assignees of contract proceeds owed by the project owner). See also Hillman, et al.,
Common Law and Equity 1 24.05[2] at 24-73 to 24-76 (cited in note 271) (noting continuing appli-
cability of equitable lien doctrine in unusual cases to give priority to otherwise subordinate secured
party). But see Cherokee Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Worthen Bank and Trust, 561 S.W.2d 310, 313
(Ark. 1978) (stating that "partial payment to a contractor by an owner is not held in trust for
subcontractors, materialmen, mechanics or employees").
416. 432 A.2d 1092 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981), aft'd, 444 A.2d 98 (Pa. 1982).
417. Id. at 1095 (quoting the assignment).
418. Id. at 1095-96.
419. Id. at 1097.
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ority to nonprofessional account claimants.420 Less sympathetic claim-
ants, although invoking like legal theories, have met with less success.
421
2. The Construction Surety
Perhaps the most important exception to the first-to-file rule that
arises under U.C.C. Section 1-103 operates to protect the construction
surety.422 This recurring problem is illustrated by Case L.
CASE L. First Assignee Bank gives Calamity Construction Com-
pany a $100,000 loan to finance Calamity's construction of an office
building for Otto Owner. As security for the loan, Calamity grants
420. See First Commercial Corp. v. First Nat'l Bancorporation, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 1430 (D.
Colo. 1983); Heinrichsdorff v. Raat, 655 P.2d 860 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); Weld Colorado Bank v. E
& E Constr., Inc., 653 P.2d 758 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982). See also Mid-Atlantic Supply, Inc. v. Three
Rivers Aluminum Co., 790 F.2d 1121 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that Bank's security interest in
debtor's accounts did not reach a check which was made to debtor and his supplier because debtor
only held the check in trust for supplier); In re Sherman, 627 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that
insurance company's right to retain renewal commissions to satisfy past advances not a security
interest in contract rights); Daly, 610 P.2d at 402 (applying Section 9-318(1) equivalent in Wyo-
ming Code to defeat assignee's claims against account debtor where account debtor and assignor
had agreed that account debtor could deduct amount payable to subcontractor on earlier job from
payments due under assigned contract). Contrast Septembertide Publishing, in which an author
made a contract with hardcover publisher, which in turn contracted with softcover publisher. 884
F.2d at 676-77. The softcover publisher agreed to pay the hardcover publisher royalties, and the
agreement between the hardcover publisher and the author required the hardcover publisher to
pay two-thirds of such royalties to the author. Id. at 677. The court gave priority as to two-thirds
of royalties owed to the hardcover publisher by the softcover publisher to the author, notwith-
standing the bank's first-filed floating security interest covering all of the hardcover publisher's
accounts. The court, relying in part on Sections 9-203 and 9-318, reasoned that the author was the
third-party beneficiary of the agreement between the hardcover publisher and the softcover pub-
lisher, and that "[o]nce vested, the author's third-party rights could not be assigned without its
consent." Id. at 679-82. But compare Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions 1 2.04 at 2-39 to 2-
40 (cited in note 8) (stating that "case law strongly suggests that secured creditors are having little
difficulty with the requirement that the debtor have rights in the collateral," and citing "the broad
notion of rights in the collateral under Article 9"). Notably, the result in Himes seems to be one
that would have been proper under pre-Code law. See Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 893 at 588
(cited in note 6) (stating that "the power may be reserved [by the account debtor] to discharge the
obligation by payment to a third party" and that "[tihe right of the assignee is subject to such a
power"); id. § 901 at 611 n.50 (citing additional cases) and 613 (collecting numerous cases in which
surety who satisfies laborers' and suppliers' claims defeats, on subrogation theory, competing claim
of general contractor assignee).
421. See MNC Commercial Corp. v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 882 F.2d 615, 619 (2d
Cir. 1989) (finding a contractual right of set-off held by steel corporation, though exempt from
filing requirement, unprotected from subordination under Code priority rules); AMCO Prods., Inc.,
17 Bankr. at 764-65 (rejecting bank's argument that bankrupt's estate does not include reserve
account that bank had contractual right to draw against to cover shortfalls in collections on obliga-
tion assigned by customer to bank where in fact such shortfalls existed).
422. Professor Clark collects some 20 reported decisions concerning this type of priority dis-
pute. See Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions 11.04[3]-[5] at 11-17 to 11-26 (cited in note
8). The problem was common under pre-Code law. See Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 901 at 608-
14 (cited in note 6).
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First Assignee Bank a security interest in all its rights to payment
under its contract with Otto. Thereafter, pursuant to its contract
with Owner, Calamity secures both a performance and a payment
bond from Second Assignee Surety, Inc. The bonds obligate the
surety to finish performance and to pay off all subcontractors, labor-
ers, and suppliers if the contractor defaults. Pursuant to the bonds,
Calamity assigns to the surety all its payment rights under the Otto-
Calamity contract to cover any expenses the surety might incur in
completing the project. After finishing half of the office building,
Calamity defaults on the construction contract. Second Assignee
Surety finishes the work pursuant to its bond. First Assignee Bank
has filed a U.C.C. financing statement, but Second Assignee Surety
has not. On these facts, is the bank or the surety entitled to the
now-earned progress payments and retainages that Otto Owner has
refused to pay Calamity due to its breach of contract?
Because both First Assignee Bank and Second Assignee Surety
took security interests in the same account, First Assignee Bank will
claim priority as the first assignee to file under Section 9-312(5)(a).423
The first-to-file rule, however, does not control this case. Rather, courts
have been all but unanimous in declaring that the first-filing bank is
subordinate to the second-filing or nonfiling surety.42 4 Their reasoning
is that, wholly apart from its consensual security interest, the surety
has a prior right to amounts unpaid by the owner under the doctrine of
equitable subrogation.2 5 In particular, because the owner had a right to
retain unearned contract payments vis-d-vis the contractor's bank upon
the contractor's default, so does the surety that steps into the shoes of
the owner upon finishing the project.
426
423. See notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
424. See, for example, Canter v. Schlager, 267 N.E.2d 492 (Mass. 1971) (giving the surety
priority; collecting many earlier cases). See generally Henson, Handbook on Secured Transactions
§ 5-7 at 153-55 (cited in note 8); Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions 1 1.07 at S1-14 (Cum.
Supp. No. 2 1992) (noting that "the courts simply love sureties in these cases"); White and Sum-
mers, Uniform Commercial Code § 21-6 at 948 (cited in note 8); Coogan, et al., Secured Transac-
tions § 4B.10[3] at 4B-58 (cited in note 8) (stating that "surety has priority"); Hillman, et al.,
Common Law and Equity ' 24.01[2][a][i] at 24-9 (cited in note 271) (stating that "courts agree
almost unanimously that the [s]urety should prevail").
425. For example, Rudolph, 5 B.C. Indus. & Comm. L. Rev. at 248 (cited in note 30) (sug-
gesting that, at least on private project, subrogation is to rights of owner even when surety pays off
suppliers and subcontractors under payment bond). See also id. at 251-54 (discussing progress
payment of differing judicial treatment of surety subrogation claims to retained percentages versus
unreleased progress payments); Friedberg, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. at 315 (cited in note 411) (stat-
ing that "[tihe doctrine of equitable subrogation, as applied in nearly every jurisdiction, grants
payment and performance bond sureties a superior claim to undisbursed contract funds over the
lender with a perfected security interest in such funds."). See generally Corbin, Corbin on Con-
tracts § 901 at 609-10 (cited in note 6); Speidel, 47 Va. L. Rev. at 645-48 (cited in note 347).
426. For illustrative discussions of the surety-lender priority problem, see, in addition to
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Some observers have criticized this analysis as formalistic and in-
sensitive to pertinent policy considerations.2 They have a point. Pass-
ing references to "subrogation" and "shoes" hardly provide a satisfying
analysis of this recurring conundrum in account priority law. Close
analysis, however, shows that the courts have picked the right rule for
the construction-surety cases.42s
On the formal side, the Code's legislative history establishes that
the Code itself does not protect the first-filing bank.429 Section 9-312(7)
of the 1952 revision of the Code broadly favored lending banks over
construction sureties. 430 The Code's drafters, however, excised that pro-
vision from their finished product.431 In doing so, they explained that
"existing law" under which "the surety's rights come first" should "not
be disturbed. '43 2 One might respond that this analysis does not apply to
those authorities collected in note 424, Comment, Surety's Equitable Priority in Defaulting Con-
tractor's Retained Proceeds Does Not Extend to Contractor's Personal Property, 27 Vand. L. Rev.
389 (1974), and Friedberg, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. at 305 (cited in note 411). The many cases and
secondary authorities are collected in Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions 1.07[2] at 1-61
n.202, and Hillman, et al., Common Law and Equity % 24.01[2][a][i] at 24-7 to 24-11. For a useful
discussion of bonding practices, see Rudolph, 5 B.C. Indus. & Comm. L. Rev. at 254 (cited in note
30).
. 427. See, for example, Friedberg, 41 Case Wes. Res. L. Rev. at 326 (cited in note 411); John
Harrison, Note, Secured Transactions: Who Is Entitled to Assigned Construction Progress Pay-
ments Made to Assignee Bank After Contractor's Default?, 32 Okla. L. Rev. 957, 961 (1979). See
also Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 902 at 307 (Supp. 1992) (citing "the superior results of prefer-
ring the Uniform Commercial Code secured party to the common law surety interest"); Rudolph, 5
B.C. Indus. & Comm. L. Rev. at 257 (stating that "[w]hether the position of [a] surety, a profes-
sional risk taker, should be fully equated to that of labor and material claimants is open to ques-
tion"); Hillman, et al., Common Law and Equity T 24.0112][a][ii] at 24-13 to 24-14 (citing
"appealing policy argument" that subjecting sureties to first-to-file rule would generate greater
certainty and solve bankers' "problem of lack of notice of suretyship arrangements").
428. Courts may favor sureties because they fear that subordinating sureties would also jeop-
ardize the position of project owners. If state law dictates that a surety stands in the shoes of a
project owner, and the contractor's lender takes priority over the surety, then why shouldn't the
contractor's lender take priority over the owner too? Steering clear of this result makes eminently
good sense. See, for example, Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 902 at 617 (cited in note 6) (stating
that "[w]hatever rule is adopted as to preference between successive assignees, care must be taken
to protect the obligor"). Any justification for subordinating sureties based on their insurer-like
loss-spreading capacity, see note 425, does not apply to lender-owner priority disputes. Moreover,
requiring Code filings of all owners who keep retainages would needlessly generate massive trans-
action costs because lenders know that owners routinely hold back retainages. In any event, the
owner's right not to pay out unearned retainages to the contractor's assignee seems clearly estab-
lished by U.C.C. § 9-318(1)(a).
429. See, for example, Transamerica Ins. Co., 540 So. 2d at 116.
430. U.C.C. § 9-312(7) (1952).
431. Recommendations of the Editorial Board for Changes in the Text and Comments of
the Uniform Commercial Code 25 (1953).
432. Id. See, for example, Rudolph, 5 B.C. Indus. & Comm. L. Rev. at 256 (cited in note 30)
(stating that "[w]hen the draftsmen eliminated the 1952 provision favoring assignees they appar-
ently intended that the Code should thereafter be neutral in these disputes between assignee
banks and sureties").
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Case L because the surety in Case L did not simply stand on its com-
mon-law rights; he obtained an Article Nine security interest.43 3 This
argument is feckless, however, for the plain reason that the surety that
does more to safeguard its legal rights-by specifically securing a con-
sensual, in addition to a nonconsensual, interest-should not as a result
receive less legal protection.434
A determination that the Code does not control the surety-bank
priority dispute does not mean that the surety must win under applica-
ble non-Code law. Courts fashioning common-law doctrine could opt for
a priority rule that favors the contractor's lender.4 5 To do so, however,
would not make good economic sense.
Assume no surety is in the picture. The bank then will make its
lending decision (as to whether to lend, how much to lend, and at what
rate to lend) with full knowledge that it may never realize its account
collateral because the owner will not make payments if the contractor
breaches. 436 Assume now that the project owner requires a surety bond,
but that the surety will not issue a bond unless it knows it will get the
benefit of retainages withheld by the owner upon the surety's comple-
tion of the project. 437 Under a rule favoring the first-filing lender over
the nonfiling surety, the surety can obtain this result only by filing a
financing statement and obtaining a subordination agreement from the
contractor's lender.
Will the lender provide this agreement? For two reasons, it nor-
mally should. First, without such an agreement, the entire transaction,
including the loan agreement the bank wishes to effect, will not go for-
ward.43B Second and more important, the bank's subordination of its
interest to the surety does not worsen the bank's position. 49 The bank
is giving up nothing more than its interest in monies that the owner,
upon the contractor's default, would hold back from the bank any-
433. See Hillman, et al., Common Law and Equity 24.01[2][a][ii] at 24-12 & n.43 (cited in
note 271) (developing this argument and noting that the cases reject it).
434. In accord is Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions 1.07[2] at 1-62 (cited in note 8).
Clark states that "it makes no difference that the contractor executed a legal assignment ...
[because] the surety's primary reliance is still on its equitable right of subrogation," but notes,
however, that the "surety is asking for trouble when it acts as though Article 9 applies and then
fails to play according to its rules". Id.
435. See, for example, Rudolph, 5 B.C. Indus. & Comm. L. Rev. at 250 (cited in note 30).
436. See U.C.C. § 9-318.
437. This is hardly an exotic assumption if, as has been said, "[t]he premium that the surety
charges reflects its expectation of reaching the retainage." Clark, The Law of Secured Transac-
tions 1.07[1] at 1-61.
438. See Henson, Handbook on Secured Transactions § 5-6 at 152 (cited in note 8).
439. See Speidel, 47 Va. L. Rev. at 653 (cited in note 347) (stating that "[c]laims of the
[owner] and the . . .surety pose similar threats to [the lender's] security.").
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way.
4 4 0 It is sensible in these circumstances simply for courts to give the
surety priority without insisting that it incur the needless transaction
costs involved in scouring the U.C.C. files, securing subordination agree-
ments, and filing U.C.C. financing statements.44'
The soundness of this result is confirmed by a host of additional
considerations. For example, "thousands of bonds are constantly being
written all over the country; ' 442 thus, the cost of requiring sureties to
comply with the Code would be enormous in the aggregate.443 In addi-
tion, the notice value of U.C.C. filings by construction sureties is mini-
mal; lenders know that sureties are a probable feature of a construction
project 444 and can confirm the use or nonuse of a surety bond through a
440. See, for example, First Nat'l Bank of Minot v. MacDonald Constr. Co., 137 N.W.2d 667
(N.D. 1965) (recognizing prime contractor's right to withhold payments upon subcontractor's de-
fault). See Hillman, et al., Common Law and Equity t 24.01[2] [a] [ii] at 24-14 (cited in note 271)
(holding that by defaulting, contractor forfeited retainage to the bank); Coogan, et al., Secured
Transactions § 4B.10[2] at 4B-54 (cited in note 8) (noting rule that "contractor has rights in only
those payments actually due under the contract [so that] secured lender will lose to. . .the owner
to the extent progress payments or retainages is needed to cure the contractor's breaches"). Lend-
ing banks might prefer to have a surety on the scene, both to help police the contractor and to
minimize mop-up costs (by way of a professional surety's, rather than a nonprofessional owner's,
handling of the project following a contractor's default). See Coogan, et al., The Law of Secured
Transactions § 4B.10[3] at 4B-58 (recognizing lender's potential right to surpluses upon job com-
pletion by surety).
441. See Thomas H. Jackson and Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priority
Among Creditors, 88 Yale L. J. 1143, 1164, 1180 (1979) (asserting, with respect to another Code
priority rule, "[t]he justification for the rule, then, is that it does what parties would do for them-
selves in its absence, and thereby achieves a savings in transaction costs"; also recognizing that
obtaining subordination agreements is costly). See also In re J. V. Gleason Co., 452 F.2d 1219, 1224
(8th Cir. 1971) (stating that to require filing "where no legitimate purpose is served is a waste of
time and energy"); Frances A. Rauer, Note, Conflicts Between Set-Offs and Article 9 Security
Interests, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 235, 236 (1986) (noting that "minimizing the total costs of credit"
constitutes "a major policy objective of the law of secured transactions"). At least one observer has
suggested that it is wise to adopt a rule that requires sureties to "achieve priority through a subor-
dination agreement." Friedberg, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. at 321-22 n.111 (cited in note 411). The
argument is that this method forces "the surety and the lender to define their respective rights"
and thus reduces the likelihood of an expensive dispute. Id. However, to seek to avoid "an expen-
sive dispute" by adopting a rule that requires staggering front-end transaction costs in the form of
constant file searching and negotiation of subordination agreements hardly makes sense. The way
to avoid these disputes is simply to make the governing priority rule both efficient and clear. The
existing rule that consistently favors sureties serves this end well.
442. Henson, Handbook on Secured Transactions § 5-6 at 151 (cited in note 8).
443. See Baird and Jackson, 35 Stan. L. Rev. at 185-86 & n.38 (cited in note 170) (noting
potential significance of costs involved in filing and checking files).
444. See, for example, Hillman, et al., Common Law and Equity fl 24.01[2][a][ii] at 24-14 to
24-15 (cited in note 271); Speidel, 47 Va. L. Rev. at 653 (cited in note 347) (stating that "it is
unrealistic to assume that money is loaned without cognizance of the possibility that Miller Act
payment bond sureties will successfully assert claims to retained proceeds"); Friedberg, 41 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. at 306 (cited in note 411) (stating that "[w]hen a general contractor. . . and owner
execute a construction contract, the contractor is often required to obtain performance and pay-
ment bonds from a surety company").
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routine check of project documents.44 5 Finally, both lenders and sure-
ties are used to the universally recognized pro-surety rule and have
structured rates and practices upon it. 446 A departure from the rule at
this time would disrupt reliance interests and thwart the Code's goal of
interstate uniformity.
447
Considerations of fairness, as well as efficiency, favor the existing
surety-favoring rule. A contrary rule would improve the lender's finan-
cial position-by making available to it funds otherwise unreachable
from the owner-solely because of the fortuity that a surety bond was
secured. It also seems unfair to favor the bank in these cases because
the surety's own work is what matures the owner's duty to pay the
funds from which the bank seeks to exclude the surety.
448
In the end, these reasons are less important than the actions of the
courts. Moreover, the drumbeat of the cases is steady and clear: per-
forming sureties may rest assured of priority over lenders with security
interests in a contractor's accounts.
E. Additional Exceptions to the First-To-File Rule
The foregoing discussion-focusing on U.C.C. Sections 9-302(1)(e),
9-104(f), and 1-103-highlights the most often invoked account-related
exceptions to the general first-to-file rule. In many cases, however, the
first filer will take a backseat to a competing account assignee under
Code rules that generally apply to all types of secured parties. The
creditor who first files a flawless financing statement, for example,
nonetheless may forfeit priority if it later makes a subordination agree-
ment,449 terminates its financing statement,5 0 or lets the financing
statement lapse.451 The first proper filer also will lose if she had "knowl-
445. See generally Baird and Jackson, 35 Stan. L. Rev. at 190-91 (recognizing that one "situ-
ation in which the informational value of a filing requirement would be insignificant is where there
is widespread knowledge that the possessor of an asset is not the owner").
446. See note 424 and accompanying text.
447. Transamerica Ins. Co., 540 So. 2d at 117 (stating that favoring banks over sureties
"would frustrate uniformity and create conflict in the application of U.C.C.").
448. See Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. at 240 (1947) (recognizing "the peculiarly equitable
claim of those responsible for the physical completion of building contracts"); Grant Gilmore, The
Assignee of Contract Rights and His Precarious Security, 74 Yale L. J. 217, 245 (1964) (stating
that sureties are favored because they make advances that "enable the assignor to complete the
performance of the contract").
449. U.C.C. § 9-316. See, for example, AM Int'l, 46 Bankr. at 571-73 (holding that first filing
assignee loses priority to later assignee because of subordination agreement, and noting that "a
subordination 'agreement' can be inferred from words of the parties, course of dealing, surrounding
circumstances and the like").
450. See U.C.C. § 9-404.
451. See id. § 9-403(2). Most financing statements will lapse if not renewed within five years
of filing. "Upon lapse the security interest becomes unperfected unless perfected without filing."
Id. See generally Special Project, 62 Cornell L. Rev. at 853-54 (cited in note 12) (discussing circum-
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edge of the contents" of an earlier, but improperly filed, financing state-
ment.452 And the first filer as to a particular account may find itself out
of luck if a second filer claims the same account through a debtor differ-
ent than the first filer's transferor.5 3
Five other matters, distinctive to account assignments, merit more
extended attention: (1) the special problems posed by purchase-money
security interests in accounts; (2) the proper treatment of account pro-
ceeds of inventory collateral; (3) the distinctive rules applicable to pri-
ority disputes involving proceeds of accounts; (4) exceptions to the first-
to-file rule arising out of the Code's limited definition of the term "ac-
count"; and (5) the removal of Code coverage by account-related scope
provisions other than Section 9-104(f).454
1. Purchase-Money Security Interests in Accounts
Some secured creditors are more equal than others. The Code of-
fers a "super-priority," even against first filers, to any creditor who ob-
tains a purchase-money security interest ("PMSI"). 455 A secured
stances under which perfection lapses). A security interest in accounts can lapse with respect to
account proceeds unless perfection is properly maintained. See Clark, The Law of Secured Trans-
actions I 10.01[2][b] at S10-2 (Supp. 1990) (cited in note 8).
452. See U.C.C. § 9-401(2). See generally Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions 1 2.12[3]
at 2-131 to 2-136 (cited in note 8); Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 6.06 at 6-141 to 6-170
(cited in note 8); White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 22-17 at 1027-29 (cited in note
8); Special Project, 62 Cornell L. Rev. at 856 (cited in note 12) (discussing different interpretations
of the knowledge-of-the-contents exception to the general first-to-file rule).
453. The leading case on this subject, with respect to accounts, is Bank of the West v. Com-
mercial Credit Fin. Servs., 852 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1988). A useful discussion of the case appears in
Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions 2.11[1][b][iii] at 52-22 to 52-24 (Cum. Supp. No. 1
1992). Detailed discussions of the dual debtor problem appear in Coogan, et al., Secured Transac-
tions § 7B.03 at 7B-20 to 7B-28, and Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions V 3.08[4] at 3-91 to
3-92. For a recent statement from the Permanent Editorial Board on this issue, see Permanent
Editoral Board Commentary on the Uniform Commercial Code, PEB Commentary 6: Section 9-
301(1) (1990) (indicating that the first-to-file rule should not necessarily protect the creditor who
takes a security interest through an original debtor's transferee). See also Special Project, 62 Cor-
nell L. Rev. at 860-63 (cited in note 12) (suggesting that the first filer's loss of priority in these
circumstances can be explained by viewing Section 9-312 as fixing priority rules only for competing
security interests that were created by a single debtor). Another interesting departure from the
strict first-to-file rule, applicable to transferees of certain foreign assignors, is established by
U.C.C. Section 9-103(3)(c). That section provides: If the debtor is located outside the United
States in a jurisdiction that does not provide for Article Nine-type filing, the financing statement
may be filed in the state where the debtor has its major U.S. executive office; in the alternative,
perfection against a foreign assignor may always be accomplished by notification of the account
debtor. Of course, "account debtor notification is ineffective as a means of perfection in all other
situations." Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions 10.04(3)(b) at 10-45 n.156 (cited in note 8).
See note 95 and accompanying text.
454. U.C.C. Section 9-104(f) describes the principal forms of account transfers to which Arti-
cle Nine does not apply. For a discussion of these exceptions, see notes 211-327 and accompanying
text.
455. U.C.C. §§ 9-312(3), (4). For a detailed general study of the purchase-money security
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creditor takes a PMSI if that creditor provides the money the debtor
uses to purchase the property subject to the security interest.456 When
Zinc, Inc. sells restaurant furniture under a conditional sales contract,
for example, it takes a PMSI in the furniture because the seller's exten-
sion of credit on the purchise price has directly facilitated the sale. In
like fashion, Lava Lou Lender's security interest in a Dimension Pinball
Machine is of the purchase-money ilk if Lava Lou has lent to the Di-
mension Machine buyer the funds the borrower spent to acquire that
treasure.
457
As lenders with PMSIs in goods, Zinc, Inc. and Lava Lou Lender
may sidestep the general first-to-file rule under U.C.C. Sections 9-
312(3) and 9-312(4). The Code speaks with a delphic voice, however, to
the question whether the PMSI exception to the first-to-file rule ex-
tends to security interests in accounts.458 In particular, after Section 9-
312(3) sets out the PMSI rules for security interests in inventory, Sec-
tion 9-312(4) goes on to explain:
A purchase money security interest in collateral other than inventory has priority
over a conflicting security interest in the same collateral or its proceeds if the
purchase money security interest is perfected at the time the debtor receives pos-
session of the collateral or within ten days thereafter.
459
The argument is straightforward that this rule does not afford any pro-
tection to the PMSI in accounts. Under the express terms of Section 9-
312(4), the PMSI can take priority only if it "is perfected at the time
the debtor receives possession or within ten days thereafter." In the
usual sense, however, a debtor cannot take possession of accounts be-
cause they constitute purely intangible property.460 Thus, the argument
goes, Section 9-312(4) provides no exception to the first-to-file rule
when the collateral are accounts.461
interest, see Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 7B.01 at 7B-3 to 7B-8 (cited in note 8) (chap-
ter by Professor McDonnell).
456. U.C.C. § 9-107. See generally White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 24-5 at
1138-49 (cited in note 8).
457. See U.C.C. § 9-107.
458. See generally Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions T 3.09[2][b] at 3-97 (cited in
note 8) (noting difficulty of determining whether the Code's purchase-money priority sections
cover intangible property).
459. U.C.C. § 9-312(4).
460. See notes 88-91 and accompanying text (noting assignees' inability to perfect account
interests under U.C.C. Section 9-305 because accounts are not susceptible to possession). See also
Arctic Air Conditioning, 35 Bankr. at 109 (stating that "since defendant could not have physically
possessed the contract rights, a written agreement was necessary to create a security interest"
under U.C.C. Section 9-203); Scult, 11 Ariz. L. Rev. at 4-5 (cited in note 19) (stating that "[s]ince
accounts, contract rights and general intangibles are not capable of 'possession' by a secured party
within the meaning of the Code, a security interest in such collateral is enforceable only if the
debtor has signed a written security agreement").
461. Professor McDonnell skirts this problem in his otherwise helpful discussion of PMSIs in
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All things considered, courts should reject this analysis and afford
otherwise qualifying account transferees PMSI priority under Section
9-312(4). The text of Section 9-312(4) leans in this direction by sug-
gesting on its face that it applies without exception to "collateral other
than inventory. ' 462 Of no less importance, the Official Comments state
flatly that "[s]ubsection (4) states a general rule applicable to all types
of collateral except inventory."4 63 Nor is there any apparent policy rea-
son for treating PMSIs in accounts or other nonpossessible intangible
property less hospitably than other forms of PMSIs. A basic purpose of
affording PMSI priority is to avert monopolization of credit by the
holder of a security interest that broadly covers the debtor's after-ac-
quired property.46 4 In addition, the PMSI rule achieves this result with-
out prejudicing the preexisting floating-lien financer because the
purchase-money interest extends only to new collateral that is added to
the debtor's estate as a direct and traceable consequence of the
purchase-money financing.46 5 These policies for favoring purchase-
accounts. He states that a purchase-money financer of accounts should take priority over an ear-
lier-filed floating lienholder "if it files within the applicable period of grace." Coogan, et al., Se-
cured Transactions § 7B.12[2] at 7B-69 (cited in note 8). He does not explain, however, when or
how that grace period-which is tied to the taking of possession-begins to run.
462. See Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 7B.12[2] at 7B-69 (concluding that the
purchase-money financer of accounts should be able to obtain priority under Section 9-312(4) be-
cause "[aiccounts are 'other collateral'" within the terms of that section); Clark, The Law of Se-
cured Transactions T 3.09[2][b] at 3-97 (cited in note 8) (stating that Section 9-312(4)
"contemplates a purchase money security interest in collateral other than inventory, and is not
limited to tangible collateral").
463. U.C.C. § 9-312 cmt. 3 (emphasis added).
464. See, for example, Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 7B.05 at 7B-32 to 7B-33 (citing
"avoidance-of-stranglehold" philosophy of purchase-money provisions); Robert Braucher and Rob-
ert Riegert, Introduction to Commercial Transactions at 464 (Foundation, 1977); Special Project,
62 Cornell L. Rev. at 870-71 (cited in note 12) (recognizing that "the purchase money exception
facilitates commerce and reduces the potential unfairness created by monopolization of credit").
465. See, for example, First Interstate Bank v. IRS, 930 F.2d 1521, 1525 (10th Cir. 1991)
(holding that "such an interest takes priority over any pre-existing lien on the theory that because
the lender has augmented the capital assets of the borrower, previous creditors are not
prejudiced"); Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions 10.06[2] at 10-52 (stating that "[tihis
superpriority is frequently not a bad thing for the general financer, since value is added to the
debtor's stock by the secondary financing"); Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 7B.05 at 7B-35
(stating that "[t]o allow the floating lienor to prevail as to assets which the debtor acquired
through the new value provided by the purchase money credits arguably would give a windfall to
the floating lienor"); Jackson and Kronman, 88 Yale L. J. at 1176-77 (cited in note 441) (stating
that "[i]f the appreciation in the debtor's estate resulting from [the purchase-money lender's] loan
can be linked to the debtor's acquisition 6f distinct items of property, the debtor can grant [that
lender] purchase money priority without occassioning a de facto demotion of the [earlier floating
lienholder's] security interest"). The purchase-money priority rule may eliminate needless transac-
tion costs by automatically prioritizing the purchase-money interest. Viewed from the time of a
first-filed floating lien transaction, this may be the case because the parties otherwise would have
to negotiate, with some difficulty, a cost-of-credit reduction to offset the floating lienor's situa-
tional monopoly. Id. at 1172-73. On this view, the "purchase-money provision in Article 9 merely
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money creditors apply no less forcefully when the borrower buys non-
possessory intangibles than when the borrower buys restaurant furni-
ture or Dimension Pinball Machines.6 6
Any interpretation that extends Section 9-312(4) to nonpossessory
intangibles necessitates a somewhat awkward inquiry into when a trans-
feree of accounts takes possession of them. To say that the assignee
takes possession for purposes of Section 9-312(4) on the date the trans-
fer of the intangibles takes place, however, is not farfetched.6 7 That
others have reached the same conclusion-either explicitly468 or implic-
itly4" 9-is not surprising.
Application of Section 9-312(4) to account transfers raises tricky
questions about whether particular interests in accounts qualify as PM-
SIs. Consider, for example, Case M.
legislates a standard contract term the parties would be likely to adopt in its absence." Id. at 1173.
Viewed from the time of the purchase-money transaction, the rule may remove the costliness of
bargaining to get a subordination agreement that the rational floating lienholder is likely to pro-
vide in any event. In our restaurant furniture case, for example, to give priority to the seller under
the conditional sales contract would seem to do no harm to the holder of the floating lien covering
the restaurant equipment. This is because the floating lienholder has not lost any collateral by
purchasing this additional equipment with new funds. The debtor's procurement of this equipment
may generate more income to the business and thus solidify the floating lienor's position. Under
these circumstances, a rational floating lienholder should agree to subordinate its otherwise-prior
interest in the purchase-money collateral. The PMSI rules of Section 9-312 achieve this result
automatically without the need for costly communications, bargaining, and drafting.
466. The acquisition of certain forms of intangible property-such as patents, copyrights,
trade secrets or other forms of intellectual property-may be especially important to the operation
and growth of the debtor's business. Professor McDonnell suggests that there is another policy
reason for favoring the secured lender who finances the purchase of accounts over an earlier-filed
floating lienholder. In his view, the floating lienholder is adequately protected by its interest in
accounts generated by the debtor's own sales or services, which are "all that a receivables financer
normally expects or needs." Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 7B.12[2] at 7B-69 (cited in
note 8). This assumption is inappropriate, however, when the floating lienholder has bargained for
a security agreement that by its terms covers accounts either generated or purchased by the
debtor. Unless the security agreement is written in this way, no priority question will exist at all.
467. Section 9-103(5) of the 1962 Code provides some support for this proposition by recog-
nizing the possibility that accounts "are within the jurisdiction of [a] state" even when the as-
signor's records concerning them are located elsewhere. See generally Special Project, 62 Cornell L.
Rev. at 884 & n.230 (cited in note 12) (stating that meaning of the term "possession" varies in
different contexts).
468. Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions 3-09[2][b] at 3-97 (cited in note 8) (stating
that when a bank finances the acquisition of one company by another, possession of the acquired
company's accounts receivable and other intangibles occurs when the deal is closed).
469. See MBank Alamo, 886 F.2d at 1452-54 (acknowledging possibility of obtaining
purchase-money priority in accounts, although denying such priority on facts); Northwestern Nat'l
Bank SW v. Lectro Sys., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 678 (Minn. 1977) (implying that appellant who had
security interest in accounts would have been entitled to purchase-money priority if it had pro-
vided funds for the purchase of those accounts); In re Woodworks Contemporary Furniture, Inc.,
44 Bankr. 971 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1984) (agreeing with holding and reasoning of Lectro Sys.);
Grant Gilmore, The Purchase Money Priority, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1333, 1372 (1963).
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CASE M. Bungling Bank agrees to lend a general contractor suf-
ficient funds to facilitate the general contractor's pursuit of a partic-
ular construction contract. In light of this commitment, the
contractor is able to bid on the job and obtain the contract. The
general contractor then transfers its payment rights under the con-
tract to the Bungling Bank as collateral for its loan. Does Bungling
Bank have a PMSI in the construction-contract account?
The bank will argue that it does because "by making advances or
incurring an obligation [it gave] value to enable the debtor to acquire
rights in" the account.470 The interest taken by the bank, however, is
not a PMSI in the ordinary sense because the borrower has not used
the loan proceeds to make a purchase at all.47' It is also doubtful that
the no-skin-off-your-back policy behind the purchase-money priority
provisions applies in this setting.4 72 This is so because the contractor's
payment rights are not purchased solely with the money lent by that
bank; rather, they are purchased principally with the contractor's work
in performing the contract. It is precisely that work, however, that the
floating lienholder is counting on to generate additional accounts to col-
lateralize its own earlier commitments. Finally, giving PMSI status to
persons who facilitate the creation of accounts-in addition to persons
who facilitate their outright purchase-will create hair-raising charac-
terization problems.473 For all these reasons, the better result is to re-
strict the PMSI in accounts to the lender who in fact finances an
account purchase.474 Again, courts and commentators are in agreement.
470. U.C.C. § 9-107(b).
471. See Lectro Sys., 262 N.W.2d at 680 (finding no PMSI in accounts, the court reasons
that "[t]his is not a case in which funds were advanced for the purchase of a receivable"); Wood-
works Contemporary Furniture, 44 Bankr. at 973 (quoting Lectro Sys. with approval); White and
Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 24-5 at 1139 n.4 (cited in note 8); Gilmore, Security Inter-
ests in Personal Property § 29.2 at 781 (cited in note 2); Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions §
7B.04[2] at 7B-31 (noting that the "purchase money creditor enables the acquisition of the collat-
eral rather than ...their production or generation in the debtor enterprise") (cited in note 8);
Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions T 3.09[2] [b] at 3-97 (distinguishing case in which "funds
were used to perform an existing contract" from one in which funds are used "to purchase rights
under the contract") (cited in note 8).
472. Contrast note 465 and accompanying text.
473. Compare Lectro Sys., Inc., 262 N.W.2d at 680 (rejecting bank's argument that loan to
subcontractor that enabled subcontractor to finish contract and thus earn right to payment was a
purchase-money transaction), with Friedberg, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. at 321-22 n.111 (cited in
note 411) (arguing that construction-surety's contingent interest in assigned project payments is a
PMSI). See also White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 24-5 at 1139 n.4 (expressing
concern about "mak[ing] any loan a purchase money loan if it enabled the debtor to conduct his
business and generate profit").
474. See Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 7B.12[3] at 7B-70 (concluding that a bank
that makes a loan to enable a contractor to finish a project, and thus generate account debt, does
not have a PMSI; otherwise "the different standing of purchase money and operational financing
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2. Security Interests in Accounts as Proceeds of Inventory
One of the most talked-about problems in the history of Article
Nine concerns the position of the accounts financer vis-d-vis an inven-
tory financer who claims accounts as proceeds. Following promulgation
of the Code, controversy raged over whether a later-filing creditor with
a PMSI in inventory could claim account proceeds to the exclusion of
an earlier-filing direct transferee of the same account.475 The Code was
ambiguous on this point, and some commentators advocated awarding
priority to the later-filing inventory financer in derogation of the gen-
eral first-to-file rule.
476
The 1972 Amendments mooted this debate. Under those amend-
ments, the special protection afforded by Section 9-312(3) to the PMSI
in inventory extends only to "cash proceeds received on or before deliv-
ery of the inventory to a buyer. 477 It follows that no exception to the
ordinary first-to-file rule protects the inventory financer whose proceeds
are accounts.41 s
will collapse"); Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions 3.09[2][a] at 3-96 (same); Henson,
Handbook on Secured Transactions § 5-6 at 89 (cited in note 8) (suggesting that PMSI in ac-
counts arises "where Bank B advances funds to Financer C to enable C to purchase the accounts of
A"); Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 29.2 at 780 (cited in note 2) (suggesting
that the PMSIs in accounts would be only of "academic" interest). See generally note 469 (collect-
ing cases). Notably, the problem identified here lurked in MBank Alamo, 886 F.2d at 1451-54. In
that case, a manufacturer agreed to sell X-ray machines on credit to a distributor on the condition
that the distributor would assign back to the manufacturer all accounts generated by its resale of
the X-ray machines. Id. at 1450. The manufacturer thereafter argued it had a PMSI as to those
accounts, entitled to priority over two earlier-filed accounts financers, because its commitments
had "enable[d] the debtor to acquire" the accounts. Id. at 1451 (quoting U.C.C. § 9-107(2)). The
court rejected this argument on the ground that the manufacturer looked too much like a pro-
ceeds-claiming inventory financer (whom the Code clearly subordinates to an accounts receivable
financer by way of U.C.C. Section 9-312(3), see notes 475-78 and accompanying text). Id. at 1452-
53. As Professor McDonnell has noted, the court more properly could have rejected the claim of
priority on the ground that the manufacturer failed to qualify as a PMSI holder. As he puts it:
"[The manufacturer's] commitments did not enable [the distributor] to 'acquire' the accounts
within the meaning of Section 9-107(b). The commitment allowed [the distributor] to generate the
accounts. . . . [However, the] accounts arose in the business of [the distributor] as part of its
normal business operations rather than being purchased." Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions §
7B.12[4][c] at 7B-73 (emphasis added).
475. See, for example, Final Report, § 9-312 at 113-14 (cited in note 308) (describing the
problem as "one of the most widely discussed questions under the 1962 Code"). Commentary on
this subject was extensive. See, for example, Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property §
25.8 at 674 n.1; Coogan and Gordon, 76 Harv. L. Rev. at 1559-64 (cited in note 31); Scult, 11 Ariz.
L. Rev. at 26-30 (cited in note 19) (collecting earlier literature).
476. The principal exponent of this position was Professor Henson. See, for example, Hen-
son, Handbook on Secured Transactions § 6-5 at 213 (cited in note 8).
477. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (emphasis added). See also id. § 9-312(3) cmt. 3.
478. See id. § 9-312 cmts. 3, 8, ex. 8. In accord, for example, Coogan, et al., Secured Transac-
tions § 15.10[3][b] at 15-67; id. § 7B.11[1] at 7B-66. As stated in the Permanent Editorial Board's
Final Report:
The Committee believes that where a financing statement as to accounts financing is filed
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Notwithstanding the 1972 Amendments, some departures from the
first-to-file rule will continue to result from the interaction of the
Code's proceeds and PMSI rules. One reason why is that the cash-pro-
ceeds limitation of Section 9-312(3) applies only to the PMSI in inven-
tory.479 Consider, in this regard, Case N:
CASE N. Snuffieupagus properly files a floating lien covering all
of Cookie Monster's accounts. Thereafter Oscar sells a steamroller
to Cookie Monster on credit, retaining a PMSI. Oscar files his fi-
nancing statement covering his security interest before Cookie Mon-
ster takes delivery of the steamroller. For a time, Cookie Monster
uses the steamroller in his business, but then sells it to Prairie
Dawn, who promises to pay Cookie Monster $10,000 in one year in a
writing that is neither an instrument nor chattel paper. Cookie
Monster thereafter defaults on his obligations to Snuffleupagus and
Oscar, who both lay claim to the Prairie Dawn account.
Oscar, although he is the second filer, takes priority on these facts.
The reason why is that the steamroller was not inventory, but equip-
ment.48 ° Oscar properly perfected his PMSI in that equipment under
Section 9-312(4), and that interest carries over to the collateral's pro-
ceeds, including accounts. 481 For Oscar, the would-be Grouch, Article
Nine has chased the clouds away. His second-filed security interest
gives him a first-priority position with respect to the Prairie Dawn
account.48 2
Notwithstanding the limits imposed by Section 9-312(3), even a se-
cured creditor who lays claim to account proceeds of inventory may, in
a proper case, defeat a perfected direct account assignee. If an inven-
tory financer files before any filing by the account transferee, the inven-
tory financer takes priority even though her financing statement does
not mention accounts at all. This result arises because the inventory
financer is not relying on the special protection provided by the PMSI
first (with or without related inventory financing), the security interest in accounts should not
be defeated by any subsequent claim to accounts as proceeds of an inventory security interest
which was filed later. This result is accomplished by the absence in Section 9-312(3) of any
priority rule carrying forward the purchase-money priority to proceeds which are accounts.
Final Report § E-38 at 225-36 (cited in note 308).
479. See note 477 and accompanying text.
480. U.C.C. § 9-109(2).
481. See id. § 9-312 cmt. 3 (stating that PMSI continues in proceeds of non-inventory collat-
eral); Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 7B.11[3] at 7B-67 (emphasizing that "Section 9-
312(4) does not limit the 'flow through' of the priority to cash proceeds of the acquired asset").
482. In accord, for example, Special Project, 62 Cornell L. Rev. at 880 (cited in note 12)




rule of Section 9-312(3),4 as but instead on the general protection af-
forded by Section 9-312(5).484 This protection is available to the inven-
tory financer because other Code provisions broadly extend the first-to-
file principle to proceeds of collateralized property. 485 One can quibble
about whether these provisions in effect create an exception to the first-
to-file rule.46 However, the fact that they do cause the first filer to take
a subordinate position with respect to the accounts themselves is
clear.
487
3. Security Interests in Checks or Cash as Proceeds of Accounts
In many cases, priority as to a transferred account has significance
only if that priority extends to the account's proceeds. Consider, for
example, Case 0.
CASE 0. Fan and Stan both pay for assignments from Ann of an
account payable to her by Jan. Fan files first. Stan, however, re-
ceives payment on the account, without notice of Fan's competing
interest, by way of a check drawn by Jan. Can Fan, because she has
priority as to the account, recover from Stan the check, its proceeds,
or an equivalent amount?
According to a recent pronouncement of the Permanent Editorial
Board, Fan is out of luck even though she was the first to file.488 The
Board's reasoning is that Stan took the check as a holder in due
course;489 thus, under Section 9-309, he has "priority over an earlier se-
curity interest even though perfected."'490
483. See notes 477-78 and accompanying text.
484. See notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
485. See U.C.C. §§ 9-203(3), 9-306(3), 9-402(2)(b); Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions
10.01[21[al at 10-5 (cited in note 8) (stating that "the 1972 amendments. . . automatically extend
a security interest to proceeds without the necessity of mentioning proceeds in the security agree-
ment or financing statement") (footnotes omitted).
486. After all, the inventory financer takes priority precisely because it was the first to file.
487. See Final Report at 225-26 (cited in note 308); Davenport and Murray, Secured Trans-
actions § 7.02(e)(2) at 313-15, § 7.02(e)(3) at 315-16 (cited in note 8) (stating that first-filing claim-
ant of inventory proceeds in the form of accounts defeats later-filing secured party with direct
security interest in accounts so long as first filer's interest has not lapsed and detailing how secur-
ity interest in account proceeds of inventory may lapse). See also Coogan, et al., Secured Transac-
tions § 15.10[3][b][v] at 15-66 (cited in note 8) (stating "[t]hus, if the Finance Company's interest
in the car was perfected before local bank filed as to the accounts, Finance Company would have
priority as to the account. The first to file does not always win.").
488. See Permanent Editorial Board Commentary on the Uniform Commercial Code, PEB
Commentary 7, at 33-35 (1990) [hereinafter "PEB Commentary 7"].
489. Stan was not disqualified from acquiring holder-in-due-course status on the ground that
he had notice of any claim to the instrument merely by reason of Fan's earlier filing. See U.C.C. §§
3-301(1), 9-309.
490. Id. § 9-309. See PEB Commentary 7 at 34 (cited in note 488). The issues of when a
checkholder is a holder in due course under Section 3-302, when a non-holder in due course might
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The appropriateness of this application of Section 9-309, which
gives priority to the check recipient even though his receipt of the
check is wholly derivative of his interest in an account that is
subordinate to the interest of another, is hardly self-evident. At least
one court rejected the position now espoused by the Permanent Edito-
rial Board,491 and distinguished commentators-writing prior to issu-
ance of the Board's declaration-approved the result in that case.492
Even so, the broad language of Section 9-309 strongly supports the
Permanent Editorial Board's position. So does the longstanding pol-
icy-now embodied in Article Three of the Code-that favors finality
and assuredness in taking negotiable paper.43 Because the Board's ap-
proach to Case 0 is more than reasonable, it should be followed by the
courts in the interest of achieving and maintaining uniformity.
A different problem arises if Stan receives payment by way of cash
instead of by check. Again, the Permanent Editorial Board would pre-
clude any recovery by Fan from Stan under these circumstances. 494 The
Board's reasoning on this question, however, differs significantly from
its analysis of Case 0. In addressing the cash-proceeds issue, the Board
states that "resort must be had to the principles of law and equity"
made applicable to Code problems by Section 1-103.495 It goes on to
explain: "[I]f [Stan] gave value for the assignment (as [he] must have,
see § 9-203(1)(b)) and obtained the payment in good faith and without
secure priority under Section 9-308, and when a first filer's proceeds interest in a check or its
proceeds might lapse under Section 9-306 are all beyond the scope of this Article. In accord, All-
state Fin. Corp. v. Financorp, Inc., 934 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1991).
491. Bank of the West v. Commercial Credit Fin. Serv., Inc., 655 F. Supp. at 807, 819-20
(N.D. Cal. 1987). The Bank of the West case involved the unsuccessful assertion of priority under
Section 9-309 by a second-filing factor who had bought accounts without recourse and then had
taken the checks as payments on those accounts.
492. See Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions 3.08[1][c] at 3-85 to 3-86 (cited in note
8) (stating that "the decision seems correct," including inapplicability of Section 9-309, because
second-filing "factor had no interest in the checks except as proceeds of the accounts"); Hillman,
et al., Common Law and Equity I 25.02[5][c] at S25-25 (Cum. Supp. 1991) (cited in note 271)
(reasoning that case was correctly decided because the junior account holder's "liability was based
on conversion of the accounts rather than the proceeds of the accounts").
To the extent that the latter authority approved Bank of the West solely on the ground that
the junior account holder received checks directly from the account debtor rather than proceeds
passed through to it following collections by the assignor, that analysis is questionable for two
reasons. First, the factual recitation by the court in Bank of the West indicates that some of the
check payments received by the junior assignee came from the assignor, rather than directly from
the account debtor. 852 F.2d at 1164-65. Second, whether collections come from the account debtor
or through the assignor seems to make no difference as a matter of Code language or Code policy.
Most important, in either case, the junior assignee who takes a check in good faith qualifies as a
holder in due course.
493. See Allstate Fin. Corp., 934 F.2d at 59-60.
494. PEB Commentary 7 at 34-35 (cited in note 488).
495. Id. at 34.
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knowledge or reason to know of the prior assignment, then [Stan] may
retain the payment. See Restatement, Second, Contracts, § 342(b). 496
The key difficulty with this analysis is that it unjustifiably assumes
that all states abide by the four-horsemen rule of Restatement Section
324(b), which entitles an innocent second-in-time assignee to retain ac-
count collections.497 While the Permanent Editorial Board might prop-
erly claim authority to engage in ongoing interpretation of the Code
itself, claiming authority to declare uniform principles of non-Code
common law is a far different matter. Even so, as the Board suggests,
there is good cause for courts to interpret the common law so that Stan
keeps the cash. Otherwise, given the preceding analysis of Case 0 under
Section 9-309,418 "cash would be rendered less negotiable than a
check."
499
In short, the gravitational pull of the Code on the common law is
distinctively powerful in this setting, for otherwise an anomaly will
arise.500 The resulting common-law rule-which subordinates the first
filer if the competing account transferee has innocently collected money
proceeds-highlights the many uncertainties that face even the most
properly perfected first-filing account assignee.50 1
4. Exceptions Arising Under the Code's Definitional Provisions
Departures from the Code's first-to-file rule also result from the
Code's specialized definition of the term "account." Consider Case P.
CASE P. On January 1, Fern Factoring, Inc. takes an outright
assignment of all of Saul Dramaseller's existing rights to payment.
Those right§ are (1) Saul's payment rights for six past deliveries of
videocassettes, and (2) Saul's entitlements to payment for seven
transfers of staging rights as to a recently copyrighted play. On Feb-
ruary 1, Saul assigns these thirteen payment rights to Second As-
signee Bank as collateral for a $100,000 loan. Second Assignee Bank
files its financing statement on February 1, and Fern Factoring files
on February 2. Who has priority as to these receivables?
Article Nine governs this priority dispute to the extent it concerns
496. Id.
497. See notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
498. See notes 488-92 and accompanying text.
499. PEB Commentary 7 at 35. See also Hillman, et al., Common Law and Equity
25.02[5][c) at S25-24 (Cum. Supp. 1991) (cited in note 271) (noting "the long-established, com-
mon-law rule that a bona fide transferee of currency, who takes or value and in the ordinary
course, cuts off preexisting ownership claims").
500. Compare text following note 404 (discussing a fortiori argument derived from Section 9-
301(1)(d)). See generally notes 334-36 (discussing impact of Code on common-law priorities rules).
501. See notes 570-71 and accompanying text.
1992] 1155
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1061
the payment rights generated by the videocassette sales. Those sales
gave rise to accounts because Section 9-106 defines the term "account"
to reach "any right to payment for goods sold. 502 Both Fern Factoring
(as a buyer of those accounts) 503 and Second Assignee Bank (as a collat-
eral transferee of those accounts),0 4 therefore, hold Article Nine secur-
ity interests. Article Nine's first-to-file rule controls, and Second
Assignee Bank prevails. 505
The same analysis, however, does not apply to the seven assigned
entitlements to payment arising from Saul's transfer of the staging
rights. The reason why is that those entitlements are not "rights to pay-
ment for goods sold or leased or for services rendered." 50 6 Thus, they
are not accounts, but general intangibles, for purposes of the U.C.CY
°7
Second Assignee Bank's collateral interest in the staging-right pay-
ments is a security interest under Article Nine, because one can take an
orthodox security interest in general intangibles.508 Article Nine, how-
ever, does not cover the sale of general intangibles, so that Saul's trans-
fer of the staging-right payments to Fern Factoring falls outside Article
Nine.509 Non-Code law, therefore, controls the Fern Factoring/First As-
502. U.C.C. § 9-106 (emphasis added). The Code definition of the term "account" is set forth
at note 15 and accompanying text.
503. See U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(b).
504. See id. § 9-102(1)(a).
505. See notes 88-112 and accompanying text.
506. U.C.C. § 9-106 (emphasis added).
507. See Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 3.08[5][b] at 3-64 (cited in note 8) (noting
that rights to payment for the right to show a film would be considered a general intangible under
U.C.C. Section 9-106). See generally Scult, 11 Ariz. L. Rev. at 5 (cited in note 19) (recognizing that
"'general intangibles' may include, in addition to non-monetary rights, rights to payments which
are not accounts").
508. See U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a); id. § 9-106 cmt. (explaining that Code extends to collateral
transfers of general intangibles, which "are used or may become customarily used as commercial
security"); Joseph Kanner Hat Co., 482 F.2d at 940 (stating that right to be reimbursed for mov-
ing expenses is a general intangible, which Article Nine governs because there was an intent to
secure); Himlie Properties, 36 Bankr. at 34-35 (holding that security transfer of general intangibles
was covered by Code).
509. See, for example, Joseph Kanner Hat Co., 482 F.2d at 939 n.5; Morrison, 28 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. at 174-75 (holding assignment of royalty payments from recording company not within Arti-
cle Nine). See generally Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions 15.02 at 15-9 to 15-10; Gilmore,
Security Interests in Personal Property § 10.5 at 308 (cited in note 2).
A danger exists that courts will fail to navigate safely through these tricky Code provisions. In
Vinzant, the court flatly stated: "Assignments of rights to payments under contracts are subject to
the filing provisions of the U.C.C. unless the assignment falls within the provisions of [9-104(f0]."
108 Bankr. at 757. This statement is inaccurate. The Code does not apply to all "[a]ssignments of
rights to payments under contracts." As the preceding citations show, the Code does not apply to
absolute assignments of contractual rights to payment that constitute general intangibles. The
right to payment involved in Vinzant itself-namely rights to payments under annuity con-
tracts-were general intangibles. Nonetheless, the court correctly applied Article Nine's filing
rules in the case because the assignments of the annuity contracts were collateral assignments
rather than absolute transfers. Id. at 754.
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signee Bank priority dispute over the staging-right payments because
that dispute has one foot in and one foot outside the Code.510 Under
non-Code law, Fern Factoring may well have a prior claim to these pay-
ment rights even though it was the second filer. In particular, Fern Fac-
toring will take the prize if the transfer occurred in a jurisdiction that
follows the New York first-in-time rule. 11
As Case P illustrates, some contract rights that the business person
may think of as accounts are not accounts for purposes of Article
Nine.512 "Examples of such rights are the right to payment of a loan not
evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper; a right to receive partial
refund of purchase prices paid by reason of retroactive volume dis-
counts; rights to receive payment under licenses of patents and copy-
rights, exhibition contracts, etc."5 13  Other contractual monetary
payment rights that are not accounts include the right to payment
given in exchange for trade secrets or for the purchase of realty,51 4 a
capital reserve account of an agricultural cooperative member,1 5 the
right to royalties under a contract transferring rights to reproduce and
distribute recordings, 516 and perhaps the right to payment under a non-
competition agreement.517
510. See, for example, Morrison, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 174-75; Farnsworth, Farnsworth on
Contracts § 11.9 at 123 (cited in note 8) (stating that "an assignment of. . .a contract right other
than an account is left to the conflicting common law rules on priority"). See generally note 332
and accompanying text.
511. See notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
512. See, for example, Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 15.02 at 15-8 to 15-9; id. §
21.02[1][a] at 21-75 (cited in note 8) (stating that "the financer would tend to include [as an ac-
count] any claim to payment of money arising out of the rendering of services or sales of any assets
(whether or not those assets are good) if payment is no longer conditional upon further perform-
ance by the entity upon whose balance sheet the item appears") (footnotes omitted); Coogan and
Gordon, 76 Harv. L. Rev. at 1531 (cited in note 31) (stating.that "[t]o a businessman, his account-
ant or his financer, the term 'receivables' describes unconditional rights to payment of money").
513. U.C.C. § 9-106 cmt. See also id. § 9-102 cmt. 2 (stating that obligation "to repay money
lent" that is not an instrument or chattel paper is a general intangible).
514. See Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 15.02 at 15-9; Clark, The Law of Secured
Transactions 1.08[10][a][i] at 1-114 to 1-117 (cited in note 8) (discussing real estate cases). For
cases holding assignments of a land vendor's rights to receive payments to be general intangibles,
see In re D. J. Maltese, Inc., 42 Bankr. 589 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984); In re S.O.A. W. Enters., Inc.,
32 Bankr. 279 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1983) (holding that assignments of numerous contracts for the
sale of real estate were not accounts or chattel paper, but general intangibles, representing a flow
of payments from the vendees of the real estate); In re Southworth, 22 Bankr. 376 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1982).
515. See In re Cosner, 3 Bankr. 445, 447-48 (Bankr. Or. 1980); Clark, The Law of Secured
Transactions 1.0312] at 1-17; Coogan, et al., Securea Transactions § 15.05 at 15-21; In re Bucy-
rus Grain Co., Inc., 67 Bankr. 336, 340 (Bankr. Kan. 1986) (holding that right to payment from
commodities futures trading account constitutes a general intangible), rev'd on other grounds, 127
Bankr. 45 (D. Kan. 1988).
516. 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 174.
517. The key question in this regard is whether money paid for the promise not to compete is
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Other commentators have wondered why the Code distinguishes
between payment rights earned by the transfer of goods or services and
payment rights earned by the transfer of intangibles or other forms of
given in exchange for services. Probably it is not. The promisor under such an agreement does not
undertake to perform "services" in the ordinary sense; rather she promises not to undertake speci-
fied work. Even more important, the legislative materials suggest that the Code's definition of the
term "accounts" targets traditional accounts, or "the ordinary commercial account receivable."
U.C.C. § 9-106 cmt. The right to money payments under a one-shot noncompete agreement hardly
seems to fit this description. Contrast Worden, 63 Bankr. at 724 (raising issue of whether noncom-
petition agreement gives rise to account). For a questionable ruling, see Padgett, 49 Bankr. at 214-
15. There the court confronted a "two-for-one" contract, under which a seller of soybeans obtained
as consideration a right to receive, at the buyer's election at a future date, either twice the amount
of delivered soybeans or the cash equivalent. Id. at 213. The court concluded that this contract
right constituted an "account", even though the buyer could perform by delivering either money or
goods. Id. at 214-15. See Dynair Electronics, Inc. v. Video Cable, Inc., 127 Cal. Rptr. 268, 273 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1976) (stating that "[r]eference to section 9106, and especially to the UCC Comment
under that section, removes any doubt the former section was intended to define the terms 'ac-
count' and 'contract right' in terms of a right to payment of money"). For some other cases finding
contractual rights to money payments not to be accounts, see, for example, Joseph Kanner Hat
Co., 482 F.2d at 940 (holding right to be reimbursed for moving expenses not an account); Vinzant,
108 Bankr. at 757 (holding payment rights under annuity contracts not an account). See also Per-
cival Constr. Co. v. Miller & Miller Auctioneers, Inc., 532 F.2d 166 (10th Cir. 1976) (holding
money owed a construction company by auctioneer who sold construction company's equipment
not an account); In re Cooper, 2 Bankr. 188 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980) (holding promoter's right to
payment from agent who sold concert tickets for promoter not an account); Jensen, 1977 Utah L.
Rev. at 335 n.29 (cited in note 74) (noting that royalty payment for film contract in Consoldated
Film Indus. would constitute general intangibles). For general discussions of general intangibles,
see Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions 1 1.0312] at 1-16 to 1-21 (cited in note 8); Coogan, et
al., Secured Transactions § 15.05 at 15-19 to 15-22 (cited in note 8); Henson, Handbook on Se-
cured Transactions § 5.11 at 167-69; White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 21-9 at
955 (cited in note 8).
One important definitional point concerns whether amounts payable to a contractor or sub-
contractor constitute an account or a general intangible. There was some uncertainty about this
matter under the accounts receivable statutes. Compare Costello v. Bank of Am. Nat' Trust &
Sav. Ass'n, 246 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1957) (construing bookmarking accounts receivable statute not
to cover payment rights under construction contract), with Honolulu Constr. & Drayning Co. v.
Terrace Developers, Ltd., 395 P.2d 691 (Haw. 1964) (construing accounts receivable statute to
cover assignment of payment rights under construction contract).
Homer Kripke also questioned the status of such payment rights following enactment of the
Code. Kripke, 4 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 691-92 (cited in note 217). The Code, however, seems clear on
this point, and the courts have concluded uniformly that the contractor, for Article Nine purposes,
is a holder of an account. See, for example, AM Int'l, 46 Bankr. at 571 (stating that "[c]ases have
held that where a subcontractor assigns to a supplier its right to payment under a contract, that
assignment creates a security interest"); Mississippi Bank v. Nickles & Wells Constr. Co., 421 So.
2d 1056 (Miss. 1982) (holding that right to payment under construction contract constitutes an
account); Sherburne Corp. v. Carter, 340 A.2d at 85-86 (finding that right to payment under con-
struction contract constitutes "account" under Article Nine that is not excluded by Section 9-104).
See also Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 12.5 at 380-83 (cited in note 2); Clark,
The Law of Secured Transactions 11.01 at 11-2 (cited in note 8) (finding that "[t]he term also
includes service contracts such as real estate construction contracts, which are frequently subject
to Article 9 financing"); Kuhn Constr. Co., 11 Bankr. at 749 (stating that "were the contractor to
assign these same rights to an entity other than a surety, such as a financier, Article 9 would
apply"); In re Munro Builders, Inc., 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 740-41.
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performance. Indeed, proposals have been made-even by some of the
Code's original drafters5lS-to jettison this distinction and apply the
Code to all forms of contractual payment rights. 19 In forging the 1972
Amendments, however, the Permanent Editorial Board rejected these
proposals.520 It reasoned that "too many standard forms of agreement
use the term 'accounts' and reflect [the] intention of the parties to in-




Redefining the term "accounts" for purposes of the perfection and
priority rules, however, could not and would not change any intention
of the parties expressed in consensual security agreements.2 2 Moreover,
the Board's reasoning ignores the fact that the Code already defines the
term "accounts" to include many forms of payment rights that are not
traditional accounts in the sense of being routinely carried on a seller's
or service-provider's account ledgers. 23 For better or worse, however,
the law remains unchanged. The consequence is that the common-law
rules still apply to many priority problems involving successive assign-
ments of contractual rights to the payment of money. 24
What principles should govern these priority problems? For rea-
sons already given, courts need not feel bound to follow some dusty pre-
Code formula in deciding these cases. Rather, in a commercial world
revolutionized by the U.C.C., courts should look to the common law
with a more creative eye.
525
518. See Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 5A.9 at 5A-47 (cited in note 8) (recognizing
that "some financing patterns for general intangibles for the payment of money seem to be so
similar to those for accounts as to argue in favor of bringing absolute assignments within the arti-
cle"); Coogan and Gordon, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1537-38 (cited in note 31); Kripke, 4 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at
693-700 (cited in note 217).
519. See Scult, 11 Ariz. L. Rev. at 6 (cited in note 19).
520. Final Report at 216-17 (cited in note 308).
521. Id. at 217.
522. See U.C.C. § 9-203. See generally White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 22-
4 at 981 (cited in note 8). Contrast Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 15.05 at 15-21 (noting
that, in light of the thin line between accounts and many general intangibles, "[iut is difficult to
imagine a receivables financing situation in which the financer would not be advised to include
some claim to general intangibles").
523. A large sum payable under a major construction contract is illustrative.
524. See Sun Bank, 466 So. 2d at 1090 (noting that trial court's application of common-law
first-to-notify-debtor rule was based on conclusion that assigned payment right was not an account
within the Code). See also Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 8.7 at 277 (cited in
note 2) (noting that, under the account receivable statutes, "[s]ince many types of intangibles were
expressly excluded from the statutory coverage, there was left a common law area which co-ex-
isted, so to say, with the statutory area").
525. See notes 348-49 and accompanying text.
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5. Section 9-104 Exceptions Apart from Section 9-104(f)
As we have seen, Section 9-104(f) excludes important categories of
money-payment rights from the coverage of Article Nine.5 26 So, too, do
five other provisions of Section 9-104.
Section 9-104(d) makes Article Nine inapplicable to "a transfer of a
claim for wages, salary or other compensation of an employee. '527 Sec-
tion 9-104(c) excludes accounts assigned by a governmental unit.5 28 Sec-
tion 9-104(g) excludes "a transfer of an interest in or claim in or under
any policy of insurance, except as provided with respect to proceeds
. . . and priorities in proceeds.15 2 Section 9-104(j) removes from Code
coverage rents from a lease of real estate.5 30 And Section 9-104(1) ex-
cludes any deposit account in a bank or other financial institution. 31
One surprising effect of these provisions is to place outside Article
Nine even priority disputes between claimants who have received direct
collateral transfers of the exempted-from-the-Code account property.
For example, when a debtor grants a collateral interest in the debtor's
bank account to two different lenders, it certainly "smells" like an Arti-
526. See notes 211-327 and accompanying text.
527. This provision is designed to focus state-by-state attention on the important social
problems posed by employee assignments, including whether such compensation rights should be
assignable at all. The courts have encountered few interpretive problems with the section. They
have made clear, however, that the section covers only traditional employees and not independent
contractors. See, for example, Rankin, 102 Bankr. at 443 (stating that "it is clear that the debtor
operated as an independent contractor, in business for himself. His earnings were not wages, salary
or other compensation of an employee exempted from Article 9 by § 9104(4)"); K.A.O.P. Co., 372
N.W.2d at 776 (trial judge's ruling that payment for legal services were not wages subject to 9-
104(d) exclusion not challenged on appeal); Perry v. Freeman, 293 S.E.2d 381 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982)
(holding that payment to independent contractor not excluded by Section 9-104(d) exclusion of
compensation of employee). For a discussion of the wage-assignment exemption, see Clark, The
Law of Secured Transactions 5 1.08[4] at 1-93 to 1-94.
528. U.C.C. § 9-104(3). See Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions T 1.08(5] at 1-94 (cited
in note 8) (noting that "if a rural water district borrowed funds and assigned as security future
water receipts to be paid by customers, the transaction would be exempt," but arguing that "the
flat exemption does not seem justified").
529. U.C.C. § 9-104(g). For an extensive discussion of the insurance-related exemption, see
Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions 1.08(7] at 1-98 to 1-106.
530. U.C.C. § 9-104(j). For a discussion of the rental-payment exemption, see Clark, The Law
of Secured Transactions 1.08[10][b] at 1-120 to 1-122.
531. U.C.C. § 9-104(1). Section 9-105(1)(e) of the Code defines "deposit account" as "a de-
mand, time, savings, passbook or like account maintained with a bank, savings and loan associa-
tion, credit union or like organization, other than an account evidenced by a certificate of deposit."
For a comprehensive treatment of the law governing assignments of deposit accounts, see Zubrow,
68 Minn. L. Rev. at 99 (cited in note 75)..See also Peter F. Coogan, Homer Kripke, and Fredric
Weiss, The Outer Fringes of Article 9: Subordination Agreements, Security Interests in Money
and Deposits, Negative Pledge Clauses, and Participation Agreements, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 229, 261-
63 (1965).
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cle Nine case. Under U.C.C. Section 9-104(1), however, Article Nine
does not speak to this problem.
5 32
The most common priority battle involving deposit accounts pits a
financial institution exercising a common-law set-off right against an
Article Nine secured party who lays claim to the deposit account as
proceeds of inventory, equipment, or accounts. 33 Much has been writ-
ten on this subject, and it will not be repeated here.534 The theme of
these cases, however, is significant for our purposes: courts almost al-
ways subordinate the professional financer, 535 and are willing to bend
the Code's text to achieve that result.536
532. See AMCO Prods., Inc., 17 Bankr. at 761 (holding Code priority rules not applicable to
security transfer of reserve account because it constitutes deposit account); Zubrow, 68 Minn. L.
Rev. at 971-74 (discussing application of common-law priority rules to bank deposits).
533. See Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions 3.11 at 3-128 (describing this as "[a]
classic priority clash that has been the subject of intense litigation").
534. See id. 3.11 at 3-131 n.394; Dwight L. Greene, Deposit Accounts as Bank Loan Collat-
eral Beyond Setoff to Perfection-The Common Law Is Alive and Well, 39 Drake L. Rev. 259
(1989-90); Alan M. Keefe, Setoff and Security Interests in Deposit Accounts, 17 Colo. Law. 2107
(1988); Philip Lacy, Conflicting Security Interests in Inventory and Proceeds Under the Revised
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 41 S.C. L. Rev. 247, 369-76 (1990); Gerald T. Mc-
Laughlin, Security Interests in Deposit Accounts: Unresolved Problems and Unanswered Ques-
tions Under Existing Law, 54 Brook. L. Rev. 45 (1988); Zubrow, 68 Minn. L. Rev, at 907
(advocating abolition of set-off rights, and stating that "[t]o the extent that depository institutions
need a unilateral, self-help remedy, they, like other creditors, can bargain with the debtor for an
article 9 security interest"); Rauer, 39 Stan. L. Rev. at 235 (cited in note 441); Rose M. Urban,
Note, Conflicts Between a Bank's Common Law Right of Setoff and a Secured Party's Interest in
Identifiable Proceeds, 9 Loy. Univ. of Chi. L. J. 454 (1978); Comment, Right of Secured Party to
Recover Proceeds Commingled in Debtor's Bank Account, 28 Kan. L. Rev. 325 (1980); Barkley
Clark, Bank Exercise of Setoff: Avoiding the Pitfalls, 98 Banking L. J. 196 (1981).
535. See Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions 3.11 at 3-128 (stating that "[tihe courts
almost always give priority to the Article 9 claimant, whether the matter is resolved under Article
9 or by fashioning a common law priority rule"); White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code
§ 21-8 at 954-55 (cited in note 8); Rauer, 39 Stan. L. Rev. at 248 (cited in note 441) (stating that
"[riegardless of the rationale used, bank set-offs typically lose when the third party claims a per-
fected security interest in the proceeds"). See, for example, City of Vermillion, 341 F. Supp. at
711-12 (holding that secured creditor takes priority over bank exercising set-off right).
536. Particularly heavy-handed are those cases that say that Section 9-104(i) exempts set-off
rights only from Code perfection rules, but not from Code priority rules. See White and Summers,
Uniform Commercial Code § 21-8 at 954-55 (collecting cases). The logical implication of this posi-
tion is that the Code's priority rules apply to all transfers to which the Code "does not apply" by
reason of Section 9-104. The consequence of this reasoning is that persons who receive Section 9-
104 transfers should routinely lose priority disputes with Code transfers (in particular under
U.C.C. Section 9-201, see Continental American Life Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 306 S.E.2d 285 (Ga.
1983)), notwithstanding the fact that Section 9-104 is designed to safeguard such transferees from
the technical requirements of Article Nine. The better reasoned authorities reject this distinction
between perfection and priority. See, for example, State Bank of Rose Creek v. First State Bank,
320 N.W.2d 723, 725-26 (Minn. 1982) (relying heavily on Coogan treatise). See generally Clark,
The Law of Secured Transactions 3.11 at 3-128 to 3-131.
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V. A JURISPRUDENTIAL AND POLICY APPRAISAL OF THE JUDICIAL
TREATMENT OF ACCOUNT PRIORITIES
Richard Posner has said that the American judge "rarely starts his
inquiry with the words of the statute, and often, if the truth be told, he
does not look at the words at all." ' There could be little better evi-
dence for this proposition than the manner in which judges have
treated the U.C.C.'s provisions concerning accounts. Courts have all but
ignored Section 9-302(1)(e)'s "significant part" language.538 In word and
deed, many courts have endorsed Professor Gilmore's antitextual "illus-
trative list" reading of Section 9-104(f).539 Courts also have neglected
other statutory commands in untangling account-priority issues.540
Why? At the most basic level, these decisions reflect the intensely
substantive character of much American judging. As Professors Atiyah
and Summers have documented, "[m]any American judges have a very
non-formal or substantive conception of what counts as a true rule.
'5 41
These judges are likely to see a statutory rule "as no more than a mere
'guide,'" and may well "go behind it to determine its meaning almost
without limits. '542 By and large, Atiyah and Summers avoid normative
evaluation of highly substantive reasoning. 43 Judgments about such
reasoning are inescapable, however, if judicial action is to be critiqued
at all.
5 44
Any such critique requires at least three steps. First, one must
identify the particular substantive reason relied on by the court-the
relevant "moral, political, economic or social consideration" that has
537. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the Courtroom,
50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 807-08 (1983).
538. See notes 174-81 and accompanying text.
539. See note 218 and accompanying text.
540. See, for example, notes 535-36 and accompanying text (discussing bank deposit setoffs).
541. P.S. Atiyah and Robert S. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law at
88 (Clarendon, 1987).
542. Id. For another illustration of this phenomenon in the Article Nine area, see David Gray
Carlson, Rationality, Accident, and Priority Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 71
Minn. L. Rev. 207, 210 (1986) (stating that "although law professors are practically unanimous in
believing that Article 9 condones a race priority wherein knowledgeable lenders can defeat prior
unknowledgeable lenders, some judges have not been as placid"). Contrast David M. Phillips, The
Commercial Culpability Scale, 92 Yale L. J. 228, 290 (1982) (noting that results inconsistent with
widely shared norms of behavior "may presage judicial hostility to the strict application of the
Code").
543. See, for example, Atiyah and Summers, Form and Substance at 420 (cited in note 541).
At the same time, Professors Atiyah and Summers signal a concern about judicial excesses in sub-
stantive reasoning: "[O]ne of our principal purposes is to rehabilitate formal legal reasoning, be-
cause we are convinced that formal reasons are central to law, and that their proper analysis is one
of the most neglected topics in the history of modern legal theory." Id. at 7.
544. See id. at 419-20.
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spurred the court to action.5" Second, one must evaluate whether that
substantive reason is sound." Third, one must decide whether that
reason, even if sound, is one the court legitimately may invoke in the
face of countervailing formal reasons generated by statutory text, prece-
dent, and the like.57 A careful pursuit of each of these three inquiries
suggests that the courts have veered off course in refining and applying
the Code's account-priority rules.
A. Protection of Nonprofessional Assignees as a Substantive
Reason in Account-Priority Cases
The central substantive aim running through the account-priority
decisions is clear enough. It is to give special protection to the nonpro-
fessional account transferee, while imposing the strictest of require-
ments on professional assignees like banks and other financial
institutions. Courts have invoked this professional-nonprofessional dis-
tinction explicitly in cases involving the Section 9-302(1)(e) significant
part standard.54  As Professor McDonnell has shown, the same orienta-
tion explains the courts' erratic application of Section 9-104(f) .5 9 A dis-
favor of the professional lender also dovetails with the judicial
proclivity to subordinate financial institutions that assert set-off
rights,550 or that find themselves competing with subcontractors or sup-
pliers for retainages held back from general contractors by project own-
ers.51' This overriding tendency to favor the nonprofessional and to
disfavor the professional surfaces even in decisions that seem at first
545. Id. at 5.
546. See generally, Robert S. Summers, Two Types of Substantive Reasons: The Core of a
Theory of Common-Law Justification, 63 Cornell L. Rev. 707, 743-49 (1978).
547. See notes 569-70 and accompanying text. Formal reasoning, an inherently good and in-
dispensable form of legal reasoning, is to be distinguished from formalistic reasoning, an inherently
bad form of reasoning. See Atiyah and Summers, Form and Substance at 28-30.
548. See, for example, Bindl, 13 Bankr. at 150 (refusing to apply exemption because each
assignee was "in the business of agricultural financing and sufficiently familiar with filing to file a
financing statement on equipment"); Consolidated Film Indus., 403 F. Supp. at 1285 (noting that
the test employed gives "greater protection" to the "inexperienced entrant in the world of com-
mercial financing than to subsequent creditors"); Sherburne Corp., 340 A.2d at 86 (stating that
"[bloth the professional status of the assignee and [assignor's] testimony that he had been as-
signing in this manner to this bank on most of his major contracts for four years precludes ...
characterization" of account assignment as "casual or isolated"); E. Turgeon Constr. Co., 292 A.2d
at 234 (noting that "the exemption can serve a beneficent purpose by protecting the 'insignificant
and ignorant assignee' "). See generally notes 161-68 and accompanying text.
549. See generally Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 3.08[2] at 3-48 to 3-51 (cited in
note 8). See also id. § 3.08[5][e] at 3-61 (describing decision as "a rare case where Article 9 was
held to apply to a non-professional financer").
550. See notes 535-36 and accompanying text.
551. See notes 416-21 and accompanying text. Indeed, it may even help explain the results in
the bank-surety cases because, although sureties clearly qualify as professionals, their claims are
based on subrogation to the rights of nonprofessionals. See note 428 and accompanying text.
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blush most attentive to the textual commands of Sections 9-302(1)(e)
and 9-104(f). 52
B. The Normative Soundness of the Professional-Nonprofessional
Distinction
To many, heightened protection of the "little person" nonprofes-
sional is on its face a proper, and indeed powerful, desideratum. For
others, however, articulating a more detailed and context-specific de-
fense of this approach is necessary. At least with respect to priority dis-
putes concerning limited account transfers, such a defense can be
mounted. Stating that defense is helped by looking at the account
transfer from three different angles: first, from the point in time the
transaction is initiated; second, from the point in time that the court
must untangle problems that the account transfer has created; and
third, from a broader instrumentalist perspective of facilitating efficient
transactions.
View One: Viewed from the front end of the transaction, the dis-
tinction between professionals and nonprofessionals reflects differences
in the relative abilities of these two groups of assignees to protect their
own interests.5 3 Professionals should and do know about U.C.C. filing
rules; nonprofessionals, understandably, often do not.5 4 That the filing
552. A good example is provided by American East India Corp., in which the court found
that a commercial financer had priority over an import-export company, the nonprofessional fi-
nancer, as to an account. 400 F. Supp. at 162-65. The court nonetheless went on to conclude that
amounts paid representing the import-export company's performance on the contract were not
Article Nine proceeds and, therefore, were not covered by the commercial financer's security inter-
est. Id. at 165-68. Accordingly, the account debtor's payment to the commercial financer was
improper.
Using a theory of conversion, however, the court awarded to the commercial financer the
amount in excess of that which was attributable to performance by the nonprofessional financer.
The nonprofessional financer thus was entitled to reimbursement of its performance expenses. Id.
at 168-69. The bottom line was that the nonprofessional financer-although "second in time" in
every respect-was given virtually all the account proceeds. See also Sun Air Int'l, 24 Bankr. at
137 (protecting nonfinancial institution assignee by applying Section 9-302(1)(e) even though court
properly holds Section 9-104(f) inapplicable to account transfer).
553. See, for example, Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289 (7th Cir.
1985) (Judge Posner) (noting that "substantial corporation" is "well able to avoid improvident
commitments").
554. Wholly apart from the filing rule, professional account lenders and factors are better
positioned to evaluate the circumstances and trustworthiness of account transferors through use of
such mechanisms as credit reporting agencies and to call on lawyers or other business specialists to
obtain subordination agreements. See Jackson and Kronman, 88 Yale L. J. at 1159 & n.59 (cited in
note 441) (suggesting appropriateness of fixing priority rules based on "the comparative advantage
[some] creditors enjoy in obtaining and assessing information about the debtor's behavior");
Rauer, 39 Stan. L. Rev. at 250 (cited in note 441) (stating that because "[blanks are large institu-
tions" they can "fairly easily" conduct such activities as "negotiat[ing] subordination agreements"
and "look[ing] for other collateral").
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rule (unlike, for example, the rule of duress or fraud) imposes a purely
formal requirement for perfecting a transaction is significant. 555 Fur-
thermore, the formality required by a filing rule is not natural;5 6 it is
instead what might be called a technical requirement, akin to the rule
that a promise is enforceable only if memorialized in a sealed writing.
Whenever a legal system imposes such technical requirements, it
necessarily favors professionals because they, by reason of the very fact
that they are professionals, are better able to learn of, assimilate, and
comply with such rules. Put another way, the adoption of technical re-
quirements-like the U.C.C. filing requirement-alters legal baseline
rules in favor of professional players. Recognition of a principle that
mitigates the rigor of a technical requirement for nonprofessionals thus
provides a sort of compensating tradeoff to nonprofessionals for adopt-
ing the technical legal requirement in the first place.5
View Two: An approach to perfection and priorities that favors
nonprofessional assignees over professional assignees also is justifiable
when viewed from the back end of the transaction. At bottom, perfec-
tion and priority rules dictate who should bear a risk of loss.558 Indeed,
the basic first-to-file rule is defensible on risk-allocation grounds be-
cause the initial transferee can best avert loss by promptly notifying
other prospective secured parties of the earlier transfer. Thus, a failure
to provide such notice-including by a nonprofessional-may be said to
justify subordination of the transferee whose failure to provide such
warning presumptively results in the loss caused by multiple transfers.
Significant reasons exist, however, for saying that professional ac-
count transferees are generally better loss bearers than are nonprofes-
sional assignees. The first reason is elementary: the uncollectibility of
an account is more likely to produce serious harm to the nonprofes-
sional assignee than the professional. To a family farmer or business
proprietorship, the failure to collect a transferred account-even a
small one-may be catastrophic. A similar result is not likely for the
555. See generally Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799 (1941)
(discussing the rationales behind legal formalities).
556. See id. at 815.
557. Another argument for special treatment of nonprofessionals is that "[flailure by the first
secured party to file notice of his security interest can be interpreted as a per se category of con-
duct intended to cause others to rely to detriment upon the debtor's assets." Phillips, 92 Yale L. J.
at 250 (cited in note 542). When a secured party is unaware of the filing system, however, attribut-
ing such an intention-based culpability to that person is difficult. See id. Reliance on this sort of
rationale "must be made cautiously," lest incentives for careless conduct by nonprofessionals be
created. See id. at 265-66 n.141. But if operative rules restrict professionals' exposure to nonprofes-
sional non-filers to limited account transfers, it seems improbable that the incentives for careless
conduct will be increased too much.




properly capitalized financial institution. Professionals also may be bet-
ter loss bearers because generally they will value the proceeds of ac-
count collections less highly than "little person" nonprofessionals.5 59
This theory of a wealth-tied relativity of value is extremely controver-
sial. To some observers, however, it may help explain the professional-
nonprofessional distinction drawn by courts in account assignment
cases.
5 60
A less controversial, and more powerful, justification for this dis-
tinction lies in the professional financer's superior practical ability to
spread the risk of account-collection losses. Institutional financers en-
gage in many transactions over extended periods of time with a wide
variety of customers. They thus can adjust rates and prices to cushion
against account-collection risks in a way that the painting subcontrac-
tor or other small businessperson cannot.5 6' This economic reality pro-
vides an appealing reason for saying that professional financers are
generally better loss bearers than amateur account transferees.
5 62
View Three: Finally, judicial favoritism of nonprofessional account
assignees may reflect a broader instrumentalist perspective focusing on
economic efficiency. This is the case because applying the usual perfec-
tion rules to nonprofessional account transferees may well drive such
transferees from the market altogether. If amateurs come to know or
sense that they cannot safely purchase accounts unless they hire law-
yers to file U.C.C. financing statements, they simply will not buy ac-
counts.56 3 The resulting constriction of the class of potential account
purchasers will, in turn, reduce competition for the purchase of these
assets and thus frustrate wealth-maximizing transactions." 4 This is es-
pecially true because banking and factoring institutions may have little
interest in limited, one-shot transactions except at highly discounted
prices.56 5 Subjecting nonprofessional account transferees to the ordinary
559. This assertion may be even more apt when an unanticipated loss of a value already
being counted on is at stake.
560. Contrast Phillips, 92 Yale L. J. at 268-69 (cited in note 542) (noting that juries may
"allocate loss according to the relative wealth of the contesting parties").
561. Id. at 265 n.141 (noting that "[f]actors such as size, wealth, and expertise might allow
one commercial party to pool risk better than another and therefore dictate allocation of risk to
that party, regardless of the other's negligence").
562. See Rauer, 39 Stan. L. Rev. at 250 (cited in note 441) (arguing that bank relying on set-
off rights should normally lose "[b]ecause the bank can bear the burdens of risk and monitoring
more cheaply").
563. See Architectural Woods, 562 P.2d at 250 istating that "the casual assignee may
not . . . take the time and resources to investigate outside sources of information").
564. See generally Kronman and Posner, Economics of Contract Law at 1-2 (cited in note
20).
565. See Daly, 610 P.2d at 402 & n.5; Abramson, 440 S.W.2d at 327 (noting assignor's inabil-
ity to sell to professional factors "because of the small size of the accounts").
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U.C.C. rules threatens to dry up an already limited pool of transferees
for the small, nonrecurring account assignment. 66
Arguably, all these arguments for favoring nonprofessional account
assignees are unpersuasive because they prove too much. The U.C.C.
filing rules generally impose technical requirements on all parties who
take security interests and put the risk of loss on all secured parties
who fail to file or otherwise perfect those interests. Article Nine usually
does not give special treatment to nonprofessional secured parties. Why
then should the law afford special treatment to nonprofessional secured
parties who take account transfers?
One possible response to this question is that account assignees
should not receive special treatment. This conclusion does not suggest
that nonprofessional account transferees should be treated the same as
professional assignees as a normative matter. Rather, it suggests that all
nonprofessionals should receive an added measure of protection under
Article Nine.
The more fundamental point, however, is that significant reasons
do exist for structuring the law to be more protective of nonprofessional
account transferees than other nonprofessional secured parties. At least
three considerations indicate why.
The first consideration flows from Article Nine's coverage of both
collateral and outright assignees of accounts. 67 Outright transferees of
accounts may well liken themselves more to buyers of property, who
566. Contrast Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 7B.01[3][b] at 7B-7 (cited in note 8)
(noting that automatic perfection rule for purchase-money financers of consumer goods results in
part from fact "that consumer creditors do not typically search the record before lending"). One
objection to this argument rests on the proposition that affording special protection to nonprofes-
sionals imposes economic costs. Economic losses-in terms of both lost claims to security and
heightened dispute-resolution costs-will result from the presence of multiple, conflicting assign-
ments generated by the nonprofessional's authorized failure to file. Also, the professional market
for limited assignments may contract once professionals interested in such transactions recognize
the risk of subordination to valid, unfiled assignments. If professionals have only a limited interest
in limited assignments, however, these costs should be minimal. In addition, if some professionals
wish to pursue this business, they should be able to fix rates in such a way as to cover these risks
without having to flee the market altogether. The economic calculus in this area is complex. For
the reasons set forth in the text, however, considerations of economic efficiency may weigh at least
as much for as against special protection of nonprofessional account assignees.
A second possible objection to the efficiency argument set forth in the text is that, if profes-
sional financers are not interested in this market, then nonprofessionals will not flee it even if they
are subjected to ordinary perfection and priority rules. There are two problems with this claim.
First, the main reason nonprofessionals will flee this market has nothing to do with the presence or
absence of professional buyers; instead flight will result principally from potential subordination to
the bankruptcy trustee representing general creditors. Second, the argument has a boomerang
quality. If professional financers will not deal in limited assignments, the need for filings to warn
them of earlier assignments is greatly reduced. It follows that the case for requiring filing of non-
professionals who deal in limited transactions is much weaker.
567. See notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
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ordinarily need not concern themselves with filing rules, than to ortho-
dox collateral-taking secured parties, who certainly should be so con-
cerned. Given that many nonprofessional account transferees may view
themselves as buyers, rather than as financers, giving them a break in
establishing filing requirements seems proper because they understand-
ably will not focus on using the Article Nine filing system at all. This
thought led the original drafters of Article Nine to conclude that there
was a class of transactions, which "no one would think of filing," that
properly should be excluded from the Code's filing requirement." 8
Second, there exists a sort of perfection trap for the nonprofes-
sional account transferee that does not exist for collateral transferees of
other forms of property. This is so because the nonprofessional account
transferee might well assume that his interest is as protected as it can
be once he, without incident, provides notice of the assignment to the
account debtor. Nonprofessional collateral transferees of other forms of
property cannot be tricked in this way, for there is no account debtor to
advise of the property transfer. Non-account transferees thus may more
properly be expected to discover and use another way of telling th6
world of their interest-namely, the U.C.C. filing system.5 9
Finally, from the perspective of creditors competing with the non-
professional secured party, an important difference exists between ac-
counts and other forms of property. This is so because of the built-in
and distinctive precariousness of account collateral. 7 0 For example, a
party with a possessory security interest in a harvester would be
shocked to find that security interest subordinated to an unfiled secur-
ity interest held by a nonprofessional. Even fully perfected assignees of
account collateral know, however, that their interests are readily subject
to divestment or diminishment in any number of ways. In particular,
the account debtor may assert against that assignee any defense and
many set-offs that are available against the assignor, even though the
assignee lacks any knowledge of such defenses or set-offs. 57 1 To subject
568. See U.C.C. § 9-302 cmt. 5.
569. Secured parties who take instruments or chattel paper could fall into this trap. It seems
more likely, however, that nonprofessional transferees of such collateral will naturally protect their
interests by taking possession of the documentary collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-305. This mode of
perfection is not available to the account transferee. See notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
570. As numerous commentators have documented, a floating lienholder may find that con-
tract-based payment rights prove uncollectible for a host of reasons. Clark, The Law of Secured
Transactions 111.01 at 11-3 (cited in note 8) (calling such collateral "precarious"); Corbin, Corbin
on Contracts § 895 at 591 (cited in note 6); Henson, Handbook on Secured Transactions § 3-14 at
52 (cited in note 8); Coogan and Gordon, 76 Harv. L. Rev. at 1568 (cited in note 31) (noting that
accounts financers traditionally have followed the pattern of operating "a little bit scared");
Zubrow, 68 Minn. L. Rev. at 916 (cited in note 75) (discussing the risk of fraud by the debtor);
Gilmore, 74 Yale L. J. at 227-60 (cited in note 448).
571. U.C.C. § 318(1)(a), (b). For a discussion of this subject, see Gilmore, Security Interests
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professional transferees of accounts to the additional risk of subordina-
tion to a competing nonprofessional assignee thus is qualitatively differ-
ent from creating a similar risk for transferees of other types of
property. Imposing such a risk on a first-filing professional account as-
signee does interfere with that person's contracted-for expectancy.
Given the many qualifications that already crowd that interest, how-
ever, it does so in only a limited way.
C. The Propriety of Using the Professional-Nonprofessional
Distinction in Account-Priority Cases
All these considerations support, as an abstract matter, the judicial
instinct evidenced in the account-priority cases. As a substantive mat-
ter, distinguishing between the professional and nonprofessional as-
signee makes sense. Legal analysis, however, does not begin and end
with substantive reasoning. Courts also must heed formal rea-
sons-most importantly, reasons generated by the texts of operative
statutes. 2 "[I]t must be stressed that the very concept of a formal rea-
son . . . entails that there are some circumstances in which counter-
vailing reasons of substance cannot be used."57 Whether the text of a
statute overrides countervailing substantive reasons depends, in the
end, on the text's clarity or ambiguity." 4 Does there inhere in Sections
9-302(1)(e) and 9-104(f) the sort of ambiguity that justifies the strong
professional-nonprofessional distinction courts have overlaid on those
provisions? Enough has been said already to explain why the proper
answer is no.575 Three additional observations might be offered, how-
ever, to suggest why strained efforts to find ambiguities in those provi-
sions is a particularly misbegotten venture.
First, Sections 9-302(1)(e) and 9-104(f) are part of a Code carefully
forged by experts to deal comprehensively with the subject of commer-
cial law.57 '6 This is not to say that the Code is free of unclarity. It is to
in Personal Property §§ 41.1 to 41.11 at 1077-1126 (cited in note 2).
572. See note 547 and accompanying text.
573. See Atiyah and Summers, Form and Substance at 10 (cited in note 541) (emphasis orig-
inal in part and added in part). "The statute is not just one additional reason to be taken account
of by the judge, a reason which may tip the scales in one direction or be overridden by contrary
substantive arguments. The statute shuts out contrary arguments." Id. at 8.
574. See, for example, Western Union Tel. Co. v. F.C.C., 665 F.2d 1126, 1137 & n.21 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (stating that "a statute's plain meaning should be given priority in its construction").
575. See, for example, notes 174-82, 215-42 and accompanying text.
576. See U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt.; Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions 1.01 at 1-3 (cited in
note 8) (proclaiming that "the UCC is perhaps the most carefully drafted statute in history"). One
may or may not like the set of rules embodied in this comprehensive Code. Professor Carlson, for
example, finds that Article Nine establishes "a set of priorities that awards a bounty to experts for
locating and punishing amateur lenders." Carlson, 71 Minn. L. Rev. at 210 (cited in note 542). See
also id. at 209 (stating that "[b]ecause the experts heavily lobbied the drafters and the amateurs
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say, however, that these Code provisions differ fundamentally from, for
example, the Sherman Antitrust Act or the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause.5 " Courts called on to apply the U.C.C. should not
shrink from invoking policy to resolve genuine ambiguities. They
should not be out, however, to find ambiguities behind every rock and
bush.
Second, applying unrestricted notions of ambiguity to the Code
threatens the Code's foundational objective of bringing simplicity and
uniformity to commercial law.518 Again, courts certainly should see to it
that Article Nine is "liberally construed and applied to promote its un-
derlying purposes and polices. 51 9 At some point, however, the Code's
text must limit judicial discretion to pursue policy objectives, lest we
end up with as many constructions of Code provisions as there are
courts.8 Constraining purposive interpretation in this way not only en-
hances certainty and interstate uniformity; it advances more fundamen-
tal jurisprudential aims such as producing intelligibility in law and
increasing the probability that similarly situated persons will be simi-
larly treated.
5 8 1
Finally, the Code's framers knew how to write statutes that distin-
guish between professionals and nonprofessionals when they saw fit to
do so. Many sections of Article Two draw this very line by making re-
sults turn on whether the contracting party is or is not a merchant.582
did not, provisions that might have protected amateur lenders against voracious experts were left
underdeveloped"). This description is overdrawn. Even if it were correct, however, it is not the
proper role of courts to alter fundamental choices made by the Code's drafters and the state legis-
latures that have enacted their handiwork.
577. See Posner, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 807-08 (cited in note 537).
578. See U.C.C. § 9-102. See, for example, Jensen, 1977 Utah L. Rev. at 341-42 (cited in note
74) (recognizing that "[tihere are special incentives for favoring the clarity and uniformity of stat-
utory standards over the flexibility of judicially created standards in the area of defining the scope
of Article Nine").
579. U.C.C. § 1-102(1). See generally Julian B. McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the
Uniform Commercial Code: Some Implications for Jurisprudence, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 795 (1978).
-580. See Atiyah and Summers, Form and Substance at 26-27 (cited in note 541) (stating that
"interpretive formality . . . tends to lead to more predictability").
581. Professors Atiyah and Summers cite these aims-as well as "freedom from official arbi-
trariness in the administration of the law"-as "more or less obvious justifications" for adhering to
formal reasons. Id. at 24. They point out that adherence to formal reasons has the salutary effect
of "controlling and limiting agendas" in the legal process, id. at 25, holding down dispute-resolu-
tion costs, minimizing the risk of error, and providing for "repose . . . in human affairs." Id. at 25-
26. They also emphasize that "laws which can be identified solely by reference to their source or
origin are in general easier to discover," id. at 26, and "make the law more certain and predict-
able," id. at 27.
582. The term "merchant" is defined in Section 2-104(1) as "a person who deals in goods of
the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to
the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be
attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation
holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill." Many Article Two provisions draw important
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The Code's drafters recognized no such distinction, however, in Sec-
tions 9-302(1)(e) and 9-104(f).
Questions of ambiguity are matters of degree. They are also, as this
discussion suggests, matters of context. There are good reasons why
courts applying the Code's account provisions should respect the ordi-
nary meaning of the words those provisions employ. Courts interpreting
Sections 9-302(1)(e) and 9-104(f) have failed to heed this counsel.
VI. A PROGRAM FOR REFORM
So what should be done to help along the law of account-assign-
ment priorities? As we have seen, explicit statutory commands bar the
courts, in most cases, from applying the sensible distinction between
professional and nonprofessional assignees developed and defended in
Part IV.583 To be sure, courts retain some freedom to draw this distinc-
tion in fashioning common-law rules. 5 14 Manipulating the common law
in a Code-dominated field, however, can do little to produce a sound
and coherent body of law. The only real path to progess lies in the di-
rection of statutory reform.
The opportunity for reform, as it turns out, is singularly ripe at the
present moment. The Permanent Editorial Board recently formed a
Study Committee "charged with recommending whether Article 9 and
related provisions of the UCC are in need of revision. '155 That commit-
tee has just begun its work.586 Based on the analysis set forth in the
preceding parts of this Article, my own recommendation is that that
committee should propose significant revisions to Article Nine's treat-
ment of accounts. The most sensible program of reform would entail
five key steps.
A. Step One: Extending the Code to All Contractual Payment
Rights
As a first step, the revisors of Article Nine should modify the ex-
isting Code definition of "account" to include all contractual rights to
all money payments. The Permanent Editorial Board declined to make
this move in 1972 on the ground that parties had come to use the term
distinctions between merchants and nonmerchants. Illustrative provisions include U.C.C. Sections
2-201(2), 2-205, 2-207(2), and 2-314.
583. See, for example, notes 174-82, 215-42 and accompanying text.
584. See notes 346-49 and accompanying text.
585. William M. Burke, Steven L. Harris, and Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Interim Report on
the Activities of the Article 9 Study Committee 1, reprinted in William C. Hillman, ed., Introduc-
tion to Secured Transactions and Letters of Credit 1991 at 367, 369 (PLI, 1991) (Commercial Law




"account" in security agreements in the technical and narrow sense that
that term is used in Section 9-106.587 Thus, the Board concluded, a re-
definition of the term could produce unpleasant surprises for those as-
signors who had assumed that they had transferred only traditional
accounts when they used the term "account" in their security agree-
ments.588 The easy answer to this problem-if it is a problem at
al1589 -is simply to choose a statutory term other than "accounts" to
cover the newly expanded category of Code-covered contractual rights.
The term "payment rights," for example, would provide a suitable
substitute.
Fine-tuning the Code's definitional provisions to subject to Code
rules all collateral and absolute transfers of contract-based payment
rights would have three happy effects. First, it would eliminate the ar-
bitrary results produced by defining the term "account" to cover only
payment rights generated by transfers of goods and services.8 90 Second,
a shift from the narrow term "account" to the broader concept of "pay-
ment rights" would eliminate irksome linedrawing problems that exist
under the Code's present language.5 91 Third, and most important, this
definitional shift would set the stage for a desirable result: the compre-
hensive treatment within the Code of all priority conflicts involving all
assignments of all commercially significant contract rights.
5 92
B. Step Two: Undoing the Section 9-104(f) Exclusions
In addition to expanding the Code category now called "accounts,"
Article Nine's revisors should reject the notion-now reflected in Sec-
tion 9-104(f)-that many categories of account transfers should be ex-
cluded from the Code altogether. Instead, the committee should
welcome the chance to extend Article Nine's coverage to virtually all
payment-right transactions.593 This shift in approach is sensible based
587. See notes 518-21 and accompanying text.
588. See id.
589. See notes 522-23 and accompanying text.
590. See notes 502-19 and accompanying text. The restricted character of the existing defini-
tion of the term "accounts" causes odd results, not only under the Code's priority rules, but also in
regard to the Code's treatment of defenses available against the assignee of a contract right. See
Coogan and Gordon, 76 Harv. L. Rev. at 1538 (cited in note 31) (noting defect in "the exclusion of
receivables which are general intangibles from . . . 9-318"); Gilmore, Security Interests in Per-
sonal Property § 12.8 at 392 (cited in note 2) (stating that "[i]t is not clear why § 9-318(4) was not
made applicable to all intangible claims").
591. See, for example, note 517 and accompanying text.
592. But compare note 636.
593. There is perhaps good reason to continue to exclude wage assignments from Article
Nine. See U.C.C. § 9-104 cmt. 4 (noting that such assignments "present important social problems
whose solution should be a matter of local regulation"). Why governmental assignments or assign-
ments of insurance proceeds or rental payments for realty should be excluded from Code coverage
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on both the internal logic of the Code and broader considerations of
policy. From a purely intra-Code perspective, Article Nine's drafters
undertook to deal comprehensively with those account transfers con-
nected with commercial financing transactions.594 By adopting Section
9-104(f), however, the drafters undercut their own efforts because prior-
ity disputes fall outside the Code whenever they pit an institutional fac-
tor or account financer against a Section 9-104(f) transferee. 95 To deal
fully with "financing" assignments within the Code, no choice exists but
to deal with "nonfinancing" assignments as well.
The revisors of Article Nine should also scrap the Section 9-104(f)
exclusions because of broader policy considerations. The subject of ac-
count priorities has confused judges for a hundred years.,, e Section 9-
104(f) as prior analysis shows, continues to breed such confusion by in-
jecting much complexity and nonuniformity into this field of law.59" 7 No
good reason exists why this should be so. No fundamental and divisive
policy concerns justify differing treatment on a state-by-state basis of
the account transfers enumerated in Section 9-104(f).59 s Nor is the
number of Section 9-104(f) cases so small as to be insignificant. The
very existence of the Code, with its already substantial coverage of ac-
counts, provides a golden opportunity to the revisors of Article Nine to
deal in a genuinely comprehensive manner with all perfection and pri-
ority issues presented by contractual payment-right transfers.599
is less clear. See notes 528-30 and accompanying text. The proper treatment of deposit accounts
presents a distinctive problem because of the recurring conflict between a security interest in a
bank account and the depository bank's right of set-off under state law. See notes 531-36 and
accompanying text. Professor Zubrow has treated the subject of deposit-account transfers at great
length. Her key conclusions are that (1) deposit-account assignments, at least of the collateral
variety, should be included in Article Nine, Zubrow, 68 Minn. L. Rev. at 901; and (2) bank set-off
rights should be treated like normal security interests that must be filed to secure perfection, id. at
907-08. I agree with the former conclusion. I am doubtful of the latter. Persons who lend money
against deposit account collateral should be aware of the universal risk of the bank's exercising set-
off rights. For this reason and others, to require all banks to go through the motion of filing financ-
ing statements to make set-off rights as to all bank depositors operable vis-&-vis third parties
seems to be a low-need and high-cost approach. See Clark, The Law of Secured Transactions
1.0819] at 1-107 (cited in note 8) (stating that absent Section 9-104[i] exclusion of set-offs, "a
blizzard of financing statements might be required"). Beyond this, I leave to others the task of
developing sound priority rules in this area. See generally note 534 (collecting authorities).
594. See Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 11.1 at 336-37.
595. See note 332 and accompanying text.
596. See notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
597. See notes 211-327 and accompanying text. Because some transfers of an account are
covered by Article Nine while others are not, the Code carries forward a problem it sought to solve:
resolution of priority problems "in the no-man's land between the various security devices." Gil-
more, Security Interests in Personal Property at 655 (cited in note 2) (Introductory Note).
598. Contrast note 527 (discussing wage assignments); Zubrow, 68 Minn. L. Rev. at 911 (cited
in note 75) (describing differential treatment of deposit accounts among states as "unwarranted").
599. See generally Jackson and Kronman, 88 Yale L. J. at 1144 (cited in note 441) (recogniz-
ing that the "comprehensive and systematic treatment of priority questions" represented a "dis-
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This is especially true because the legal setting of today differs
greatly from the setting that prevailed when the Code was adopted. Be-
cause the Code has so long been in place, lawyers and businesspersons
recognize that the Code governs most account transactions. As a result,
there is far less reason to exclude large groups of account assignments
wholesale from the rules of Article Nine. The revisors of Article Nine
should not lose sight of the Code's central and enduring purposes: to
"simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transac-
tions," and "to make uniform the law among the various jurisdic-
tions."600 The revisors could do much to advance these objectives if
they simply repealed Section 9-104(f) and put in place a uniform body
of statutes governing all transfers of all contractual payment rights.
C. Step Three: Codifying the Professional-Nonprofessional
Distinction
Once the revisors of Article Nine decide to formulate a new set of
rules for contractual payment rights, they then must decide what those
new rules will be. A good starting point would be to retain, as the gen-
eral rule, the first-to-file principle of Section 9-312(5)(a). That rule has
operated without dire effects for many years, builds on the investment
long since made in the Code filing system, and continues to carry the
advantages of straightforwardness and simplicity.60 1 In addressing the
proper limits of this general rule, however, courts should not look to
existing Code approaches, but instead to the evident judicial instinct to
distinguish between professional and nonprofessional account transfer-
ees. 2 To this end, the revisors should junk the unsuccessful significant
part test of Section 9-302(1)(e), as well as the grab bag of assignments
excluded from the Code by Section 9-104(f). In place of these excised
sections, the revisors should identify a single set of payment-right
transfers deserving of an exemption from the Code's ordinary perfec-
tion and priority rules.
A suitable description of such transfers might well be as simple as
this: "The assignment of payment rights to a nonprofessional trans-
feree." Properly construed, this nonprofessional assignee formulation
tinct improvement" over pre-Code law, "which treated priority problems in an ad hoc and
inconsistent fashion"); Zubrow, 68 Minn. L. Rev. at 966 (emphasizing in advocating Article Nine
coverage of deposit accounts that the "article 9 filing system is already in place for other types of
collateral").
600. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a), (c). One commentator states: "The approach toward uniformity is
one of the important advantages of the Code. The confusion of five separate sets of rules with
many subvariations . . . seemed to impose a permanent burden on financing across state lines."
Craig, 42 B.U. L. Rev. at 207 (cited in note 92).
601. See Special Project, 62 Cornell L. Rev. at 843-44 (cited in note 12).
602. See notes 547-52 and accompanying text.
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would serve to render the statute's protection inapplicable to three
types of persons: (1) the financial institution; (2) the person who acts
like a financial institution by regularly receiving account assignments;03
and (3) the person who takes an assignment so substantial in absolute
size that that assignee is not fairly viewed as a nonprofessional. 04
A textual litmus that turns on whether an account transfer is to a
nonprofessional assignee will raise difficult questions of application in
some cases. 0 5 That, however, is hardly catastrophic. First, uneven and
undesirable results under this new standard will be mitigated by appro-
priate purposive interpretation by the courts. 06 For example, courts
confronting close cases can consider the specific assignee's ability to
avoid, absorb, and spread account-collection losses in deciding whether
the assignee qualifies as a nonprofessional. 07 Second, some ,level of
open-endedness is unavoidable, and indeed desirable, in framing any
legal rule of this sort.608 The purpose of affording protective treatment
to some, but not other, account transferees is to avoid otherwise harsh
results for those assignees least able to protect their interests through
compliance with technical legal requirements, and to absorb the effects
603. See Coogan, et al., Secured Transactions § 3.08[5][b] at 3-65 (cited in note 8) (stating
that "[i]f the assignee regularly takes assignment of accounts, it is not burdensome to require it to
file"); Jensen, 1977 Utah L. Rev. at 343 (cited in note 74) (noting that "those assignees who regu-
larly take assignments ... have greater opportunity and motivation to investigate the coverage of
Article Nine"). For an example of a case in which a nonfinancial institution acts like one, see In re
Drapery Design Center, Inc., 86 Bankr at 124 (finding that nine assignments to individual lender
over four months to secure at least $30,039 were neither casual nor isolated where lender made
loans against assignor's accounts "during the course of an unspecified number of years").
604. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 19.6 at 538 (cited in note 2) (citing
"beneficent purpose of protecting assignees who are both insignificant and ignorant"). It might be
proper to add a rule that states any transfers over a specified dollar amount-for example,
$30,000-cannot qualify for this special protection. This limitation might be criticized as too rigid
and arbitrary, but Article Nine establishes any number of rigid rules of a similar numeric charac-
ter. For example, U.C.C. § 9-301(2) (requiring party with PMSI to file within 10 days of taking
possession to defeat intervening lien creditors"); id. § 9-312(4) (establishing similar 10-day rule for
defeating earlier-filed non-PMSI). Such a rule might add a desirable level of certainty in applying
this prong of the professional test.
605. An illustrative case is In re First Gen. Contractors, Inc., 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 762 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1971). There no filing was required for the transfer of a $25,000 ac-
count to secure a $25,000 loan made for "general operating purposes" to the borrower, a dry wall
contractor, by Adobe Brick and Supply Company. The court concluded that the assignment was
"casual and isolated," so that no filing was required. It seems a bit of a stretch to say, however,
that an assignment of a $25,000 account as collateral for a loan made for general operations quali-
fies as "casual." A no less plausible description of the transaction is that a non-bank acted like a
bank and then claimed-successfully-that it did not have to play by the same rules.
606. See note 579 and accompanying text.
607. See notes 553-62 and accompanying text.
608. See Baird and Jackson, 35 Stan. L. Rev. at 184-85 n.35 (cited in note 170) (stating that
"[tihere is likely . . . to be a residual level of imprecision that cannot be cost-effectively
removed").
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of account-collection losses. Achieving this largely rightness-based and
backward-looking objectives 9 requires-as in many other contexts-a
flexible legal tool.6 10
Holmes said that "[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has
been experience."61' Experience, in the form of judicial treatment of the
Code's existing account provisions, teaches that something like the as-
signment-to-a-nonprofessional standard provides the proper rule for ex-
cluding accounts from ordinary Article Nine filing requirements. So,
too, do those considerations of logic, collected in Part V, that support
the distinction between professional and nonprofessional assignees. A
statutory standard based on the professional or nonprofessional charac-
ter of the assignee at the least should prove sounder than tests that
focus on such dubious concerns as whether the assignment involves a
612significant part of the assignor's accounts, was given in satisfaction of
a preexisting debt,13 or otherwise falls within the welter of Section 9-
104 exclusions. 4
Perhaps most important, the test proposed here carries the badge
of intellectual honesty. There may be pragmatic reasons for leaving the
existing Code provisions, like sleeping dogs, where they lie. Institutional
financers, for example, might balk at any statutory pronouncement that
expressly discriminates in favor of nonprofessionals. 15 Article Nine
"populists," on the other hand, may be willing to finesse the issue by
continuing to count on courts to give nonprofessionals special protec-
tion by twisting the existing language of the Code. 6 A respect for the
rule of law demands more than this.6 17 Important rules ought not to
sneak into the Code through judicial manipulation of the text and the
inertia of those charged with overseeing the operation of Article Nine. A
need exists for an honest assessment whether the professional-nonpro-
fessional distinction has a proper role to play in fixing account priori-
ties. If it does, Article Nine's revisors ought to recognize that distinction
609. Atiyah and Summers, Form and Substance at 6 (cited in note 541).
610. See, for example, U.C.C. § 1-203 (stating rule of good faith); id. § 2-302 (stating rule of
unconscionability). See also Ford, 22 Okla. L. Rev. at 431 (cited in note 112).
611. Oliver W. Holmes, The Common Law 1 (Howe ed. 1963).
612. See notes 128-36 and accompanying text.
613. See notes 292-93 and accompanying text.
614. See notes 593-99 and accompanying text.
615. Contrast Zubrow, 68 Minn. L. Rev. at 921-22 (cited in note 75) (suggesting that the
financial institutions' self-interested lobbying efforts resulted in exclusion from Code of deposit
account assignments and set-off rights).
616. See notes 572-82 and accompanying text.
617. See, for example, McIntosh v. Murphy, 469 P.2d 177, 181 (Haw. 1970) (straightfor-
wardly acknowledging that reliance-based exception to Statute of Frauds "is to be preferred over
having the trial court bend over backwards to take the contract out of the Statute of Frauds").
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explicitly, in a straightforward standard that courts can consistently
apply.
D. Step Four: Forging Special Rules for Special Transferees
If the revisors choose to give special treatment to assignments to
nonprofessionals, they then must decide what that special treatment
will be. Three basic possibilities exist. First, nonprofessionals might be
excused from filing, but required instead to perfect their interests by
notifying the account debtor. Second, nonprofessionals might be af-
forded automatic perfection. Third, nonprofessionals might be afforded
not only automatic perfection, but also automatic priority. On balance,
the best choice is a general rule of automatic perfection, perhaps cou-
pled with a rule of automatic priority for a very narrow class of the
most-deserving nonprofessional assignees.
1. Notice-to-the-Debtor Perfection Versus Automatic Perfection
Should Article Nine provide that the nonprofessional assignee must
notify the account debtor of the assignment to secure a perfected posi-
tion? Reason exists to say that it should. Most important, such a rule
would advance a basic goal of Article Nine's filing rules, even while ex-
cusing nonprofessionals from the technical and burdensome filing re-
quirement. It would generate, at low cost, the dispersal of information
about the assignee's otherwise undiscoverable interest to an identifiable
source (namely, the account debtor) who could be readily consulted by
later would-be transferees seeking to avoid reliance on the debtor's al-
ready-encumbered property.6 18 Additionally, such a rule probably would
pose no major practical problems for nonprofessional assignees because
they often will inform account debtors of their assignments anyway.6 19
Article Nine already provides strong incentives to provide such notice
clearly and early on.2 0
The very naturalness of providing such notice, however, also gener-
ates an argument against notice-to-the-account-debtor perfection. If
such notice is likely to occur in any event, little need exists to mandate
618. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 342 cmt. b (1979) (stating that "[t]he English
rule has consequences similar to that of a system of public filing, except that the obligor acts as the
filing office").
619. See also id. (noting that English rule is "somewhat more convenient where a single obli-
gor is involved . . . than in cases of multiple obligors, as where a business concern assigns its
accounts receivable").
620. See U.C.C. § 9-318(1)(b) (stating that "[u]nless an account debtor has made an enforce-
able agreement not to assert defenses or claims arising out of a sale as provided in Section 9-206
the rights of an assignee are subject to . . . any other defense or claim of the account debtor




that it occur to protect third-party interests. This is especially true be-
cause conditioning a nonprofessional assignee's perfection on notice to
the account debtor would engender difficulties of proof at odds with the
Code's goals of creating simplicity and certainty in these transactions.
Did the assignee actually give notice? To whom? At what time? In the
proper manner? As to what account? As to all these matters, what does
the account debtor have to say?
The inevitable uncertainty surrounding these questions will pro-
duce doubts about the security of the nonprofessional assignee's posi-
tion, which are not easily reconciled with a decision to show special
solicitude to the nonprofessional assignee in the first place. The nonpro-
fessional assignee might minimize such uncertainty by providing a "bul-
letproof" form of notice, such as a professionally prepared declaration
delivered by registered mail. To expect such deliberate and formal ac-
tion, however, is little different from requiring perfection by filing. In
the end, insufficient reason exists to impose on nonprofessional assign-
ees one formal perfection requirement (notice) in place of another for-
mal perfection requirement (filing). Rather, in keeping with the current
Code's basic approach, the revisors should treat the interests of nonpro-
fessional account transferees as automatically perfected. 21 Affording
automatic perfection to qualifying nonprofessionals will serve the criti-
cal purpose of protecting the small-scale assignee, who understandably
fails to file, from the trustee in bankruptcy and subsequent lien credi-
tors.2 2 It also will protect deserving nonprofessionals against the claims
of later-filing professional assignees, without unduly hampering the
practical ability of professional financers to buy or lend against
accounts 2 3
621. See id. § 9-302(1)(e).
622. See Page, 53 Wash. L. Rev. at 516 (cited in note 113) (noting that Gilmore viewed Sec-
tion 9-302(1)(e) as basically "a line of defense in bankruptcy").
623. See notes 626-27 and accompanying text. In effect a rule of automatic perfection gives
the professional filer one-half the benefit normally accorded the first filer by Article Nine. Al-
though the professional first filer cannot "be confident [it] will prevail over earlier claimants," it
can "determine the risks that [it] faces from subsequent property claimants," Baird and Jackson,
35 Stan. L. Rev. at 194 (cited in note 170) (emphasis added in part, original in part), which would
be none at all. The professional account assignee may attack this "half-a-loaf" result for treating
nonprofessionals too generously and departing dramatically from the ordinary priority principles
embodied in Article Nine. It is, however, not much of a departure at all, since Section 9-302(1)(e)
already embodies an automatic perfection rule that exposes the professional financer to exactly the
same sort of risk the proposed standard creates.
In addition, the Code already affords a sort of super-priority to the first-filing professional
assignee of accounts. Such transferees enjoy a distinctive protection against most competing secur-
ity interest holders who claim accounts as proceeds. See notes 473-76 and accompanying text. Un-
like holders of security interests covering all other forms of property, the holder of a perfected
security interest in accounts faces no risk of divestment by a later good faith purchaser for value.
Compare U.C.C. § 9-307 with § 9-309. Those who get special benefits from the law may more fairly
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2. Automatic Perfection Versus Automatic Priority
Affording automatic perfection to the nonprofessional who takes an
account assignment will not protect such assignees if an institutional
transferee already has recorded its interest. Such a previous filing fre-
quently will exist because institutional financers often secure floating
liens that cover all of an assignor's after-acquired payment rights.
624
The risk of subordinating the automatically perfected nonprofessional's
interest to such a competing claimant is troubling because the timing of
that claimant's filing may be seen as a mere fortuity. Why on Earth
should a nonprofessional who takes an assignment on Day 2 have prior-
ity over the bank that files on Day 3, but not the bank that files on Day
1? Because a basic purpose of singling out the nonprofessional is to ex-
cuse her from having to deal with the U.C.C. files, whether the nonpro-
fessional could have discovered the professional assignee's previous
filing if she had checked those files should not matter. As we already
have seen, the case for special protection of the nonprofessional rests in
part on the professional financer's superior capacity to bear and spread
account collection losses. 25 The professional's superiority in these re-
spects, however, does not hinge at all on whether that professional's
filing predated or postdated the assignment to a competing nonprofes-
sional assignee.
Does it follow that the nonprofessional recipient of a limited ac-
count transfer should receive not only automatic perfection, but also
automatic priority? On balance, probably not. Most important, a rule of
automatic priority would clash with the Code's basic goal of removing
the need for post-filing policing by a secured party who complies with
Article Nine formalities. 26 A rule of automatic perfection forces a pro-
fessional financer to bear the risk that an account transferred to it al-
ready has been transferred to a nonprofessional prior to professional's
filing. The professional financer, however, can fairly guard against this
be asked to bear special burdens. So it is with professional account assignees who might complain
of an automatic perfection rule for nonprofessionals.
624. See note 31 and accompanying text.
625. See notes 558-62 and accompanying text.
626. See, for example, H. and Val J. Rothschild, Inc., 242 N.W.2d at 848 (stating that "Arti-
cle 9 establishes a system of notice filing whereby a creditor by proper filing of a financing state-
ment can rely upon his prior secured position as contained in a written security agreement");
Rauer, 39 Stan. L. Rev. at 245 (cited in note 441) (stating that "first-in-time principle. . . helps to
lix the level of risk" and "relieves the creditor who is first in time of the burden of monitoring the
debtor after extending credit"); In re Howell Enters., Inc., 105 Bankr. 495, 499 (Bankr. E.D. Ark.
1989) (subordinating constructive trust to floating lien, and stating that "[t]here are overriding
policy reasons for insulating a secured creditor's lien rights in after-acquired property from attack
by unrecorded claims similar to the claims asserted here"); U.C.C. § 9-312 cmt. 5 (emphasizing
importance of removing need for later checking by first-filing secured party); Robert E. Scott, A
Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 901, 953-56 (1986).
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risk before giving value, even outside the U.C.C. filing system, by check-
ing with account debtors, by securing an affidavit from the assignor,
and by examining, through credit agencies and others, the assignor's
character and veracity. In pre-Code days, this same risk of earlier unre-
corded assignments was routinely put on professional
financers-particularly those located in New York-by way of the strict
first-in-time rule.627 Thus, a rule of automatic perfection for nonprofes-
sionals puts an added, but limited, burden on professional account
assignees.
A rule of automatic priority has far different and far graver effects.
First, such a rule greatly increases the first-filing professional assignee's
risk of subordination. Under an automatic-priority rule, the profes-
sional assignee runs that risk against not only a pre-filing transferee,
but also any nonprofessional assignee who takes an assignment at any
time at all. This risk may mean that, as a practical matter, the profes-
sional financer that holds accounts as security will see herself as having
no security at all. Such a perception could seriously deter much socially
useful accounts financing, particularly by way of the future-oriented
floating lien.
A rule of automatic priority also would greatly increase the debtor-
monitoring costs of the professional financer. In effect, the professional
assignee battling an automatic perfection rule must assure himself only
at the time of the professional's own filing that no prior transfers have
occurred. A professional facing a rule of automatic priority, however,
must monitor the assignor's affairs continuously following his filing to
ensure that his security remains sound. Insisting on ceaseless monitor-
ing seems inefficient. More important, the burden simply might dis-
courage valuable account transactions too much.
A rule of automatic priority carries with it the added risk that
shady assignors will re-use accounts already subject to an honestly ob-
tained and recorded security interest. This danger could be reduced by
adoption of a rule that strips away priority whenever the nonprofes-
sional takes an assignment with knowledge of the earlier-filed transac-
tion. Knowledge, however, often is hard to prove, and a rule focusing on
the transferee's knowledge in large numbers of cases would diminish
the salutary certainty provided by the first-to-perfect-or-file principle.
Finally, the post-filing nonprofessional transferee-as opposed to the
pre-filing transferee-at least could have discovered the earlier filing in
the Article Nine files. Particulary for this reason, there exists a basis in
fairness for preferring an automatic-perfection to an automatic-priority
rule.
627. See notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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In light of all these considerations, the Code's revisors should, as a
general matter, afford to nonprofessionals only automatic perfection
and not automatic priority. The policies supporting special treatment of
nonprofessionals, however, may justify supplementing the rule of auto-
matic perfection in one limited way: by adopting a rule of automatic
priority for the nonprofessional assignee of a genuinely limited account
assignment over a professional assignee who received an assignment
that included a substantially greater dollar volume of additional col-
lected or collectible accounts. To render this added protection less ma-
nipulable and more readily administered, the Code's drafters also
should specify that the nonprofessional can claim it only if the value of
the accounts transferred to the nonprofessional is less than a stipulated
amount-for example, $5000.
To afford this added protection to the genuinely limited assign-
ment is defensible in light of the policies set forth above. First, the pro-
posed rule would protect only the smallest of the small-time
nonprofessional account transferees. In addition, it would subordinate
only those professional assignees particularly well-positioned to absorb
and spread the account collection loss, because of the necessarily small
size of the lost account and the professional transferee's continuing
ability to realize other substantially greater accounts transferred by the
same assignor. Finally, such a rule is not likely to unduly discourage or
complicate professional factoring or accounts receivable financing.
Rather, the continuing assurance that the large-scale professional as-
signee will, in all cases, remain able to collect the large majority of the
customer's transferred accounts-and be exposed, at most, to a risk of
some $5000-should suffice to protect the professional assignee's inter-
ests without forcing major changes in its business practices. Because the
professional is a professional, it should be able to spread this limited,
added risk through a modest adjustment of account prices or loan rates.
Undoubtedly, a rule of automatic perfection, supplemented by this
narrow rule of automatic priority, will draw criticism from professionals
and nonprofessionals alike. All priority systems, however, require some
sort of compromise. 28 The compromise proposed here gives much to
the professional financer; indeed, in many cases the professional fi-
nancer should fare better under this set of rules than under existing
Code-based law.629 This compromise also gives broad benefits to non-
professionals. Most important, it protects all nonprofessional transfer-
628. Baird and Jackson, 35 Stan. L. Rev. at 177 (cited in note 170) (noting that, with respect
to rules allocating loss between innocent first and second filers, "some sort of compromise is
inevitable").
629. See, for example, note 154.
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ees in those cases in which they seem to need protection most:
bankruptcy cases. This is so because automatic perfection standing
alone suffices to protect the claim of the qualifying nonprofessional
against the bankruptcy trustee.630
There is much room for debate about the best perfection and prior-
ity rules for account transactions. All in all, however, much can be said
for a rule that affords automatic perfection to nonprofessional assign-
ees, coupled with a narrow rule of automatic priority reserved for the
most appealing nonprofessional-assignee cases. Reflecting the policies
operating in this field, this approach seems to steer a sensible middle
course between the competing interests of professional and nonprofes-
sional account assignees.
E. Step Five: Clearing Away the Underbrush of the Code's
Account Priority Rules
At the very least, the revisors of Article Nine should clear away the
excrescences of account-priority law built into the Code by Sections 9-
312(4) and 9-301(1)(d). With respect to Section 9-312(4), the committee
should clarify that secured parties can take PMSIs in payment rights
when funds are provided for the purchase of those rights in the ordi-
nary purchase-money sense.6 3 1 With respect to Section 9-301(1)(d), the
committee should consider and decide expressly whether that section
protects outright-buyer account transferees, Section 9-104(f) account
transferees, or no account transferees at all.
632
If the revisors follow the other recommendations set forth here, the
proper way to deal with the Section 9-301(1)(d) problem is to remove
any reference to accounts (or, to use the proposed nomenclature, "pay-
ment rights") in that section. As explained above, the best reading of
Section 9-301(1)(d) is that it protects those account transferees, and
only those account transferees, described in Section 9-104(f). 33 Under
the first two proposals set forth above, however, Section 9-104(f) would
630. See note 70.
631. An interesting and difficult question is whether the qualifying nonprofessional assignee
should get the protections of the four-horsemen rule, see notes 41-43 and accompanying text, in
addition to automatic perfection. Should a nonprofessional's security interest that would otherwise
be subordinate to the security interest of an earlier filed floating lien nonetheless take priority if,
for example, the nonprofessional collects the account in good faith? The answer to this question, in
many cases, will be determined by the principles discussed in notes 488-501 and accompanying
text.
632. See generally Comment, 41 Wash. L. Rev. at 905 (cited in note 336) (commenting that
"Sections 9-301(1)(c) and (1)(d) of the Uniform Commercial Code are awkwardly, if not incom-
prehensively, drafted; they and companion section 9-104(f) appear to be in need of clarification, if
not extensive revision").
633. See notes 364-99 and accompanying text.
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not continue to exist. As suggested in the third proposal, there would
continue to be value in protecting many of the nonprofessional account
transferees now covered by Section 9-104(f). Those transferees, how-
ever, should receive ample protection, apart from Section 9-301(1)(d),
under the fourth proposal's newfangled rules of automatic perfection
and limited automatic priority.
Any effort to implement these five proposals may require some
clean-up work in addition to polishing away the rough edges of Sections
9-312(4) and 9-301(1)(d) . 3 4 That task, however, should not prove too
difficult. A key advantage of the proposals made here is that they are,
in their totality, straightforward and uncluttered. All payment rights
are covered by the Code. 35 These rights are divided into only two
groups. Assignments to nonprofessionals get the benefit of automatic
perfection, as well as the narrow and well-defined automatic priority
described above. All other assignments of payment rights are subject to
the Code's ordinary prescriptions regarding perfection and priorities,
including the first-to-file rule of Section 9-312(5). No obscure provisions
exist and no extensive common-law rules overlay the Code.
The proposed statutory framework will generate tough questions,
particularly regarding whether a given non-financial-institution assignee
that takes a given assignment qualifies as a nonprofessional.6 6 At the
same time, the proposed framework will prove less cumbersome and
more intelligible than the existing crazy quilt of Code and non-Code
rules that govern account priority conflicts. The Code seeks to clarify
and simplify commercial law for the working businessperson and prac-
ticing lawyer.6 37 Judged by these critical criteria, the scheme proposed
herein reflects a vast improvement over existing law, while advancing
the felt need to protect deserving nonprofessional account transferees.
VII. CONCLUSION
For more than one hundred years, the law of account priorities has
bred confusion and uncertainty. It is time for a change. Building on the
professional-nonprofessional distinction .recognized in the case law, the
revisors of Article Nine should move to simplify and clarify the rules
that govern these disputes. In the meantime, this Article seeks to offer
634. For example, the Code's revisors would have to be mindful of possible priority conflicts
between two nonprofessional assignees. Under the proposal made here-which simply affords non-
professionals automatic perfection-such conflicts would be resolved in effect by the first-in-time
New York rule.
635. This is true only if the term "payment rights" is defined not to include wages. See note
590 and accompanying text.
636. See notes 603-05 and accompanying text.
637. See note 578 and accompanying text.
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aid to lawyers and judges forced to claw their way through the clutter of
modern-day account-priority law.
